Report of the Advisory Group on Defense Issues, "The Modality of Security and Defense Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century" (Higuchi Report)

"The World and Japan" Database (Project Leader: TANAKA Akihiko)

Database of Japanese Politics and International Relations

National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS); Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia (IASA), The University of Tokyo

[Title]　Report of the Advisory Group on Defense Issues, "The Modality of Security and Defense Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century" (Higuchi Report)

[Place]　

[Date]　August 12, 1994

[Source]　Advisory Group on Defense Issues

[Notes]　

[Full text]

CONTENTS

Foreword...1

Chapter 1 The World and Asia/the Pacific After the Cold War

1. The End of the Cold War and Qualitative Changes in the Security Environment...2

2. Multilateral Cooperation Centering on the United States...2

3. Roles of the United Nations and Other Regimes for Cooperative Security...3

4. Four Type of Likely Danger...4

5. Characteristics of the Security Environment in the Asia/Pacific Region...4

Chapter 2 Basic Thinking on Japan's Security Policy and Defense Capability

1. Active and Constructive Security Policy...6

2. Multilateral Security Cooperation...7

3. Enhancing the Functions of the Japan-U.S. Security Cooperation Relationship...10

4. Maintenance and Operaton{sic} of Highly Reliable and Efficient Defense Capability...10

Chapter 3 The Modality of Defense Capability in the New Age From the Cold War Defense Strategy to the Multilateral Strategy...11

Section 1 The Role of Defense Capability for Multilateral Security Cooperation...12

1. The Strengthening of U.N. Peacekeeping Operations and the Role of the SDF...12

(1) Missions of the SDF and Peacekeeping Operations...13

(2) Organizational Improvement of the SDF...13

(3) Points to be Revised in the International Peace Cooperation Law...14

2. Other Forms of International Cooperation for Security...15

(1) International Cooperation for Arms Control...15

(2) Promotion of Security Dialogue...15

Section 2 The Enhancement of the Japan-U.S. Security Cooperation Relationship...16

(1) Enhancement of Policy Consultations and Information Exchange...17

(2) Promotion of Operational Cooperation Setup...17

(3) Improvement of Mutual Cooperation Setup in Logistic Support...17

(4) Promotion of Mutual Cooperation in Equipment...17

(5) Improvement of the Support Setup for U.S. Forces Stationed in Japan...17

Section 3 Maintenance and Qualitative Improvement of Self-Defense Capability...17

(1) Likely Military Dangers...18

(2) Factors to be Considered in Defense Buildup...19

(3) New Thinking on Defense Capability...20

(4) Specific Measures of Reform...20

Section 4 Other Items Pertaining to Defense...26

(1) Improvement of Research and Education on Security...26

(2) Defense Industry...26

(3) Technology Foundation...28

(4) Modality of Future Defense Program...28

(5) Establishment of Crisis Management System and Integration of Intelligence...28

Conclusion...29

Appendices

Member of the Advisory Group on Defense Issues...33

Chronology of the Advisory Group on Defense Issues...34

Summary...39

Foreword

Nearly half a century has passed since the Japanese people recovered from the physical and spiritual ruin caused by World War II and, bearing a deep sense of self-reproach in mind, started building a new Japan. At the same time, peoples of the world, having overcome the long ordeals of the Cold War, are seeking to create a new era half with hope, half with anxiety. Japan, too, faces an urgent need to reconsider its future course with a view to the 21st century. From this standpoint, the modality of the security and defense capability of Japan has reached the stage where a fundamental review must be done.

When postwar Japan made a new start, we were given a new framework of basic national policies, externally by the United Nations Charter and internally by the Constitution. However, the ideal of collective security upheld by the United Nations still in its infancy rapidly lost its basis for realization as it was exposed to the stern realities of international politics. Peoples of the world realized anew that self-defense capability was the best assurance of national security. Furthermore, with major nations of the world in a state of confrontation centering on the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, they realized that they had no alternative but to ensure national security on the basis of an alliance of nations that shared common interests and values. Thus the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was chosen as the realistic basis of postwar Japan's security policy.

Japan, which returned to the postwar international community in April 1952 with the coming into effect of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, made that choice after serious discussions. Since then, while cooperating with the United States which has assumed the largest share of the responsibility of maintaining international order, Japan has achieved an economic recovery, and contributed to transforming the Asia/Pacific region, which was half a century ago plagued by war and poverty, into a region of peace and prosperity. Looking back on this path which postwar Japan has followed, it can be said that the choice was, on the whole, not mistaken.

This forum, created five months ago as a non-statutory advisory group for the Prime Minister, has since continued discussions with a view to reviewing the National Defense Program Outline, which has served as the guideline for the modality of the nation's defense capability, and presenting ideas that would form the basis of an alternative guideline. The task of this advisory group is to define a direction of security policy appropriate to the new era and, on that basis, propose a new modality of defense capability while taking into account changes in the post-Cold War international situation and also various changes facing Japanese society itself.

Chapter 1 The World and Asia/the Pacific After the Cold War

1. The End of the Cold War and Qualitative Changes in the Security Environment

The pattern of East-West confrontation, which formed the basic framework of international politics for nearly half a century following the end of the World War II, collapsed with the Berlin Wall. As Western nations centering on the United States firmly maintained freedom and democracy and achieved steady economic development in the process, the Soviet Union and other socialist nations found themselves left far behind in the economic and technological race. The reforms undertaken by the Soviet Union to reverse the setback and rebuild itself as a great power produced unintended results in the form of the collapse of the socialist system in one East European nation after another and, finally, the disintegration of the Soviet Union itself. The demise of the Warsaw Pact Organization (WPO) was a stark testimony to the end of the Cold War.

Not all regions and peoples on earth experiencd{sic} the effects of U.S.-Soviet confrontation in the same manner during the Cold War. Furthermore, the end of the Cold War has produce various effects in various regions and countries. However, as far as the modality of the security question goes, there is no denying that the Cold War has impacted every corner of the globe. It is also difficult to deny that the security environment has changed significantly with the termination of U.S.-Soviet confrontation. While clearly visible threats have disappeared and moves toward arms control and disarmament have made some progress centering on the United States, Russia and Europe, we find ourselves in an opaque and uncertain situation. In other words, there exist dangers of various qualities which are dispersed and difficult to identify, and it is hard to predict in what forms such dangers would threaten our security. The sense of security has increased in the sense that we have been freed from the "balance of terror that might collapse at any moment. At the same time, however, it can be said that we confront a more difficult security environment in the sense that we must prepare for unpredictable dangers and maintain a stance of responding quickly to such dangers. We cannot remain insensitive to the new security problems that are presenting themselves with the ending of the Cold War.

2. Multilateral Cooperation Centering on the United States

The realistic basis of the security environment consists of two factors - modes of military power and international regimes for keeping peace. The U.S. supremacy in military power has become even more strengthened with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The network of U.S.-centered alliances built during the Cold War is likely to be maintained as a stabilizing factor in international relations. The most typical examples of these alliances are the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). There is little possibility that any major nation with both the intention and the capacity to challenge U.S. military power head-on will emerge in the near future.

However, the United States no longer holds an overwhelming advantage in terms of overall national strength. Particularly in the economic field, competition between the United States and other industrialized countries - and the newly industrializing economies as well - is showing a tendency to intensify. Consequently, there is a possibility that competitive relations will intensify over economic issues. But it seems unlikely that this will trigger an arms race in the classic sense of the term. All nations want to avoid such an eventuality. It is expected, therefore, that in spite of somewhat intensified conflicts of economic interest, the U.S.-centered cooperative relationships in the military and security field will continue.

The question is whether the United States, its preeminent military power notwithstanding, will be able to demonstrate leadership in multilateral cooperation. The answer to the question will depend to a certain extent on actions by nations in a position to cooperate with the United States. The mechanism of resolving security problems through international cooperation is still imperfect, but it is showing signs of developing little by little, both on the level of the United Nations and on the regional level.

3. Roles of the United Nations and Other Regimes for Cooperative Security

For the United Nations security mechanism to work it is essential that multilateral cooperation be maintained under U.S. leadership. During the period of serious U.S.-Soviet confrontation the United Nations was unable to function fully. In recent years, however, it has actively deployed peacekeeping operations, thus expanding the scope of activity both geographically and qualitatively. Whether the U.N. will be able to continue such operations in the future depends largely on how cooperation can be maintained not only among the five permanent members of the Security Council but also among all major nations, such as the Group of Seven, including Japan and Germany, both of which are making large financial contributions to the world body.

The possibility of an all-out military showdown between major powers has decreased. On the other hand, in various regions and countries around the world, particularly in areas where the social infrastructure is so fragile that the unity of a nation-state is nearly absent, conflicts among various forces have intensified across or inside borders and, in many cases, have developed into armed clashes. How to deal effectively with such relatively small-scale regional conflcits is now a major task for international peace.

Meanwhile, as the fruits of economic development begin to spread to benefit many nations and regions beyond the boundary of a handful of industrialized nations, adjustment of economic interests has become more complex than ever before. For the moment, however, there are no indications that such economic problems will develop into military clashes. But if mishandled, such problems could develop into new problems that would threaten regional and even global security. In the Asia/Pacific region, which includes many nations whose state building has just got under way and are in the process of achieving dynamic economic development, it is especially necessary to pay close attention to this kind of danger. Lest the fruits of economic development should increase political distrust because of conflicts of interest over such achievements, efforts to build a political relationship of trust on a regional scale must be emphasized from the viewpoint of security.

4. Four Types of Likely Danger

In the security environment that has these features, what types of danger are likely to occur in the future?

First, direct military confrontation between major nations, such as developed between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, is unlikely for the moment. Consequently, the possibility of a global military conflict is far smaller than before, if not nonexistent. For the time being, all major nations of the world will pay attention to domestic economic and social problems. Russia, which is experiencing a difficult transition from the socialist system, and China, which is grappling with the task of transforming itself into a market economy, are no exceptions. The question is whether the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, including Russia and China, will continue to have the will and ability to play a constructive role in the international community in ways commensurate with their responsibilities. If cooperation among major nations centering on the United States is lost, the global security environment could deteriorate rapidly.

Secondly, it is likely that localized military clashes will occur frequently and become more complex in nature. Such regional conflicts also occurred in many places during the Cold War. In this sense, there is nothing new about that likelihood. However, there is also something new about it in the sense that the danger of such conflicts being directly linked to tensions between the two blocs has receded. The reduced relation of regional conficits to big-power interests would make it easier for the international community to deal with such conflicts. On the other hand, there is the danger that the situation will worsen in the absence of effective solutions, now that the coordinative capacity of big powers is less likely to work than it was during the Cold War era.

Thirdly, there is the increasing danger that weapons and arms-related technologies will proliferate. This would be both the cause and the result of localized military clashes. In particular, if the proliferation of nuclear and chemical/biological weapons and missile technologies - not to mention conventional weapons - is left unchecked, the security of the entire international community will be threatened. Particularly grave is the danger that nuclear technologies and materials will flow out of the former Soviet Union and come into possession of those who do not abide by international rules.

Fourthly, regional military clashes of the kind described above would be induced by economic poverty and social discontent and by the related loss of the ability to govern. For example, regions containing many of the poorest nations and regions rich in resources but very low in regional stability require special attention. In this respect, it seems that the solution of security problems will increasingly require not only responses by military means but also comprehensive responses by multidimensional means including economic and technical assistance.

5. Characteristics of the Secruity{sic} Environment in the Asia/Pacific Region

For the moment, any large-scale danger that would threaten the security of the international community is distant. But, with nations of the world becoming increasingly interdependent because of the economic and technological conditions of the modern society, even localized conflicts are likely to affect the entire international community. In particular, the Japanese economy is built on close relations with various parts of the world, including heavy dependence on Middle East oil. Therefore, the nation's security concerns are worldwide.

