[Title] The Council on Security and Defense Capabilities Report

CONTENTS

PREFACE.....1

INTRODUCTION.....3

CHAPTER 1:

JAPAN'S NEW SECURITY STRATEGY

Section 1 Concept and Goals of our Security Strategy

: the World that Japan Strives for.....6

(1) Maintaining Japan's Security and Prosperity.....6

(2) Maintaining Regional and Global Stability and Prosperity.....6

(3) Maintaining a Free and Open International System.....7

Section 2 Security Environment Surrounding Japan.....8

(1) Basic Trends.....8

(2) Global Challenges.....9

(a) Failed States, International Terrorism and International Crime.....9

(b) Threat of Proliferation of WMDs and Ballistic Missile.....11

(c) Changing Influence of the United States and Shortage of International Public Goods.....12

(3) Security Environment Surrounding Japan.....14

a) North Korea.....14

b) People's Republic of China.....15

c) Russia.....16

d) Asia Pacific Region.....17

Section 3 The "Multilayered Cooperative Security Strategy".....18

(1) Japan's Security: Responses to Direct Threats and Issues to Japan.....21

(2) Preventing Threats from Materializing.....27

(3) Maintenance and Strengthening of the International System.....31

CHAPTER 2:

The Modality of Japan's Defense Force

Section 1 Roles of Japan's Defense Force.....37

(1) Basic Ideas on Roles of Japan's Defense Force.....37

(2) Roles of Japan's Defense Force.....38

a) Deterrence and Effective Response to Contingencies On and Around Japan's Territory.....38

b) Further Stabilization of Regional Environment and Order.....41

c) Improving the Global Security Environment.....43

Section 2 New Functions and Posture of the Defense Force.....45

(1) Guiding Principles for the Buildup of Japan's Defense Posture.....45

(2) Common Requirements for the Defense Force to Fulfill Functions.....46

(3) Enhancing Joint Operations and Increasing Jointness.....48

(4) Defense Build-up that Contributes to Strengthening Japan-U.S. Alliance.....48

(5) International Peace Cooperation Activities.....49

Section 3 Infrastructure that Bolsters the Defense Force.....49

(1) Personnel Infrastructure

(Response to Decline in Number of Young People, and Other Issues).....50

(2) Materiel Infrastructure (Defense Production and Technology Infrastructure).....52

(3) Social Infrastructure (Support from Japanese Nationals, and Local Cooperation).....54

CHAPTER 3:

REVIEW OF BASIC PRINCIPLES OF JAPAN'S NATIONAL SECURITY

Section 1 Guiding Principles for National Security Policy.....56

Section 2 Guidelines and Frameworks for International Peace Cooperation Activities.....58

(1) Japan's participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations at Present.....58

(2) Revision of Criteria for Participating.....59

(3) Enactment of a Permanent Law for International Peace Cooperation.....62

(4) Establishment of a Legal Basis for International Peace Cooperation.....62

Section 3 Policies on Response to a Ballistic Missile Attack.....63

(1) Importance of U.S.-Japan Cooperation.....63

(2) Establishment of a Legal Basis.....63

(a) Interception of Ballistic Missile on Its Way to the United States.....64

(b) Defense of U.S. Naval Vessels.....64

Section 4 The Three Principles on Arms Exports, etc......64

(1) Today's Problems Surrounding Arms Exports.....64

(2) Revision of the Three Principles on Arms Exports, etc......66

(3) The Scope of Exemption from the Three Principles on Arms Exports, etc......67

Section 5 Foundation for Realizing the New Security Strategy......67

(1) Strengthening Function of the Kantei (Prime Minister's Office).....67

(2) Strengthening the Functions of Intelligence and Information Security.....68

(3) Strengthening Civilian Control by the Diet.....69

COUNCIL MEMBERS.....75

COUNCIL MEETINGS.....76

SUMMARY.....77

PREFACE

Though two decades have passed since the Cold War ended and the bipolar world order no longer exists, the world has not celebrated a time of peace and stability -ethnic conflicts never run short, international terror activities remain active, failed states appear sporadically, and piracy is rampant. When you shift your views to the area surrounding Japan, the security policy agenda becomes more complicated: North Korea resumed ballistic missile launches and nuclear activities; China is continuing its military build-up based upon its economic success. In addition, the United States who has adopted unilateral policies at times with its overwhelming military power may now be shifting its preference to international concord upon President Obama's assumption of office. His election is said to have caused a change of global security trends.