Nevertheless it is also true that Japan cannot help having special concerns for the security of the Asia/Pacific region. What we have described with respect to the qualitative changes in global security problems in the post-Cold War world applies to this region as well. At the same time, this region, which is undergoing dynamic changes as already stated, has a number of characteristics that demand special attention from the security standpoint.

First, unlike in the European nations that have over the years built advanced defenses to meet the strong military threat of the Soviet Union, in the Asia/Pacific region the collapse of the Soviet Union has not meant such a dramatic change in the security environment. There is no evidence that the level of military tension in this part of the world has rapidly declined. On the contrary, nations of this region are generally more concerned about security problems than they have been and are devoting a considerable portion of their resources to the improvement of military power.

For most of the peoples in Asia, the half century following the end of World War II was the creative period in which they built their nations and began to assert themselves as sovereign states in the international community. Their endeavors of nation building and national unification were a major characteristic of the history of Asia in the Cold War period. The fact that peoples of this region had an abundance of energy for social construction was one of the reasons why Asia became a convenient stage for the fierce leadership struggle on which the East and West staked their respective systems.

Now that the Cold War is over and the influence of the two superpowers has relatively diminished, it is no wonder that Asian nations full of youthful vitality are beginning to pursue their own security policies. In the background of their efforts to deal more seriously with security problems is the fact that power relationships in Asia are becoming fluid as a result of the end of the Cold War. Thus many nations of Asia, including China, now have political motives and economic foundations for improving their military power. This is the first characteristic of the security environment in this region.

Secondly, the security system in the Asia/Pacific region is still in the immature formative stages. The tensions across the Demilitarized Zone in the Korean Peninsula are continuing amid the latent danger of nuclear profliferation{sic}. It will be no easy task to resolve the division of the peninsula between the northern and southern parts and achieve a sustainable political reconciliation. At this moment it is difficult to make predictions concerning the timing and mode of national unification, the character of a resultant unified state and the direction of its foreign policy.

China, blessed with a stable international environment almost unprecedented in recent history, is devoting its maximum energy to modernization. However, there are various problems that remain unresolved, such as those that exist across Taiwan Strait, the status of Hong Kong, and the widening economic disparity between the inland and coastal regions. In Indochina, the war in Cambodia has finally ended, and Vietnam and other nations are about to enter a period of economic construction. In Cambodia, however, the danger of a recurrent military clash cannot be said to have completely disappeared. Nor is it possible to make light of the danger that conflicts among the interested nations over the territorial claims to islands scattered off the coast of the Chinese mainland will develop into a military clash. All this shows that a fully stabilized political and military situation does not yet exist in this region.

Thirdly, importance must be attached to the geopolitical fact that the interests of some of the world's major military powers, namely, the United States, Russia and China, are concentrated in the Asia/Pacific region, particularly in the Northwest Pacific. Russia and China are continental states that traditionally have their foundations in the Eurasian continent. With their economic activities expanding, however, both nations are beginning to acquire the character of an oceanic state with an eye to the Pacific. Moreover, all three nations are nuclear-armed. In particular, Russia, as the nuclear-weapons state that faces the United States across the Arctic Zone, has strong concerns in the Northwest Pacific as well. The United States, meanwhile, will continue to have interest in this region, not only from the security viewpoint but also in light of its growing trade interests. Japan, situated as it is in Northeast Asia and the Northwest Pacific where the interests of these world military powers interact, cannot help but be sensitive to security problems in this region.

Considering all these characteristics - the dynamism and energy of Asian nations, the immaturity of the security cooperation system, the interacting interests of major military powers, there are both positive and negative possibilities in the security environment of the Asia/Pacific region. The period in which Asia was merely the stage for the pursuit of interests by major powers is already over. It is unlikely that Asian nations which attained sovereignty in the second half of the 20th century will repeat a history of endless wars in the rest of this century and beyond, as European nations did in those centuries in which they devoted themselves to nation building through rivalry in a narrow continent. Asia today is markedly different from Europe of those centuries not only geopolitically but also in terms of the historical circumstance. At any rate, there is little doubt that future developments in Asia will be an important determining factor in the future of global security, not only because the Asia/Pacific region abounds in opportunity but also because major nations are deeply involved in this part of the world. Nations concerned, including Japan, have great responsibilities.

Chapter 2 Basic Thinking on Japan's Security Policy and Defense Capability

1. Active and Constructive Security Policy

As stated in the preceding chapter, during the Cold War period international security problems were discussed with the focus on the development of bipolar tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. In today's security problems that focus no longer exist. The cause of our sense of insecurity is the very opaqueness of the present international order in which the dangers that exist are dispersed and difficult to predict. On the other hand, however, there are emerging signs that a collective capacity to deal with conflicts will be developed through the cooperation of the United States and other major nations under the United Nations and other international regimes. These signs indicate a new direction. Various dangers exist in the present security environment, but the international community will be able, through cooperation, to prevent the development of conflicts, to contain the expansion of conflicts that have developed, and to take the initiative to remove the causes of conflict development. Thus there exist opportunities to create a more secure world, provided nations of the world take active and constructive moves to create a sustainable "structure of peace" in the spirit of cooperation. Under the present circumstances, however, nations must possess their own defense capabilities. Also we must not forget that our security is ensured by maintaining ties with our allies because we cannot defend ourselves alone.

Japan should extricate itself from its security policy of the past that was, if anything, passive, and henceforth play an active role in shaping a new order. Indeed Japan has the responsibility of playing such a role. To prevent the use of force as means of settling international disputes is the intent of the United Nations Charter. That the international community will develop along these lines is extremely desirable for Japan in light of its national interests, since the nation is engaged in economic activities around the globe and yet resolved not to tread the path to a major military power. Consequently, pursuing an active and constructive security policy and making efforts in this direction is not only Japan's contribution to the international community but also its responsibility to the Japanese people now and in the future.

In order to fulfill such responsibility Japan must make efforts to that end by making full use of all policy means, such as diplomacy, economy and defense. That is to say, it is necessary to build a coherent and comprehensive security policy. This consists of the following: First, promotion of multilateral security cooperation on a global and regional scale; secondly, enhancement of the functions of the Japan-U.S. security relationship; and thirdly, possession of a highly reliable and efficient defence capability based on a strengthened information capability and a prompt crisis-management capability.

2. Multilateral Security Cooperation

The United Nations, which was created 50 years ago as the organization for collective security, is now awakening to its primary function.

The "threat or use of force" which is prohibited under Paragraph 4, Article 2 of the U.N. Charter refers to actions that individual states take independently as means of settling international disputes. In this respect, the 1928 treaty of Paris (the general treaty for renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy), from which the U.N. Charter originates, provides essentially the same. In other words, as stated in the preamble to the U.N. Charter, the primary intent is that no state shall use force "save in the common interest" of the international community.

In fact, the U.N. Chater{sic}, in Paragraph 3, Article 2, call on all members to settle "their international disputes by peaceful means" and, in Paragraph 4, states, "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Thus all U.N. members have pledged to the entire international community that they shall refrain from "the threat or use of force." The provision of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitutions agrees in its spirit to that pledge.

However, if any major nation that supposedly bears special responsibilities for supporting U.N. peace activities should become a party to a conflict, this function of the United Nations unavoidably would be lost for all practical purposes. As this indicates, for the collective security mechanism of the United Nations to demonstrate its primary function, stability in the international environment is necessary. At the present time, when no serious military confrontation exists between major nations now that the Cold War has ended, this condition is satisfied the minimum. How much peoples of the world, by availing themselves of this favorable opportunity, can achieve in term of cooperative security and whether they can acquire such a habit will determine the fate of the United Nations in the 21st century. Japan, which is deeply committed to peace, must make positive use of this historic opportunity, not for altruistic purposes but primarily from the standpoint of its national interest.

It seems, however, that it will be a long time before the U.N. collective security organization is established in a complete form. At the present stage, the United Nations is required not so much to deal with military clashes by regular U.N. forces stipulated in Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter as to respond to various modes of crisis by such means as preventing armed conflicts that may develop inside unstable nations where it is unclear who holds the ability to govern, or containing their expansion, and supporting the reconstruction of order following the cessation of conflicts. The U.N. peacekeeping operations are becoming more and more multifarious. Japan should actively participate in those operations and need to make efforts to improve its system and capabilities for that purpose.

Incidentally we would like to emphasize that the civilian sector of peacekeeping operations and the construction of peace following the settlement of conflicts are important fields of international cooperation for security. In these fields Japan should be able to make particularly significiant contributions. At the government level, official development assistance (ODA) policy, for example, should be positively utilized. In addition, considering that voluntary participation at the private level is particularly significant in this repsect{sic}, the entire society should make serious efforts to enable nongovernmental organizations (NGO) to step up their activities.

On the other hand, there still exists the danger that conflicts of interest between nations will lead to armed conflcits. Nations are allowed to posses self-defense capability as a measure of last resort, provided it is limited within the bounds of the exercise of the right of self-defense. However, if those nations rush to build arms while harboring an extreme sense of mutual distrust, the danger of military conflicts will increase. Consequently, it is first necessary to reduce the level of mutual distrust and to increase the sense of security and approximate a condition of mutual trust. To this end efforts should be exerted to make the arms control system effective on a global and regional scale. The registration system for the transfer of conventional weapons, established at the United Nations at the proposal of Japan and other countries, is already in practice. In addition, since preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related technologies, such as nuclear and biological/chemical weapons and missile technologies, is a grave concern of mankind, Japan should make further efforts toward the strengthening of the international management and supervision regimes for such weapons and technologies.

The cooperative security policy must be pursued not only at the United Nations but also at the regional level. Already at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) security dialogue among the participating nations is under way. Japan, which has involved itself positively in the establishment of this forum from the beginning, should continue to make further efforts for its development. We believe this forum should take up such questions as creating a regional system for increasing transparency in the mutual disclosure of information pertaining to the transfer and acquisition of weapons, the deployment of military forces and military exercises, etc. as well as building a framework of cooperation concerning the prevention of marine accidents, maritime traffic safety and peacekeeping operations. As a private-level body to complement regional dialogue at the government level the Conference on Security Cooperation in Asia and the Pacific (CSCAP) was established recently. If, through such forums, dialogue is promoted with nations from which it is difficult to obtain information on military policies, such as China, Russia, Indochinese states and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, then transparency in the security environment in Asia and the Pacific will increase, and as a result the sense of security among nations of the region will also increase.

There are some emerging signs of multilateral security diaologue{sic} in Northeast Asia and the Northwest Pacific, such as an attempt to create a five-nation forum at the semi-private level among Japan, the United States, China, the Republic of Korea and Russia. But participation of the DPRK has not yet materialized. At the government level, efforts to increase transparency on a mutual basis should, for the time being, be made by promoting bilateral military exchanges, such as those with the ROK, China and Russia.

It will be a long time before nations of the Asia/Pacific region cooperate and thereby establish a standing regional system for engaging in U.N. peacekeeping operations. But a number of nations in the region have accumulated experience in this field through participation in the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Japan can learn much about regional cooperation by promoting exchanges with nations that have rich experience in U.N. peacekeeping operations, such as Australia and Canada. In addition, Japan should make efforts to broaden the basis of cooperation for regional security by acquiring as much experience as possible through exhanges of visits by military personnel, research exchanges, exchange student programs and joint training with the United States and other nations.

3. Enhancing the Functions of the Japan-U.S. Security Cooperation Relationship

In order to further ensure the security of Japan and make multilateral security cooperation effective, close and broad cooperation and joint work between Japan and the United States are essential. The institutional framework for this is provided by the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Henceforth the two nations should make efforts to make greater use of this framework and strengthen their cooperative relations so that they can act more positively in response to new security needs.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was created in Europe against the background of East-West confrontation in the Cold War era. In Asia, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was concluded against the same backdrop, particularly the outbreak of the Korean War. Considering that international cooperation centering on the United States provides a realistic basis of the post-Cold War security system as well, it stands to reason that these treaties should be maintained as a valuable asset for the formation of a new security system.

In relation to the security environment in the Asia/Pacific region, cooperation between Japan and the United States is an essential factor. In view of the continuing need to ensure that the U.S. commitment to this region is maintained as desired by many Asian nations, it is highly significant that Japan and the United States should renew their determination to maintain their security relation. The U.S. posture in Asia might undergo some changes depending on its fiscal considerations and assessments of the military situation. In addition, as shown by the withdrawal of the U.S. bases from the Philippines and the conclusion of an agreement with Singapore on the use of military facilities, some changes have already occurred in the mode of U.S. presence. Nevertheless, it is of great significance to the security of this region as a whole that the United States should continue its existing frameworks of security cooperation with nations of this region, such as Japan, the ROK, Australia, Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand. Consequently, it is desirable that the nations concerned should cooperate in this direction.

From this international and regional viewpoints, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty will assume a greater significance than ever before. In addition, it is necessary to reaffirm the significance of this treaty in the sense that it forms an essential framework for the active and constructive security policy Japan should pursue. Consequently, in order to further ensure the continuation of this treaty and further facilitate its smooth operation, various policy considerations and institutional improvements must be made.

4. Maintenance and Operation of Highly Relaiable{sic} and Efficient Defence Capability

The ultimate foundation of security lies in the determination of a people to defend themselves and in holding the appropriate means of doing so. This truth remains unchanged. Self-defense capability is a concrete expression of a nation's ability of self-management and of crisis management. In light of the fact that one armed conflict after another is developing in regions that contain many nations without such capability, it is self-evident that international security begins with the building of states that have a stable capability of crisis management.

Japan itself must have a reliable defense posture in order to enhance the reliability of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and to participate actively and constructively in multilateral security cooperation. For that purpose it is necessary for the SDF to improve its intelligence capability and crisis prediction capability, maintain a preparedness to deal assuringly{sic} with crises and develop a policy-making mechanism that would make it possible to act in this manner.

It is also true that such self-defense capability must be one that is harmonious with the international security environment. It is not an easy task to determine the quality and quantity of defense capability that is appropriate in this sense. However, on the basis of the security environment surrounding this country and the duties of the SDF therein and taking into account such factors as relations with allies, geographic features of the land, the level of military technology, the size and composition of the population and economic and fiscal conditions, it will be possible to determine the quality and quantity of the defense capability to be maintained by this country in peacetime. Heretofore such defense capability has been expressed by the concept of basic and standard defense capability. The concept itself remains valid even in the present age of coooperative{sic} security.

Henceforth , while making use of the concept of basic defense and standard capability but at the same time responding to the needs of the new security environment and taking into account the appropriate allocation of financial and human resources, it will be important to achieve further organizational rationalization by identifing{sic} the functions that should be strengthened or improved and those that should be reduced or consolidated. The desirable defense capability will be described in specific terms in Chapter 3. Suffice here to mention the importance of (1) intelligence functions to improve the danger prediction capability, (2) the capability of responding promptly in the early stages of manifest danger, and (3) the flexibility to prepare for the possible expansion of danger.

Chapter 3 The Modality of Defense Capability in the New Age

From the Cold War Defense Strategy to the Multilateral Security Strategy

The defense capability of Japan in the Cold War period was built up and maintained for the primary purpose of preparing for attacks on Japanese territory by hostile forces and, at the same time, with a view to securing the safety of maritime traffic of vital importance to the maintenance of national livelihood, on the premise that U.S. forces would be stationed in Japan and come to its aid under the bilateral security treaty. Japan's mission was to defend the country based strictly on the right of self-defense. In light of its geographical position, however, Japan naturally played an important role in the anti-Soviet strategy of the Western bloc.

Even in the Cold War era regional armed conflcits{sic} that occurred against a backdrop of U.S.-Soviet confrontation short of a direct military showdown were a principal type of international conficits{sic}. During such conflicts, including the Vietnam War, to say nothing of the Korean War that broke out when Japan was under Allied occupation, the nation played a role as a logistical support base for U.S. forces. With the end of the Cold War, the security environment surrounding Japan changed markedly. However, the primary role of defending the country remains unchanged regardless of the changes of the times. In addition, Japan-U.S. cooperation remains unchanged as a major pillar of Japan's security policy. The question for the future is how such defense capability and security policy should be positioned from the viewpoint of cooperative security.

Section 1 The Role of Defense Capability for Multilateral Security Cooperation

As described in the foregoing, the primary task for international security in the new age is to respond appropriately to diverse dangers in various parts of the world and, by so doing, to prevent the deterioration of the security environment and make positive efforts to improve it. To this end, it is important that, acting on their relationships of alliance, nations make active efforts from the constructive viewpoint to promote global and regional security through cooperation at the United Nations and other organizations. Japan, whose involvement with the international community has vastly increased, is in a position to bear proportionately larger responsibilities in this respect. Japan's defense capability has a role to play in such multilateral cooperation for international security.

1. The Strengthening of U.N. Peacekeeping Operations and the Role of the SDF

Japan enacted the International Peace Cooperation Law in 1992, thus making its stand clear in favor of full-scale involvement in U.N. peacekeeping operations, including participation of the SDF. As noted in light of the issues raised in his "An Agenta{sic} for Peace" by U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and a number of its cases now under way, the fact is that the content and concept of U.N. peacekeeping operations are being forced to adapt to the new environment and undergo repeated experiences. There is no doubt that the United Nations is finally beginning to move in the direction of a United Nations as it should be.

Seen in this light, it should be emphasized anew that one of the major pillars of Japan's security policy is to contribute positively to strengthening the U.N. functions for international peace, including further improvement of peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, such contribution is important in the sense that Japan's firm committing to such an international trend regarding security problems will strengthen its role befitting its international position. The closer the world moves to the realization of the ideal held up in the U.N. Charter of a world without wars, the better place it will become for nations such as Japan, which aspires for a true peace in the original sense of the word, therefore it is extremely important to Japan's national interest to make utmost efforts toward this goal. The SDF, whose most important mission is to ensure the security of Japan, cannot be exempt from this duty. From this viewpoint, a number of improvements are needed in such areas as statutes governing the operation of the SDF, SDF organization, equipment and training.

(1) Missions of the SDF and Peacekeeping Operations

First, it is important to consider it a major duty of the SDF, along with the primary duty of national defense, to participate as positively as possible in various forms of multilateral cooperation that are conducted within the framework of the United Nations for the purposes of international security, including peacekeeping operations.

In this sense, it is necessary to take such measures as improvement of the law system, including revision of the SDF Law to add participation in peacekeeping operations to the primary duties of the SDF, and organizational improvement of the SDF with a view to international cooperation. In addition, use of SDF facilities for such purposes as training centers and advance depots for materials and equipment for peacekeeping operations, and supply by Japan of equipment necessary for peacekeeping operations conducted by other nations also merit positive consideration. Such measures mean providing international public goods for peace.

Peacekeeping operations, which are currently attracting the particular attention as a role of the United Nations, require in some cases that weapons be used to a certain extent. In view of the purposes of the United Nations already described, however, it is natural that such use of arms should be permitted. From this viewpoint, we believe the government should make efforts to obtain public understanding at home and abroad with regard to the mode of SDF participation. As for the mode and limits of SDF in peacekeeping operations, it should be decided in a camprehensive{sic} manner taking into consideration a number of aspects including whatever means available for Japan to make meaningful contribution.

There is a view in some quarters that organizations other than the SDF should be dispatched to engage in peacekeeping operations. If this view is intended to evade consitutional{sic} questions, it is meaningless. Organizations that participate in the military sector of peacekeeping operations, regardless of their names, are internationally regarded as military organizations. Under status-of-forces agreements, for example, they are treated as "foreign military units." In addition, when the United Nations requests nations to contribute personnel, branches of service, ranks, and so forth as mentioned. Thus even non-SDF organizations would be treated as military organizations. Furthermore, if an organization such as a peacekeeping unit for the exclusive purpose of international cooperation were to be created separately from the SDF, such a move might cause suspicion abroad that it might, to all intents and purposes, lead to substantial arms buildup. On the other hand, giving the SDF opportunities to participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations and other international activities will greatly help, internally, to broaden the international perspective of the SDF and defense authorities and enhance the public understanding of the SDF and, externally, to increase transparency in the real image of the SDF and eventually build confidence in Japan.

(2) Organizational Improvement of the SDF

In line with the purposes stated above, it is necessary to make a series of improvements in the organization of the SDF. Heretofore the SDF has maintained a system of organizations, formations and equipment on the assumption that it deal with "limited and small-scale aggression." It also has conducted education and training on that assumption. The recent participation of the SDF in several cases of peacekeeping operations was limited in scope, so that the SDF could afford to respond within the framework of its existing organizations, equipment and training. Fortunately, as shown by the example of Cambodia, education and training and its past experience in disaster relief proved highly useful, thus enabling the SDF to receive a high international rating for its performance.

However, requests for participation of the SDF in this type of activities are likely to increase hereafter, making it necessary to make more systematic efforts to prepare for such requests. This is because, first, peacekeeping operations involve, more than anything else, activities that are exceedingly different from domestic environment, culturally, geographically and politically. Secondly, such operations represent international joint actions with similar organizations from other countries. Thirdly, these activities are different in nature from conventional military actions. Consequently, if makeshift responses are made as situation demands, it may become impossible to fulfill the duties and responsibilities that are called for. Moreover, since it is expected that peacekeeping operations will require quick responses, it is even more necessary to make preparations on a routine basis.

Specifically, we believe the following improvements should be made mainly in the areas of organization/system and equipment. First, in the area of organizaion/system, it is necessary to create a special organization in charge of collecting and classifing{sic} a wide range of information pertaining to international peacekeeping operations and other types of international cooperation, to conducting the specialized education and training of personnel, and to having function to formulate and coordinate programs of implementation. In this connection, it is desirable to dispatch SDF officers to the Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations so that they can accumulate experience in various fields. As for implementing units, it is not practical for the time being to create a special unit to engage exclusively in peacekeeping operations. Such a step should be avoided. It is better, instead, to deploy existing units and personnel to carry out duties as required. In the area of equipment, it is necessary to acquire equipment required in conjunction with participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations (for example, equipment necessary for outdoor life and ensuring the safety of personnel in overseas areas). As for the questions of when it is appropriate for the SDF to participate in peacekeeping operations and what type of unit should preferably be dispatched, we advise that the government establish certain criteria while learning from past experience.

(3) Points to be Revised in the International Peace Cooperation Law

Regarding the mode of SDF participation in peacekeeping operations, it is desirable that discussions should be continued with a view to removing as soon as possible the provision in the International Peace Cooperation Law calling for freeze on participation of the SDF in the field of peacekeeping activities mainly conducted by infantly{sic} units. In this connection, Japan should study the common understanding that is recognized by the United Nations with regard to the use of arms. Furthermore, as we believe that the functions of the United Nations concerning security, including peacekeeping operations, will be improved and strengthened through experience to better meet the new needs, Japan should continue its quest for the ideal mode of participation while learning from past experience.

2. Other Forms of International Cooperation for Security

(1) International Cooperation for Arms Control

As for arms control, various efforts are being made, regionally and globally, in conjunction with confidence- building measures. In this regard, Japan has been making no small contrtibutions{sic}. In order to ensure that the uncertain and opaque security environment in the post-Cold War period does not move in the dangerous direction, it is increasingly necessary to promote international cooperation in this area. In the case of the SDF, examples of cooperation so far include participation in various disarmament-related conferences at the United Nations and other organziations{sic} and the dispatch of personnel to monitor the disposal of chemical weapons in Iraq. Regarding questions for the near future, it is desirable, for example, to dispatch SDF personnel versed in chemical weapons to the secretariats of treaty organziations{sic} as monitoring personnel in order to ensure the effectiveness of the treaty banning chemical weapons, which is expected to take effect in 1995. The challenges for the future include the disposal of weapons accumulated in the past and of chemical weapons and mines left in the battlefield. In carrying out these duties, it must be kept in mind that large-scale efforts involving an SDF unit will be required.