Against this backdrop, opportunities for the Japan Self Defense Forces to become involved in international peace cooperation activities, such as post-conflict recovery/reconstruction and disaster relief projects, are increasing. While aiming at maintenance and construction of free and democratic international systems, and "desir[ing] to occupy an honored place in an international society" as stated in the preamble of its Constitution, Japan is faced with the question of what kind of roles it should undertake.

Additionally, as an island nation with limited landmass as well as a low self-sufficiency ratio in energy and food, security of sea transportation routes is directly tied to the Japanese public's safety and relief. In this way, national security and the SDF's activities are now being viewed from not only the perspective of national defense, but also from various security standpoints.

Resulting from the discussion at our Council in which many different perspectives involving great changes in the security environment were presented, the majority of opinions can be summarized into the following three points.

First, while deepening the Japan-U.S. alliance, Japan should clarify its own role which reflects a changing security environment.

Secondly, Japan should improve the quality and quantity of its contribution to international cooperation efforts in order to counter new and globalized challenges such as international terrorism and failed states.

Lastly, despite an aging society together with slow economic growth leading to a severe fiscal circumstance, the infrastructure of human resources, industry and technology, and local communities that uphold Japan's defense should be maintained.

It is an honor to participate in this Council as a chair, and I would like to share two personal impressions I gained through this experience.

Firstly, I suspect that the Japanese people have failed to share a sense of reality about the international security situation even though they have encountered incidents that threaten the whole world and requests Japan's involvement from the international society. Maybe this is because Japan has been lucky enough to enjoy peace without nation-wide discussion over security-related problems. Japan's traditional behavior of this sort is, however, no longer tolerable in the international community, which is facing a sea change in terms of security. It is time to share a vision with simple words and stir up public debate about what the roles of Japan, as a peace-fostering nation, should be. It is also important to earnestly think of means for change including legislation that will allow Japan to play necessary roles.

Secondly, the activities of the SDF, which are becoming more diverse and more important, should be fully understood and supported by the Japanese public. Efforts to this effect should be made not only by the Ministry of Defense, but also by the entire Japanese government as a whole. These days, the SDF has caught the attention of the Japanese public through its activities such as disaster relief, overseas deployment, and missile defense operations. Seizing this opportunity, the Japanese should closely look at necessary costs, both human and material, as well as the need for coexistence with local communities that support the SDF's daily activities, in order to accomplish peace and security in Japan and around the world.

The Council has completed this report, thanks to the devotion of its distinguished members who have profound knowledge and experience. Though I refrain from mentioning individual contents shown in the following chapters, it is my sincerest hope that this report will not only facilitate the establishment of a new National Defense Program Guideline, but also attract nation-wide attention to defense policy.

Finally, I am grateful to the Council members who stimulated discussion and to other renowned guests of the Council, as well as to staff of the Cabinet Secretariat.

The Council on Security and Defense Capability

Chairperson Tsunehisa KATSUMATA

INTRODUCTION

Seven years have passed since the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, and 20years have passed since the end of the Cold War. The last world war was almost sixty five years ago. Though the world has seen wars, poverty, and disturbances during this time period, Japan has never come under fire. People have lived basically safe and affluent lives. Since democracy has taken root and freedom of speech secured, people have been enjoying the right to study and the right to criticize. For a long time, Japan has been an economic power and an important member of the international community. Japan is one of the most fortunate beneficiaries of today's free and open international system.

Until now, Japan has opted for restrictive attitudes toward international security as well as its own national defense. Now that the world is facing a change, however, the days when Japan was guaranteed security while remaining passive are coming to an end. The Council believes that it is time for Japan to think more seriously about its own role and be more proactive. Needless to say, for the sake of Japan's security, it would be preferable if peace were maintained without having to exert actual military force. We should not abandon the principle of using force only as a last resort. However, peace is not synonymous with the absence of a military. In some cases, the use of force is required in order to achieve peace, whether it is for the defense of Japan or the security of the international community. What is important is that there be thorough discussion and public consensus on the security objectives that are worth protecting by force regardless of cost or sacrifice. We should prepare a system during peacetime to appropriately exert military force in order to achieve those objectives. If the Japanese people want to maintain a world that they deem precious, the world that Japan strives for should be clearly explained and proactive efforts toward its realization should be made.

This report aims to prescribe a security strategy. Japan does not have a national security strategy that is explicitly stipulated in a document. This sometimes causes disunity between ministries' individual programs, or an inability to promote effective foreign and security policies. This report describes how Japan should realize its security objectives. Compared with the Cold War era, in today's security environment it is sometimes difficult to make a clear distinction between peacetime and wartime, as well as to confirm the existence of certain threats. This means that the security of Japan should be protected by combining defense capabilities with diplomatic power, economic power, cultural exchange, and other methods. Thus this report makes recommendations not only for the modality of our defense capabilities, but also for other measures pertaining to security policy.

The Council recommends that the National Defense Program Guidelines on and after the fiscal year of 2005 (2005 NDPG) be revised. We think that our defense capabilities should be reviewed to respond to the changes in circumstances that have been observed since the time of the 2005 NDPG. As is described in detail in the following chapters, though the United States has led the international system with its superior power, its influence is widely seen to have changed and at the same time there has been an increase in problems that cannot be solved by one country but rather require multilateral cooperation. If we shift our eyes to the area surrounding Japan, North Korea has developed its nuclear and missile capabilities to such an extent that it now represents a realistic threat. The regional security environment is also changing through China's military modernization, which could be a destabilizing factor. We call for reviewing the NDPG so as to properly respond to global and regional changes. The concept of a "multi-functional and flexible" defense force was proposed by the 2005 NDPG, recognizing the threat posed by international terrorism and destabilizing factors such as North Korea's nuclear and missile development; we make recommendations that aim to improve the effectiveness of our defense force.

In publishing this report, we try to clearly express our views on security threats and concerns. We think that observing problems directly and plainly communicating our views will help to increase the transparency of our argument, as well as provide grounds for national discussion regarding the security of Japan. This idea is also founded on our confidence in Japanese democracy. Democracy is the ultimate guarantee for the correct use of defense capabilities. In a democracy, each person is responsible for making judgments regarding security, including the use of military power. We are also conscious of the gaze from overseas; we aim to dispel any misunderstandings surrounding Japan's intentions and actions by showing our direction and honestly expressing our concerns. The expression of our concerns comes not from a hostile attitude, but from our hope to be able to construct a stable relationship.

Some of our recommendations challenge our traditional defense policy, but others encourage measures to keep such bold initiatives from affecting Japan's security for example, the promotion of cooperative relations with surrounding countries and a review to make our system of civilian control more effective. We believe it is important to establish institutions and an environment in which the Japanese can make the right decisions about possession and4use of defense capabilities.

We sincerely hope that, based upon this report, national discussion will be deepened and appropriate and executable security policies formulated.

In Chapter 1, we present Japan's new security strategy. First, we clarify our view on the ideals and objectives of our security strategy, then we give an overview of the security environment surrounding Japan and identify the threats that stand in the way of our goal and the challenges that we should address. In Chapter 2, we focus on Japan's defense force and make recommendations for its modality and how it should best be used. In Chapter 3, we stipulate review of institutions and policies in order to realize our security strategy.