Thus it is expected that SDF personnel will increasingly become involved in areas where personnel with military expertise and experience are needed. Participation in such international activities should reasonably be regarded as duties of SDF personnel, and we believe that participating personnel should be accorded appropriate status treatment.

(2) Promotion of Security Dialogue

As stated in Chapter 2, dialogue aimed at building confidence is starting to take place at various levels in the Asia/Pacific region. It is important that military and defense personnel from the nations concerned participate positively in these security dialogues.

In addition, reciprocal goodwill visits by training fleets and joint training with units of neighboring countries are some of the measures that can be recommended, in the sense that they will help increase mutual transparency. In the same vein and also with a view to developing defense personnel capable of international activity, exchanges between officials in charge of policy affairs and researchers and exchanges of defense academy students should be implemented more positively than before. For this purpose, we urge the government to take the necessary measures, including those related to funding and personnel.

Section 2 The Enhancement of the Japan-U.S. Security Cooperation Relationship

The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty remains an indispensable precondition for the defense of Japan even in the post-Cold War security environment. What is more, the range of fields in which Japan and the United States can cooperate for the security of Asia is expected to widen. In other words, the Japan-U.S. relationship of cooperation in the area of security must be considered not only from the bilateral viewpoint but, at the same time, also from the broader perspective of security in the entire Asia/Pacific region.

For example, the use of bases and related facilities by U.S. forces stationed in Japan and the support of such facilities through financial measures required for their maintenance and other means should be favorably evaluated in the sense described above. In addition, it is necessary to build a more flexible and positive relationship of cooperation in practical terms. Such cooperation between Japan and the United States will provide a foundation for further ensuring the security of this region and the whole world. The importance of the Japan-U.S. relationship of security cooperation should be recognized anew from the standpoint of such a positive "alliance for peace."

We cannot ignore, of course, the fact that the security of Japan itself depends heavily on Japan-U.S. cooperation in the military area. In particular, the United States' nuclear deterrence is indispensable to the security of Japan as long as some nations possessing nuclear weapons continue to exist on the earth. In the United States a non-governmental movement seeking abolishment nuclear weapons as a long-term goal, starting with nuclear disarmament by the five major nuclear nations including the United States, is under way. The U.S. government is making efforts for nuclear disarmament while calling on Russia and other nations to make similar effort. At the same time it has as its major policy goal for the present the prevention of the emergence of new nuclear weapons states. Both goals agree perfectly with the interests of Japan, which is determined to firmly maintain its nonnuclear policy. At the same time, until these two goals are actually achieved, it is of decisive importance that the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrence be firmly maintained. The long-term strategy for peace of creating a world free from nuclear weapons and the policy of maintaining and strengthening Japan-U.S. security cooperation are, in this respect, inseparably related.

In order to promote the Japan-U.S. relationship of security cooperation on a more routine basis, efforts should be made to establish a greater interoperability in a broad range of fields, including operations, intelligence/command communication, logistic support, and equipment procurement. Specifically, improvement should be promoted in the following respects:

(1) Enhancement of Policy Consultations and Information Exchange

Japan-U.S. policy consultations and information exchange for this purpose should be further promoted, and the relationship of mutual trust should be enhanced.

(2) Promotion of Operational Cooperation Setup

It is necessary promote joint formation and studies of unit operation plans as well as joint training on the assumption of various circumstances.

(3) Improvement of Mutual Cooperation Setup in Logistic Support

The United States maintains acquisition and cross-servicing agreement (ACSA) with NATO member states and other allies for the purpose of facilitating mutual logistic support and provision of supplies and services. Japan should conclude a similar agreement (ACSA) at the earlist{sic} possible time.

(4) Promotion of Mutual Cooperation in Equipment

In order to facilitate joint actions with U.S. forces it is necessary to emphasize the joint usability of equipment systems including C³I (command, control, communication and information). Moreover, it is expected that weapons and equipment to be required in the future will consist mainly of those types which are advanced in quality but limited in quantity. In order to meet these demands joint research, development and production with the United States and other industrialized nations would be a rational choice. This problem involves technologies developed by private corporations. Consequently, lest the interests of the corporations involved should be impaired, it is important that the Japanese government request the governments of nations concerned to take the necessary protective measures.

(5) Improvement of the Support Setup for U.S. Forces Stationed in Japan

The Japanese government has over the years borne part of the expenses relating to the U.S. forces in Japan under the status-of-forces agreement. In more recent years it concluded a special agreement to increase the Japanese share of such payments. Henceforth, too, it will be necessary to cover such expenses, while there seems to be room for technical improvement, such as ensuring more flexible management of expenses. In addition, it is desirable that the joint use of facilities be further steamlined{sic}. Efforts should continue to be made for consolidation and realignment of these facilities as necessary.

Section 3 Maintenance and Qualitative Improvement of Self-Defense Capability

The general trend for international security in the post-Cold War world is shifting from the confrontational to the cooperative pattern, but this does not mean that the roots of various military dangers have disappeared completely. As stated in Chapter 1, the security environment in the Asia/Pacific region is in a state of flux for various reasons. In light of this situation, the fact remains that the basis of security lies in individual nations possessing their own capability of managing or dealing with crises. Furthermore, we must not ignore the reality that only when at least major nations of the world possess such capability can the mechanism of multilateral security through the United Nations and other organizations demonstrate its effectiveness. In this sense, the possession of a reliable self-defense capability is the ultimate assurance of maintaining national independence; it is also desirable from the viewpoint of international security.

(1) Likely Military Dangers

During the Cold War period when the whole world was overshadowed by a military standoff between the Eastern and Western blocs, the defense of Japan was positioned in this overall picture of East-West confrontation. For example, it was hardly likely that the Soviet Union would target only Japan for a full-scale attack in disregard of its relations with the West as a whole. The National Defense Program Outline of 1976, which defined the level of defense capability to be maintained by Japan as being capable of dealing with "limited and small-scale aggression," assumed that the U.S. forces has the ability to deter aggression against Japan and in the event of such aggression actually taking place, to repel it. In other words, the assumption was that the military forces of Japan and the U.S., which stood in a complimentary relationship would deal with the Soviet aggression in a coordinated manner. On the basis of this strategic concept and, moreover, as a result of constitutional constraints and political considerations, Japan's defense capability was limited to one of modest scale and quality even during the Cold War period. Thus Japan maintained the so-called basic and standard defense capability.

Now military dangers have changed both in form and nature, but the thinking that Japan should maintain the minimum necessary level of basic defense capability as an independent state remains basically valid. The possibility that the kind of military incursion that has been anticipated in the past will be mounted directly against Japan has markedly diminished. We should not completely rule out a case in which possibility of a military attack from a certain country increases as a result of an extreme deterioration in political relations with that country. It is unlikely, however, that a state comparable to the former Soviet Union - one that is prepared to confront the U.S. militarily and politically - will emerge in the near future. At any rate, it should be possible to predict the emergence of such a threat considerably in advance. Consequently Japan, too, should be able to have a reasonable period of time in which to prepare for the kind of threat mentioned above. The modality of defense capability in such a case should be considered anew in light of the prevailing situation.

For the moment, attention should be paid to the various dangers that lurk in the unstable and hardly predictable situation. In case such dangers become manifest, it is necessary to maintain a certain level of management capability so as to deal correctly and quickly to prevent them from developing into large-scale conflicts. We believe importance should be attached particularly to the capability of dealing with the following situations: interference in the safety of maritime traffic, violation of territorial air space, limited missile attack, illegal occupation of a part of the country, terrorist acts, and influx of armed refugees.

(2) Factors to be Considered in Defense Buildup

The primary factor to be considered in determining the future buildup of defense capability is, needless to say, the perception of the situation as stated above. On the other hand, there are factors to be considered in light of the developments of recent years in military technology and from the viewpoint of the optimal allocation of national resources.

(i) Developments in Military Science and Technology

The performance of weapons has improved markedly as a result of the progress that has been made in science and technology in recent years. There has been a major shift in emphasis from conventional weapons of the heavy, large types to high-performance weapons of the precision guidance type. In parallel to these changes, progress has also been made in saving the labor required of weapons. In addition, the advancement of information and command/communication systems including the use of satellites have also made marked progress, and C³I systems such as various information networks have come to occupy a highly important position. In particular, software is expected to gain its importance since the quality of software affects equipment capability. The sophistication of equipment will likely add to the complexity of weapons systems and drive up the prices of weapons. Since the research, development and manufacture of such high-performance weapons and the training of operating personnel cannot be achieved in a short period of time, it is necessary to formulate plans from the long-term viewpoint.

(ii) Long-term Downward Trend of Young Population

Another long-term factor is the long-term trend for the decline of the young population. As a result, conditions for securing SDF personnel will deteriorate. In fact, this problem is already mentioned in the Mid-term Defense Program (FY 1991-1995). In light of the future prospects for population changes, the male population eligible for enlistment as Private, Seaman Apprentice or Airman 2nd Class, who comprise the main part of the recruitment of short-term SDF personnel (said population consisting of those aged 18-27), is projected to peak at about 9 million in 1994 and decrease sharply beginning in 1995. In particular, 18-year-olds, who form the core of the eligible population, is expected to drop about 40% 15 years from now. Assuming these population changes, we believe it is necessary to consider defense buildup in a direction leading to the conservation of human resources.

(iii) Severe Fiscal Constraints

The aging of the population will bring pressure to bear on the finances. This is because the social security budget is expected to increase substantially as the aging of society continues, and consequently, it is harldy{sic} likely that fiscal conditions surrounding defense buildup will improve in the long term.

Japan's defense spending has for many years been limited to less than 1% of the GNP. Such spending as a percentage of the general-account budget has stayed at the level of about 6%. Thus, when compared with other nations, the allocation of resources to the area of defense is never too large. Moreover, personnel expenses per SDF member and equipment prices tend inevitably to rise, as compared with nations that maintain the conscription system or follow a policy of keeping equipment prices lower with through overseas weapons markets. In addition, a considerably large portion of defense spending (about 11% of the 1994 budget) is earmarked for base countermeasure expenses and expenses for the support of U.S. forces stationed in Japan. Thus real defense spending is not as large as it appears. Defense buildup in the future demands, even more than before, that efforts be exerted to make the best possible use of the limited budget and prevent any decline in the actual level of defense capability.

Incidentally, it may be pointed out that defense spending consists mostly of obligatory expenses such as personnel expenses and payments for equipment on which contracts have been concluded in the past. In view of this characteristic, it is difficult to increase or decrease such spending on an annual basis. It is desirable that spending changes be managed from the medium- and long-term viewpoints.

(3) New Thinking on Defense Capability

Considering the above, namely, the perception of the situation, the developments in military technology and the constraints on human and fiscal resources, we believe it is reasonable to adopt the following thinking on the basic modality of future defense capability: while making use of the concept of basic and standard defense capability Japan should make the necessary revisions to that concept by adapting it to the new strategic environment. Specifically, first, the intelligence function should be improved so as to deal with the opaque security environment. At the same time operational preparedness should be maintained so as to deal correctly with manifold dangers. Secondly, combat units should be reorganized into more efficient ones while their functions and quality should be improved by such methods as promoting the use of high-technology and the modernization of equipment. On the other hand, the overall scale of such units should be reduced. Thirdly, consideration should be given to the question of flexibility so that, in the event that a more serious situation has developed, the SDF can deal with it. We hope that reform and reorganization of defense capability based on such thinking will be carried out in stages, preferably within about 10 years.

(4) Specific Measures of Reform

(i) Improvement of C³I Systems

Generally, the need for the C³I systems of defense organizations has increased in order to meet dangers, now that highly mobile military technologies are increasingly used. In particular, in order to meet manifold dangers by defense capability of a restrained scale it is necessary to attach importance to the capability of dealing quickly and flexibly with such dangers. Only by speedily and properly grasping the situation and deploying the necessary units at the necessary time at the necessary locations, is it possible to defend against a quantitatively superior attack capability. For that, it is essential to possess well-organzied{sic} C³I systems. In addition, it is necessary to make use of various types of censors, including the use of reconnaissance satellites.

The need to improve the information-gathering and analysis capability and various warning and surveillance capabilities has been pointed out in the past, as in the National Defense Program Outline. Given the tendency toward the dispersion and proliferation of dangers in the opaque post-Cold War international situations, however, it is necessary to attach greater importance to this particular need in order to quickly discern changes in the situation and help make decisions expeditiously.

(ii) Strengthening of Joint Operational Posture

In order to effectively perform new duties including U.N. peacekeeping operations and to improve the capability of dealing promptly with various types of danger stemming from the opaque international situation it is urgently necessary to strengthen the joint operational posture of the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces. This is also necessary because in many cases collaboration between Japan and the United States is essential. In particular, the strategic information function and the command/communication functions must be strengthened from the viewpoint of integration. In this connection, it is especially necessary to broaden the areas of coordination by the Joint Staff Council and its Chairman with necessary personnel.

(iii) Improvement of Maneuverability and Combat-ready Capability

In order to ensure effective operation of our defense capability of a restrained scale it is essential that such capability be deployed at the necessary locations and at the necessary time. From this viewpoint it is necessary to improve maneuverability and combat-ready capability.

(iv) Scale of Human Resources

Considering the constraints stemming from the anticipated demographic trend, we believe it is necessary to devise ways to make more effective use of a limited number of personnel to the extent that does not impair the combat capability required in an emergency. Consequently, the authorized number of regular SDF personnel, including even those who will be required correspondingly to the functions to be strengthened, should be reduced from the present level of approximately 274,000 to the neighborhood of 240,000. Henceforth, the necessary personnel must be secured to carry out the duties within this numerical limit. On the other hand, in order to promptly make up for any shortage in an emergency it is necessary to consider introducing a new system of SDF reservists. This question will be described further later in this report.

(v) Ground Defense Capability

No matter how the security environment surrounding this country may change, the fact remains that ground defense capability has the mission of national defense and contributes to the stability of national life. Hitherto, in preparation for possible aggression against Japan proper by hostile forces, the GSDF has had its uniformly organized divisions deployed across the country with emphasis on the concentrated operation of almost all of its existing force. Henceforth, the GSDF should be restructured into multifunctional units with emphasis on the capability to fulfill diverse duties such as dealing with dangers which may not be full-scale aggressions but which seem highly likely to occur, U.N. peacekeeping operations and disaster relief/emergency rescue at home and abroad. In other words, the GSDF should be reorganized into divisions and brigades of diverse formations with regional characteristics taken into account, and its units should be deployed accordingly. At the same time, the numbers and sizes of units should be reduced.

There is a wide disparity between the authorized number and the actual number of SDF personnel, creating difficulties in the maintenance and management of units. For example, education and training and management of unit activities have been considerably hampered. In order to solve these problems it is necessary to reduce the scale of units and reorganize them into qualitatively improved units. Regarding, in particular, those sections of the GSDF that have many opporotunities{sic} to perform duties in peacetime and positions that require an ability to make prompt responses, it is highly important to secure the necessary personnel and maintain high levels of proficiency. At the same time, in order to respond quickly in an emergency, a study should be made on introducing a new system of SDF reservists. Specifically, such a system should be aimed at creating a highly proficient force capable of serving in front-line units in an emergency. For this purpose reservists would be recruited from retired SDF personnel and receive training for a considerable number of days each year. For such a system is to be markable{sic}, it would also be necessary to create through cooperation between the government and the private sector, an arrangement for allowing the reservists to participate in training. For example, such supportive measures as improving treatment for the reservists and financial incentives for businesses that employ them would be necessary.

Along with the reduction of the overall number of personnel, efforts should be made to expedite the shift of emphasis in weaponry from heavy equipment such as tanks and artillery to more sophisticated equipment with increased mobility and high-tech applications. At the same time, by improving the professional proficiency of personnel who operate such equipment, the GSDF should be restructed{sic} so as to further improve its ground defense capability.

(vi) Maritime Defense Capability

For Japan which is surrounded by seas, the defense of adjacent seas and the securing the safety of maritime traffic are essential in order to secure the foundations of national survival in an emergency, the combat-sustaining capability and the foundations of U.S. military deployment. Furthermore the securing the safety of the maritime traffic in peacetime is a matter of life and death to Japan which has an extremely high degree of overseas dependence, as in energy supply and manufactured-goods trade. In addition, the MSDF has duties to perform, in collaboration with the Maritime Safety Agency, in such areas as sea rescue, crackdown on pirates and control of drug trafficking.

In the foreseeable future the naval force of the United States, which prides itself on its overwhelming superiority at sea, will, we believe, remain the basic factor in maintaining security on the world's oceans including the Pacific. Japan's maritime defense capability is to perform duties such as described above while maintaining cooperative relations with the U.S. Navy.

The possibility of full-scale attacks on sea-lanes by Soviet submarines, for example - the kind of attacks that have been anticipated in the past - has declined. Consequently, the numbers of ships and aircraft for antisubmarine and anti-mine warfare, which was previously emphasized, should be reduced. On the other hand, efforts should be made to build up a more balanced maritime defense capability. For example, the surveillance and patrol functions as well as anti-surface and anti-aircraft battle capabilities should further improved. In addition, considering participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations and other international activities, we believe it is also necessary to somewhat strengthen support functions such as maritime transport and seaborne supply.

Moreover in order to improve the level of proficiency and combat readiness, it is essential to resolve the situation where some of the manning requirements for ship crew are left unfulfilled. For this purpose we believe measures such as reassigning surplus personnel resulting from the gradual reduction of ships, etc. described above should be taken.

(vii) Air Defense Capability

Considering the development of aircraft and missile technologies, the role of air defense capability in national defense will increase rather than decrease. The introduction of the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), for example, has given a further impetus to the modernization of Japan's airborne warning and control capability. Since technology in this field is expected to make considerable progress, airborne warning and control organizations such as radar sites should be reviewed substantially, in part from the viewpoint of increasing their efficiency. Moreover, in view of the reduced possibility of a full-scale air attack of the kind that was previously anticipated, such as one by the Soviet Union, the number of fighter units or fighters should be reduced (ballistic missile defense will be discussed later since it includes something that transcends the conventional concept of air defense).

On the other hand, we believe it is worth making study on the introduction of the midair refueling function from the standpoint that it helps to increase the efficiency of and streng-then the air defense system. This will make it possible to increase the efficiency of flight training as well. Since the training of pilots takes a long period of time, however, further expenses and energies should be applied to improving their education and training.

In addition, from the viewpoint of participating in U.N. peacekeeping operations and other international activities, we believe it will be necessary to build a certain degree of long-haul transport capability.

(viii) Systems for Dealing with Ballistic Missiles

In order to deal with the danger of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery regulatory efforts are being made under various regimes, such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Needless to say, it is desirable from the standpoint of Japan's interest in terms of its security that these international efforts from the long-term viewpoint should succeed. Accordingly, Japan is playing a positive role in building such international control regimes. On the other hand, the possession of effective means of defending against attacks or threats by nuclear missiles and other weapons during the transitional period up to the time when this goal is attained is an essential condition for the success of the long-term nonproliferation regimes described above. For, as long as there exist states haunted by unrest, motives for proliferation will not disappear. From this viewpoint it is absolutely essential for Japan, which adopts the nonnuclear policy, that the credibility of the U.S. deterrence be maintained. In addittion{sic}, Japan itself should hold the capability of dealing with and defending against ballistic missiles. To that end, Japan should make positive efforts toward possessing such capability in collaboration with the United States where research in this area is most advanced. Furthermore, it should be especially noted that such a system makes collaboration with U.S. forces essential and requires a system of integrated operation among three services.

In introducing such a system it is necessary, we believe, to conduct studies on an efficient air defense system, including a review of roles and missions among the three services of the SDF.

(ix) Maintaining the Flexibtlity{sic} of Defense Capability

It may be said that there are no imminent threats today, yet no one knows what kind of situation would develop from dangers now lurking in the opaque and uncertain security environment. In preparation for such an emergency it is necessary to maintain some leeway with respect to spcialists{sic} who take a long time to train (such as commanders and pilots) and equipment that takes a long period to acquire (such as aircraft and ships). This should be done by, for example, assigning certain numbers of such personnel and equipment to the education and training divisions so that they can contribute to the improvement of education and training at the same time. Relating to this, introduction of a new reserve system should be studied, as mentioned before.

(x) Measures in the Personnel Area

(a) Improvement of the Treatment of the SDF Personnel

As is the case with every organziation{sic}, the basis of the defense organization lies ultimately in people. In particular, in order to maintain the efficiency of the entire organization while reducing the number of personnel it is essential that duties be performed by personnel of high morale and skill. From this viewpoint it is necessary to provide well-thought measures to improve the treatment of personnel, from entry to retirement, their living environment and other aspects of life in the SDF.

(b) Improving the Recruitment Method

The diminishing trend of the young population makes it unlikely that the recruitment of SDF personnel will become easier in the future. In view of this, it is desirable to improve the recruitment method as follows: First, the current method should be revised so that a method similar to that used for general civil service personnel and private company employees can be adopted as far as possible. By this method applicants would be recruited through local public organizations and schools in cooperation with the latter. Secondly, introduction of a new recruitment method that would make it possible to manage the numbers of personnel to be recruited over several years should be considered. Such a multiyear method would take into account annual increases or decreases in the number of applicants due to change in the business cycle and other factors, instead of limiting itself to the fixed number for a single year.

In view of the tendency toward the globalization and diversification of the role of defense capability in the new age, the education and training for cultivating the necessary personnel must be qualitatirely{sic} improved. This begins with securing personnel who have aptitude at the recruitment stage, but the education and training following their entry also has a very large role to play. What should be particularly emphasized henceforth is the viewpoint of cultivating personnel who have knowledge and sensibilities regarding such matters as foreign languages and international relations, namely, those who are fully capable of responding to calls for international cooperation, such as participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations. For that purpose the necessary measure should be taken so that the opportunity to study abroad may be offered as widely as possible to many SDF personnel. In addition, considering that the proportion of simple work has decreased and more complex abilities are required as a result of the modernization of weapons systems, the education and training should be improved with emphasis on the acquisition of special knowledge and skill. On the other hand, greater efforts need to be made toward the cultivation of personnel who have an ability to perform as many multifunctional duties as possible.

(xi) Consolidation of Stations and Posts

The stations that exist now were located not only from the viewpoints of defense and internal security, but also by taking the following fact into account: the dispatch of SDF troops to disaster-stricken areas in the country was emphasized immediately after the creation of the SDF. This is because major natural disasters, represented by the Ise Bay Typhoon of 1959 and the heavy snowfall that hit the Hokuriku area in 1963, occurred during the early years of the SDF. Thus responding to the needs of local communities was a major contributing factor.

Today, in light of the need for a more rational and efficient defense capability, and considering that the anti-disaster capability of local public entities has dramatically improved over the past 20〜30 years, it is high time that the siting of SDF units was reviewed. For example, some of the small GSDF stations may be consolidated to the extent that the social needs of the communities in which they are located are not seriously affected. However in the case of those locations which in an emergency are highly likely to become necessary for national defense, it is necessary to maintain such measures as will make their restoration possible in such an event.

From the viewpoint of increasing the overall efficiency of defense capability, it is desirable that the consolidation of stations and posts be promoted in such a way that funds generated by the disposition of some stations and posts are applied to the improvement of the stations and posts to be integrated. In order to facilitate such consolidation it is necessary, we believe, to work out special devices in the fiscal area.

However even if a certain degree of efficiency is achieved through consolidation, a considerable number of personnel and a considerable amount of expenses will continue to be required to maintain stations and posts. In order to ease the pressure on resource allocation and personnel assignment to other departments, we believe that, generally speaking, operations of such stations and posts should be entrusted to private entities as far as practicable.

Section 4 Other Items Pertaining to Defense

The main question addressed by this report is what improvement should be made in defense capability in order to adapt to the new international situation and security environment. However, as emphasized earlier, defense can play its role only when it is correctly positioned in the regime of comprehensive security policy. In that sense improvement of defense is part of the question of giving new direction to overall security policy. Consequently, we would like to take up in this final section questions that the government as a whole or Japanese society as a whole should address - questions that are closely related to the desired restructuring of defense capability. (We would like to add that some of the questions described in three previous sections, such as the proposed introduction of a new system of SDF reservists, also involve many difficult problems which cannot be solved unless national efforts are exerted beyond the level of the Defense Agency.)

(1) Improvement of Research and Education on Security

Education on security as it stands is extremely inadequate. It is important to the future security of Japan that appropriate security education be provided in all stages of education, from elementary school all the way to college and university. Security is a public good whose benefits are equally enjoyed by the entire people. If the whole society forgets to pay due respect to those who are engaged in the defense of the country, the spiritual foundation of national defense and security will be lost. History shows that such states did not enjoy lasting prosperity. Consequently, we believe that the necessary consideration should be given so that SDF personnel may devote themselves to their duties with pride and in the spirit of challenges.

(2) Defense Industry

Total output of Japan's defense industry today accounts for about 0.6% of domestic industrial production. From the viewpoint of the national economy, this represents a paltry amount. From the viewpoint of security, however, we would like to emphasize that it is extremely important to have a domestic defense industry capable of developing and producing technologically advanced and high-quality equipment. The roles played by state-owned munitions factories before the end of World War II, such as army ordnances and naval arsenals, have been taken over completely by the private defense industry since the war's end. What is notable about today's defense industry is that it consists of numerous enterprises that cut across a broad spectrum of industrial sectors and, moroever{sic}, includes a large number of small- and medium-sized enterprises and highly specialized enterprises. Furthermore, as Japan maintains a policy of imposing strict voluntary restraints on arms exports under the three principles of arms exports, weapons-related divisions of component enterprises have no alternative but to formulate production plans based entirely on orders from the Defense Agency. As a result, a wide variety of products tend to be produced on a limited scale, which leads to price higher than the average price abroad. As for mainline equipment, it is notable that major part of such equipment is either imported from the United States or manufactured domestically under license from U.S. defense contractors.

In spite of these limitations the Japanese defense industry has managed to maintain its manufacturing base because the nation's defense capability has until recently been in the stages of build-up and improvement. During the past few years, however, the equipment procurement budget has leveled off or begun to decrease, making the future prospects uncertain. As overall business earnings are shrinking because of the current economic slump, it is becoming increasingly difficult for related enterprises to maintain their defense divisions.

Henceforth, as already described, it will be necessary to promote the modernization of defense capability and, at the same time, reduce the overall scale of defense capability, with emphasis on combat units, and improve its overall efficiency. Moreover, considering that the service life of equipment is tending to lengthen markedly, it is expected that procurement volume of equipment, particularly front-line equipment, will be considerably reduced. As a result, unless appropriate measures are taken, a number of enterprises may find it difficult to maintain their production basis and , if worse comes to worst, may be forced to withdraw from the defense industry.

For the reasons described above, Japan's defense production is placed at a disadvantage in terms of cost. But because of the nature of the defense industry economic efficiency should not be the only criterion for judgment. It is vitally important to maintain autonomy and independence in equipment procurement and defense-related technology, partly with a view to facilitating technological exlchanges{sic} with the United States. Consequently, it is necessary to give policy consideration so that maximum possible support may be provided to help maintain the existence of enterprises involved in the defense industry. For example, it is desirable that the government should announce medium-term procurement estimates as far in advance as possible so that related enterprises will find it easier to draw up production plans. In particular, with a view to easing as much as possible the adverse effects of decreases in the procurement volume of front-line equipment, continued consideration should be given to domestic production and to the promotion of restructuring at the level of individual enterprises. At the same time the following points should be noted: First, regarding areas where advanced technology is required, consideration should be given to the maintenance of the foundations of research and development and manufacturing technology. Secondly, in order to avoid difficulties in the routine operation of equipment on the spot it is absolutely necessary for related enterprises to maintain the capacity for equipment repairs. Thirdly, regarding small- and medium-sized enterprises that depend heavily on defense demand, we believe it is necessary to consider measures from the viewpoint of industrial policy or social policy. Fourthly, we believe that promotion of appropriate joint research and development and joint production with the United States and other nations is another measure that merits consideration.

(3) Technological Foundation

It is expected that military technology will make steady progress. Furthermore, since it is impossible to make up for laggard in quality through expansion of quantity, it is extremely important to security that defense technology be maintained at the advanced level. On the other hand, as already stated, the procurement volume of front-line equipment is expected to decrease in the future, so that even if research and development work on equipment should succeed, the actual volume of orders for such equipment may not reach the level desired by the producers. It is possible that the uncertain prospects for future contracts will reduce the desire of private enterprises to invest in research and development.

In view of these points, it is essential for the government to make greater efforts for research and development, promote Government funded research of the technological demonstration type that is not predicated on mass production, and seek to strengthen the basis of most advanced technologies. In addition, it is important to make greater efforts to accumulate software and build data bases.

(4) Modality of Future Defense Program

Implemention{sic} of the restructuring of defense capability and organizational reform along the lines of thinking proposed by this report will have considerable effects not only on SDF personnel and those concerned with the Defense Agency but also on general society such as local public organizations and private enterprises concerned. Consequently, in order to avoid unnecessary confusion it will be necessary to implement our proposals in stages over a considerably long period of time (for example, about 10 years). It should also be noted that the nature of the reforms proposed herein is such that they present targets to be attained during the process of reforms to be carried out over an appropriate period of time. As such, they do not indicate targets to be maintained in the long term or upper limits of defense capability, such as those indicated in the appendix to the "National Defense Program Outline" of 1976. We must part with the "National Defense Program Outline," but whether an alternative document should be prepared is a question to be considered by the government. In addition, whether the "Basic Policy for National Defense" of 1957 should be rewritten as to express the new basic thought on defence is a question to be studied in the future.

As for specific defense buildup, we believe that midterm plans should be prepared and that efforts should be made on a flexible yet programmed basis.

(5) Establishment of Crisis Management System and Integration of Intelligence

Regarding C³I systems, it is pointed that, generally, links between a plurality of organziations{sic} are the weakest spots and that defects are liable to present themselves in these areas. This seems to be the case with the present conditions of Japan's intelligence system and crisis management system. Efforts are being made to strengthen these links, such as by holding joint intelligence conferences at the Cabinet, but it is necessary to make further efforts so that the intelligence and crisis management systems of the entire government may function more effectively. Henceforth it will be necessary to make full-scale efforts to strengthen and improve the crisis management and intelligence analysis functions at the Cabinet level. This is a task of vital importance that covers a broad range of endeavore{sic} from the training of intelligence specialists and improvement of their treatment to the strengthening of the intelligence functions at the levels of government organizations and the SDF and finally to the integration of intelligence at the Cabinet level and the maintenance of the policy-making machinery suited to crisis management type and the domestic legal system designed to prepare for emergencies. Consequently we hope that sufficient discussions will be conducted on these matters.

Conclusion

The nature of security problems has undergone certain changes with the ending of the Cold war. In these circumstances peoples of the world are beginning to make their respective efforts in search of a new international order. We, too, should deal squarely with our security policy with a fresh mind.

It goes without saying that the security policy of each state lies basically in its capacity for self-management and crisis management. It also remains true that the sharing of common interests and values is the most reliable ties in relations between nations. In this sense, the ties between Japan and the United States, which have a common goal concerning the formation of a new international order, are expected to become even more important. This is because peoples of the world, working together to prevent armed conflcits{sic} and bring about their early settlements and to resolve social problems contributing to conflict, such as poverty, will be likely to have increasing opportunites{sic} to act positively and constructively to that end. Through steady accumulation of productive results in such cooperative security mankind will be able to come closer to the United Nations' goal of collective security. As a result, an international order in which the prohibition of "the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes" is the basic rule will become a greater certainty. We should make maximum efforts toward that goal because that will also be in the interest of the Japanese people.

From this viewpoint this report has discussed the modality of security policy and defense capability Japan should henceforth pursue. Such security policy and defense capability consist of three pillars - promotion of multilateral cooperation, improvement and strengthening of Japan-U.S. security relations, and maintenance of a highly reliable and efficient defense capability.

In order to ensure that the new security policy described here is smoothly implemented and that defense plays a significant role in the process, it is essential that the entire nation make efforts accordingly from the comprehensive viewpoint and that policy be implemented in a coherent manner. To that end the building of a crisis management system that makes effective policy making and execution possible is indispensable. At the same time, we would like to emphasize that broad public understanding, support and participation lie at the heart of security policy. It is our sincere hope that this report will help to deepen the public understanding of security issues.

Appendices

Members of the Advisory Group on Defence Issues

Chairman	Hirotaro Higuchi Chairman the Board, Asahi Breweries, Ltd.
Acting Chairman	Ken Moroi Chairman, Chichibu Cement Co, Ltd.
Member	Kuniko Inoguchi, Ph.D. Professor, Sophia University
Member	Yoshio Okawara Executive Adviser,Keidanren
Member	Toyoo Gyoten Chairman the Board of Directors, The Bank of Tokyo, Ltd.
Member	Makoto Sakuma Consultant to the President, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation
Member	Seiki Nishihiro Adviser, The Tokyo Marine Fire and Fire Insurance Co, Ltd.
Member	Shinji Fukukawa Vice Chairman the Board, Kobe Steel, Ltd.
Member	Akio Watanabe, Ph. D. Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University

Chronology of the Advisory Group on Defence Issues

First session, February 28

Address by Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa

Thinking on the National Defence Program Outline

Defense Plans and systems

Second session, March 9

Perception of the international situation

Military situations surrounding Japan

Third session, March 16

Military situation in regions closely related to security

Problems in the current status of joint triservice coordination

Present status of GSDF defence strategy and problems

Fourth session, March 30

Current status of MSDF defense strategy and problems

Current status of ASDF defense strategy and problems

Fifth session, April 6

Personnel resources

Shift to preparedness new defense capability

Study of legislation of emergency situations

Current status and issues of Japan's defense industry

Defense equipment and technology

Changes in defence-related expenditures and their composition

Sixth session, April 13

Japan-U.S. security arrangement

Japan-U.S. defennse cooperation

Japan-U.S. technology exchange

Bearing costs for U.S. forces stationed in Japan

Seventh session, April 18

Japan's human contribution based on the International Peace Cooperation Law

International peace cooperation operations by SFD

Issues related to reorganization of the U.N. Security Council

Current status of arms control/disarmament issues

Efforts towaud{sic} building new security environment

Eighth session, April 27

Review of defense functions

Interim report on member' opinions

Ninth session, May 11

Address by Prime Minister Tsutomu Hata future

Procedure for future discussions

Tenth Session, Many 18

Framework of future discussions

Formula of defense program

Eleventh session, May 25

Current status of Japan's public finances and defense-related expenditures

Discussions on issues relating to the international situation

Twelfth session, June 1

Modality of defense capability

Thirteeth{sic} session, June 8

Arms export control

Application of four ODA principles

Discussions on comprehensive security issues

Fourteenth session, June 13

Integration of intelligence, information processing by the government, etc.

Issues relating to crisis management with the Gulf Crisis as a case study

Discussions on major points (basic thinking, strengthening of the coordination of Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defence Forces, SDF reservist system)

Fifteeth{sic} session, June 22

Discussions on major points (sea-lane defence, 180,000 member GSDF setup)

Sixteenth session, June 27

Cooperation with the United Nations and constitutional questions

Peacekeeping operations (PKO)

Seventeeth{sic} session, July 13

Address by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama

Discussions on issues related to defence capability

Eighteenth session, July 20

Discussions about the draft of the report

Nineteenth session, July 27

Summation

Twentieth session, August 12

Report to Prime Minister Murayama

The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan

The Outlook for the 21st Century

Summary

Foreword

Now that the Cold War has ended, peoples of the world are searching for a new world order. In these circumstances, there is a mood in Japan to reconsider forthrightly the modality of its security and defense capability as a central question of national politics. This forum, created five months ago as a non-statutory advisory group for the Prime Minister, has since continued discussions with a view to reviewing the National Defense Program Outline, which has served as the guideline for the modality of the nation's defense capability, and presenting ideas that would form the basis of an alternative guideline. The task of this advisory group is to define a direction of security policy appropriate to the new era and, on that basis, propose a new modality of defense capability while taking into account changes in the post-Cold War international situation and also various changes facing Japanese society itself.

Chapter 1 The World and Asia/the Pacific After the Cold War

1. The End of the Cold War and Qualitative Changes in the Security Environment

Now that the Cold War has ended, it is difficult to deny that the security environment has changed significantly while clearly visible threats have disappeared and moves toward arms control and disarmament have made some progress centering on the United States, Russia and Europe, we find ourselves in an opaque and uncertain situation. The sense of security has increased in the sense that we have been freed from the "balance of terror" that might collapse at any moment. At the same time, however, it can be said that we confront a more difficult security environment in the sense that we must prepare for unpredictable dangers and maintain a stance of responding quickly to such dangers. We cannot remain insensitive to the new security problems that are presenting themselves with the ending of the Cold War.

2. Multilateral Cooperation Centering on the United States

Even in such new security environment the network of U.S.-centered alliances built during the Cold War is likely to be maintained as a stabilizing factor in international relations. The most typical examples of these alliances are the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It is expected, therefore, that in spite of somewhat intensified conflicts of economic interest, the U.S.-centered cooperative relationships in the military and security field will continue.

3. Roles of the United Nations and Other Regimes for Cooperative Security

For the United Nations security mechanism to work it is essential that multilateral cooperation be maintained under U.S. leadership. During the period of serious U.S.- Soviet confrontation the United Nations was unable to function fully. In recent years, however, it has actively deployed peacekeeping operations, thus expanding the scope of activity both geographically and qualitatively. Whether the U.N. will be able to continue such operations in the future depends largely on how cooperation can be maintained not only among the five permanent members of the Security Council but also among all major nations, such as the Group of Seven, including Japan and Germany, both of which are making large financial contributions to the world body.

4. Four Types of Likely a Danger

The following types of danger are likely to occur in the future. First, direct military confrontation between major nations, such as developed between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, is unlikely for the moment. If cooperation among major nations centering on the United States is lost, the global security environment could deteriorate rapidly. Secondly, it is likely that localized military clashes will occur frequently and become more complex in nature. Thirdly, there is the increasing danger that weapons and arms-related technologies will proliferate. Fourthly, regional military clashes of the kind described above would be induced by economic poverty and social discontent and by the related loss of the ability to govern. In this respect, it seems that the solution of security problems will increasingly require not only responses by military means but also comprehensive responses by multidimensional means including economic and technical assistance.

5. Characteristics of the Security Environment in the Asia/Pacific Region

For the moment, any large-scale danger that would threaten the security of the international community is distant. But, with nations of the world becoming increasingly interdependent, even localized conflicts are likely to affect the entire international community. In particular, the Japanese economy is built on close relations with various parts of the world. Therefore, the nation's security concerns are worldwide. Nevertheless it is also true that Japan cannot help having special concerns for the security of the Asia/Pacific region.

First, it is a fact that power relationships in Asia are becoming fluid as a result of the end of the Cold War. Thus many nations of Asia, including China, now have political motives and economic foundations for improving their military power. Secondly, the security system in the Asia/Pacific region is still in the immature, formative stages. As shown by the situation in the Korean Peninsula, China, Indonchina and by conflicts among the interested nations over the territorial claims to islands, a fully stabilized political and military situation does not yet exist in this region. Thirdly, the interests of some of the world's major military powers, namely, the United States, Russia and China, are concentrated in the Asia/Pacific region, particularly in the Northwest Pacific. Russia and China, with their economic activities expanding, are beginning to acquire the character of an oceanic state with an eye to the Pacific. The United States, meanwhile, will continue to have interests in the region, not only from the security viewpoint but also in light of its growning{sic} trade interests. Japan, situated as it is in Northeast Asia and the Northwest Pacific where the interests of these world military powers interact, cannot help but be sensitive to security problems in the region.

There are both positive and negative possibilities in the security environment of the Asia/Pacific region. The period in which Asia was merely the stage for the pursuit of interests by major powers is already over. There is little doubt that future developments in Asia will be an important deterring factor in the future of global security, not only because the Asia/Pacific region abounds in opportunity but also because major nations are deeply involved in this part of the world. Nations concerned including Japan, have great responsibilities.

Chapter 2 Basic Thinking on Japan's Security Policy and Defense Capability

1. Active and Constructive Security Policy

In today's security problems no clear focus exist. The cause of our sense of insecurity is the very opaqueness of the present international order in which the dangers that exist are dispersed and difficult to predict. On the other hand, however, there are emerging signs that a collective capacity to deal with conflicts will be developed through the cooperation of the United States and other major nations under the United Nations and other international regimes. These signs indicate a new direction. There exist opportunities to create a more secure world, provided nations of the world take active and constructive moves to create a sustainable "structure of peace" in the spirit of cooperation.

2. Multilateral Security Cooperation

At the present time, when no serious military confrontation exists between major nations now that the Cold War has ended, the condition, for the collective security mechanism of the United Nations to demonstrate its primary function, is satisfied the minimum. How much peoples of the world, by availing themselves of this favorable opportunity, can achieve in terms of cooperative security and whether they can acquire such a habit will determine the fate of the United Nations in the 21st century. Japan, which is deeply committed to peace, must make positive use of this historic opportunity, not for altruistic purposes but primarily from the standpoint of its national interest. The provision of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution agrees in its spirit to that pledge. It seems, however, that, it will be a long time before the U.N. collective security organization is established in a complete form. At the present stage, the United Nations is required not so much to deal with military clashes between nations as to respond to various modes of crisis by such means as preventing armed conflicts that may develop inside unstable nations where it is unclear who holds the ability to govern or containing their expansion, and supporting the reconstruction of order following the cessation of conflicts. Japan should actively participate in these operations. Incidentally, in the fields of civilian peacekeeping activities and peaceful construction after conflict settlement, Japan should be able to make particularly significant contributions.

That said, one cannot rule out entirely the possibly that conflicts of interest between nations will lead to armed conflicts. Nations are allowed to possess self-defense capability as a measure of last resort, provided it is limited within the bounds of the exercise of the right of self-defense. However, of those nations rush to build arms while harboring an extreme sense of mutual distrust, the danger of military conflicts will increase. Consequently, it is first necessary to reduce the level of mutual distrust and to increase the sense of security and approximate a condition of mutual trust.

The cooperative security policy must be pursued not only at the United Nations but also at the regional level. If multilateral or bilateral dialogue makes progress, transparency in the security environment in Asia and the Pacific will increase, and as a result the sense of security among nations of the region will also increase. Multilateral security dialogue in Northeast Asia and the Northwest Pacific has only just started. Hereafter, efforts should be made to develop such dialogue.

3. Enhancing the Functions of the Japan-U.S. Security Cooperation Relationship

Granting that it is necessary to promote dialogue and the relationship of trust through dialogue, the fact remains that international cooperation centering on the United States provides a realistic basis of the post-Cold War security system. In this sence{sic}, it stands to reason that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in Asia, along with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Europe should be maintained as a valuable asset for the formation of a new security system.

In order to further ensure the security of Japan and to act more positively in response to the new security needs, efforts should be made to enhance the cooperative relations between the two nations. In view of the continuing need to ensure that the U.S. commitment to this region is maintained as desired by many Asia nations, it is highly significant that Japan and the United States should renew their determination to maintain their security cooperation with Japan and other nations of the region. Nevertheless, it is of great significance to the security of this region as a whole that the United States should continue its existing frameworks of security cooperation with nations of this region, such as Japan, from this viewpoints, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty will assume a greater significance than ever before.

4. Maintenance and Operation of Highly Reliable and Efficient Defense Capability

The ultimate foundation of security lies in the determination of a people to defend themselves and in holding the appropriate means of doing so. Japan itself must have a reliable defense posture in order to enhance the reliability of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and to participate actively and constructively in multilateral security cooperation. The concept of basic defense and standard defense capability as the necessary minimum required of an independent state remains valid even in the present age of cooperative security.

Chapter 3 The Modality of Defense Capability in the New Age

From the Cold War Defense Strategy to the Multilateral Security Strategy

The security environment surrounding Japan has changed significantly with the ending of the Cold War. However, the primary role of defending the country remains unchanged regardless of the changes of the times. In addition, Japan-U.S. cooperation remains unchanged as a major pillar of Japan's security policy. The question for the future is how such defense capability and security policy should be positioned from the viewpoint of cooperative security.

Section 1 The Role of Defense Capability for Multilateral Security Cooperation

In order to respond appropriately to diverse dangers in various parts of the world and, by so doing, to prevent the deterioration of the security environment and make positive efforts to improve it, it is important that, acting on their relationships of alliance, nations make active efforts from the constructive viewpoint to promote global and regional security through cooperation at the United Nations and other organizations.

1. The Strengthening of U.N. Peacekeeping Operations and the Role of the SDF

One of the major pillars of Japan's security policy is to contribute positively to strengthening the U.N. functions for international peace, including further improvement of peacekeeping operations. The SDF, whose most important mission is to ensure the security of Japan, cannot be exempt from this duty. From this viewpoint, a number of improvements are needed in such areas as statutes governing the operation of the SDF, SDF organization, equipment and training. First, it is important to consider it a major duty of the SDF, along with the primary duty of national defense, to participate as positively as possible in various forms of multilateral cooperation that are conducted within the framework of the United Nations for the purposes of international security, including peacekeeping operations. In the area of organization/system, it is necessary to create a special organization in charge of collecting and classifying a wide range of information pertaining to international peacekeeping operations and other types of international cooperation, to conducting the specialized education and training of personnel, and to having function to formulate and coordinate program of implementation. Regarding the mode of SDF participation in peacekeeping operations, it is desirable that discussions should be continued with a view to removing as soon as possible the provision in the International Peace Cooperation Law calling for freeze on participation of the SDF in the field of peacekeeping activities mainly conducted by infantry units. In this connection, Japan should study the common understanding that is recognized by the United Nations with regard to the use of arms.

2. Other Forms of International Cooperation for Security

In addition to U.N. peacekeeping operations, the U.N., its specialized agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) are conducting international cooperative activities in a widening range of fields. Of these activities those to which the SDF can contribute include, for example, various types of international rescue activities for humanitarian purpose, which are provided for in the existing International Peace Cooperation Law. In addition, we believe that the SDF will be able, for example, to provide support for refugee rescue operations conducted within the framework of international cooperation. As for arms control, various efforts are being made, regionally and globally, in conjunction with confidence-building measures. In this regard, Japan has been making no small contributions. In order to ensure that the uncertain and opaque security environment in the post-Cold War period does not move in the dangerous direction, it is increasingly necessary to promote international cooperation in this area. Dialogue aimed at building confidence is starting to take place at various levels in the Asia/Pacific region. It is important that military and defense personnel from the nations concerned participate positively in these security dialogues.

Section 2 The Enhancement of the Japan-U.S. Security Cooperation Relationship

The Japan-U.S Security Treaty remains an indispensable precondition for the defense of Japan even in the post-Cold War security environment. What is more, the range of fields in which Japan and the United States can cooperate for the security of Asia is expected to widen. In other words, the Japan-U.S. relationship of cooperation In the area of security must be considered not only from the bilateral viewpoint but, at the same time, also from the broader perspective of security in the entire Asia/Pacific region.

In order to promote the Japan-U.S. relationship of security cooperation on a more routine basis, efforts should be made to establish a greater interoperability in a broad range of fields, including operations, intelligence/communication, logistic support, and equipment procurement. Specifically, improvement should be promoted in the following respects:

(1) Enhancement of Policy Consultations and Information Exchange

(2) Promotion of Operational Cooperation Setup

(3) Improvement of Mutual Cooperation Setup in Logistic Support

(4) Promotion of Mutual Cooperation in Equipment

(5) Improvement of the Support Setup for U.S. Forces Stationed in Japan

Section 3 Maintenance and Qualitative Improvement of Self-Defense Capability

The general trend for international security in the post-Cold War world is shifting from the confrontational to the cooperative pattern, but this does not mean that the roots of various military dangers have disappeared completely. As stated in Chapter 1, the security environment in the Asia/Pacific region is in a state of flux for various reasons. In light of this situation, the fact remains that the basis of security lies in individual nations possessing their own capability of managing or dealing with crises. Furthermore, we must not ignore the reality that only when at least major nations of the world possess such capability can the mechanism of multilateral security through the United Nations and other organizations demonstrate its effectiveness. In this sense, the possession of a reliable self-defese capability is the ultimate assurance of maintaining national independence; it is also desirable from the viewpoint of international security.

(1) Likely Military Dangers

Now military dangers have changed both in form and nature, but the thinking that Japan should maintain the minimum necessary level of basic defense capability as an independent state remains basically valid. The possibility that the kind of military incursion that has been anticipated in the past will be mounted directly against Japan has markedly diminished. We should not completely rule out a care in which possibility of a military attack from a certain country increases as a result of an extreme deterioration in political relations with that country. It is unlikely, however, that a state comparable to the former Soviet Union - one that is prepared to confront U.S. militarily and politically - will emerge in the near future. At any rate, it should be possible to predict the emergence of such a threat considerably in advance. Consequently Japan, too, should be able to have a reasonable period of time in which to prepare for the kind of threat mentioned above. The modality of defense capability in such a case should be considered anew in light of the prevailing situation.

(2) Factors to be Considered in Defense Buildup

In addition to such changes of circumstances, in the field of military science and technology there has been a major shift in emphasis from conventional weapon of the heavy, large types to high-performance weapons of the precision guidance type. In parallel to these changes, progress has also been made in saving the labor required of weapons. This fact should also be taken into account. Meanwhile, taking into account the diminishing trend of the young population it is necessary henceforth to consider we believe it is necessary to consider defense buildup in a direction leading to the conservation of human resources. It is harldy{sic} likely that fiscal conditions surrounding defense buildup will improve in the long term. In addition, compared with other nations, the allocation of resources to the area of defense is never too large. Defense buildup in the future demands, even more than before, that efforts be exerted henceforth to make the best possible use of the limited budget and prevent any decline in the actual level of defense capability.

(3) New Thinking on Defense Capability

Considering the above, namely, the perception of the situation, the developments in military technology and the constraints on human and fiscal resources, we believe it is reasonable to adopt the following thinking on the basic modality of future defense capability: while making use of the concept of basic defense capability Japan should make the necessary revisions to that concept by adapting it to the new strategic environment. Specifically, first, the intelligence function should be improve so as to deal with the opaque security environment. At the same time operational preparedness should be maintained so as to deal correctly with manifold dangers. Secondly, combat units should be reorganized into more efficient ones while their functions and quality should be improved by such methods as promoting the use of high-technology and the modernization of equipment. On the other hand, the overall scale of such units should be reduced. Thirdly, consideration should be given to the question of flexibility so that in the event that a more serious situation has developed, the SDF can deal with it. We hope that reform and reorganization of defense capability based on such thinking will be carried out in stages, preferably within about 10 years.

(4) Specific Measures of Reform

(i) Improvement of C³I Systems

Generally, the need for the C³I systems of defense organizations has increased in order to meet dangers. It is necessary henceforth to place greater emphasis on intelligence garthering{sic} and analysis capability and on warning and surveillance capabilities.

(ii) Strengthening of Joint Operational Posture

(iii) Improvement of Maneuverability and Combat-ready Capability

In order to ensure effective operation of our defense capability of a restrained scale it is necessary to improve maneuverability and combat-ready capability.

(iv) Scale of Human Resources

The authorized number of regular SDF personnel, including even those who will be required correspondingly to the functions to be strengthened, should be reduced from the present level of approximately 274,000 to the neighborhood of 240,000.

(v) Ground Defense Capability

The GSDF should be restructured from uniformly organized divisions to multifunctional units. In other words, the GSDF should be reorganized into divisions and brigades of diverse formations with regional characteristics taken into account, and its units should be deployed accordingly. At the same time, the numbers and sizes of units should be reduced. Regarding, in particular, those sections of the GSDF that have many opportunities to perform duties in peace-time and positions that require an ability to make prompt responses, it is highly important to secure the necessary personnel and maintain high levels of proficiency. In addition, a study should be made on introduction of a new system of SDF reservists aimed at creating a highly proficient force capable of serving in front-line units in an emergency should be considered. Efforts should be made to expedite the shift of emphasis in weaponry from heavy equipment to more sophisticated equipment with increased mobility and high-tech applications.

(vi) Maritime Defense Capability

The possibility of full-scale attacks on SLOC has declined. Consequently, the numbers of ships and aircraft for antisubmarine and anti-mine warfare, which was previously emphasized, should be reduced. On the other hand, efforts should be made to build up a more balanced maritime defense capability. For example, the surveillance and patrol functions as well as anti-surface and anti-aircraft battle capabilities should be further improved. In addition, considering participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations and other international activities, we believe it is also necessary to somewhat strengthen support functions such as maritime transport and seaborne supply.

(vii) Air Defense Capability

Air warning and control organizations such as radar sites should be reviewed extensively, including from the viewpoint of increasing their efficiency, as further progress has been made in their modernization. In view of the reduced possibility of a full-scale air attack of the kind that was previously anticipated, the number of fighter units or fighters should be reduced. On the other hand, we believe it is worth making study on the introduction of the midair refueling function from the standpoint that it helps to increase the efficiency of and strengthen the air defense system. In addition, from the viewpoint of participating in U.N. peacekeeping operations and other international activities, we believe it will be necessary to build a certain degree of long-haul transport capability.

(viii) Systems for Dealing with Ballistic Missiles

In order to deal with the danger of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, it is absolutely essential for Japan, which adopts the nonnuclear policy, that the credibility of the U.S. deterrence be maintained. In addittion{sic}, Japan itself should hold the capability of dealing with and defending against ballistic missiles. To that end, Japan should make positive efforts toward possessing such capability in collaboration with the United States where research in this area is most advanced.

(ix) Maintaining the Flexibility of Defense Capabilility{sic}

In preparation for such an emergency it is necessary to maintain some leeway with respect to specialists who take a long time to train and equipment that takes a long period to acquire. This should be done by, for example, assigning certain numbers of such personnel and equipment to the education and training divisions so that they can contribute to the improvement of education and training at the same time.

(x) Measures in the Personnel Area

Further progress should be made in the improvement of the treatment of SDF personnel, the improvement of the recruitment method, the development of human resources and the qualitative improvement of the education and training program.

(xi) Consolidation of Stations and Posts

In light of the need for a more rational and efficient defense capability, it is high time that the siting of SDF units was reviewed. For example, some of the small GSDF stations may be consolidated while taking into consideration the social needs of the communities in which they are located. In order to facilitate consolidation it is necessary, we believe, to work out special devices in the fiscal area.

Section 4 Other Items Pertaining to Defense

We would like to take up in this final section questions that the government as a whole or Japanese society as a whole should address - questions that are closely related to the desired restructuring of defense capability.

(1) Improvement of Research and Education on Security

In Japan thus far there has been a tendency to show little concern for research and education on security. International environment surrounding us requires the government and the people to take serious interest in peace. This must be reflected in research and education on security problems. Security is a public good whose benefits are equally enjoyed by the entire people. If the whole society forgets to pay due respect to those who are engaged in the defense of the country, the spiritual foundation of national defense and security will be lost. Consequently, we believe that the necessary consideration should be given so that SDF personnel may devote themselves to their duties with pride and in the spirit of challenges.

(2) Defense Industry

From the viewpoint of security, it is extremely important to have a domestic defense industry capable of developing and producing technologically advanced and high-quality equipment. In spite of a lot of constraints the Japanese defense industry has managed to maintain its manufacturing base until recently, but now it finds itself in a difficult situation because of changes in various conditions at home and abroad. But because of the nature of the defense industry economic efficiency should not be the only criterion for judgment. It is vitally important to maintain autonomy and independence in equipment procurement and defense-related technology, partly with a view to facilitating technological exchanges with the United States. Consequently, it is necessary to give policy consideration so that maximum possible support may be provided to help maintain the existence of enterprises involved in the defense industry.

(3) Technological Foundation

It is expected that military technology will make steady progress. Furthermore, since it is impossible to make up for laggard in quality through expansion of quantity, it is extremely important to security that defense technology be maintained at the advanced level. It is essential for the government to make greater efforts for research and development, promote Government founded research of the technological demonstration type that is not predicated on mass production, and seek to strengthen the basis of most advanced technologies. In addition, it is important to make greater efforts to accumulate software and build data bases.

(4) Modality of Future Defense Program

It should be noted that the nature of the reforms proposed herein is such that they present targets to be attained during the process of reforms to be carried out over an appropriate period of time. As such, they do not indicate targets to be maintained in the long term or upper limits of defense capability, such as those indicated in the appendix to the "National Defense Program Outline" of 1976. We must part with the "National Defense Program Outline," but whether an alternative document should be prepared is a question to be considered by the government. In addition, whether the "Basic Policy for National Defense" of 1957 should be rewritten as to express the new basic thought on defense is a question to be studied in the future. As for specific defense buildup, we believe that midterm plans should be prepared and that efforts should be made on a flexible yet programmed basis.

(5) Establishment of Crisis Management System and Integration of Intelligence

In view of the need to ensure that the intelligence and crisis management systems of the entire government function more effectively, it will be necessary to make full-scale efforts to strengthen and improve the crisis management and intelligence analysis functions at the Cabinet level. This is a task of vital importance that covers a broad range of endeavor, so we hope that sufficient discussions will be conducted on these matters.

Conclusion

It goes without saying that the security policy of each state lies basically in its capacity for self-management and crisis management. It also remains true that the sharing of common interests and values is the most reliable ties in relations between nations. In this sense, the ties between Japan and the United States, which have a common goal concerning the formation of a new international order, are expected to become even more important. This is because peoples of the world, working together to prevent armed conflicts and bring about their early settlements and to resolve social problems contributing to conflict, such as poverty, will likely to have increasing opportunities to act positively and constructively to that end. Through steady accumulation of productive results in such cooperative security mankind will be able to come closer to the United Nations' goal of collective security. As a result, an international order in which the prohibition of "the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes" is the basic rule will become a greater certainty. We should make maximum efforts toward that goal because that will also be in the interest of the Japanese people.