CHAPTER 1 JAPAN'S NEW SECURITY STRATEGY

Section 1 Concept and Goals of Our Security Strategy: the World that Japan Strives for

(1) Maintaining Japan's Security and Prosperity

Security of Japan

In the world that Japan strives for, Japan's own security must be protected. The level of security the Japanese people seek is very high, and they take it for granted they can continue not worrying about security in their daily lives. However, if security is threatened, it should be maintained as a matter of priority over daily life. It is better to avoid such a situation by preventing threats and problems in the first place. In order to do so, Japan must prepare to defend itself against armed invasion and coercion and to minimize damage if deterrence fails.

Safety of Japanese People Overseas

The safety of the Japanese people must be achieved globally wherever they maybe - both inside and outside of Japan- as their activities are not limited to within Japan. The safety of transportation must be also achieved to enable the Japanese people to come and go freely throughout the world.

Free and Affluent Lifestyle

Many Japanese people hope that the current social order and comfortable daily life will endure. In order to maintain the free and affluent lives of the Japanese people, free economic activities and freedom of transportation should be ensured under an open international system. It is necessary to maintain Japan's economic fundamentals and strengthen the industrial competitiveness of science and technology.

(2) Maintaining Regional and Global Stability and Prosperity

Regional and Global Stability

In order to maintain Japan's security, the stability of the area surrounding Japan must be ensured. In particular, the stability of Japan's immediate neighbors is important. Regional and global stability is also necessary to sustain the foundations of the Japanese people's livelihoods.

Stability of Markets and Market Access

A secure supply of food and materials, access to markets, and the safety of sea lines of communication are all necessary to sustain Japan's prosperity. Overseas markets need to be stable, and maintaining the stability of important trading partners is also critical.

(3) Maintaining a Free and Open International System

Realizing a World where the Liberty and Dignity of the Individual is Protected

Material well-being is not the only objective of an affluent life. Free and democratic values should be promoted in Japan and in every country throughout the world. Advocating basic human rights all over the world is another important objective. Many world regions are wanting in peace and safety, and a great number of people suffer from starvation and fear. It is difficult not to lose hope for the future in failed states and societies lacking governance. In some cases, the government itself is the primary cause of persecution and dread. Happiness and global prosperity are brought about when individuals are born into a world where they have a chance to demonstrate their capabilities. A global society where liberty of the individual and democracy are respected can be built up when living standards are improved and societies are stabilized.

Maintaining a World Where International Rules and Arrangements are Observed

States sometimes disagree over their national interests in the international community, which, unlike a nation state, has no central government. While conflicts of interests may be resolved by armed force, the international community has adopted rules -though still imperfect -through international treaties and the United Nations to mitigate disputes and minimize the use of force to resolve disputes. These international rules and arrangements must be observed. It will be necessary to reinforce these institutions to enable them to inflict severe punishments for violations. For that purpose, international organizations have to be enhanced and norm consciousness stimulated. Japan should play a proactive role in international efforts to further strengthen international organizations and establish international norms.

Maintaining a World Where People Do Not Resort to Armed force to Break the Status Quo

Japan denies any war of aggression and renounces the use of force as means of settling international disputes. These principles will not change even if Japan gets more proactively involved in international security. A goal of the Japanese people is for the idea to prevail in the world that international disputes are not to be settled by armed force. Achieving these goals in an increasingly interconnected world will enable the realization of the world that Japan strives for. Since we cannot build walls between people, it follows that world peace is necessary for Japan's own security. Young people go abroad or come to Japan to study to realize their dreams. Families travel overseas and come back safety. Companies do business with foreign counterparts to co-develop new products. Disagreements are settled through negotiations or in court, not by force. This seems quite natural. It is of utmost importance that this continues throughout the world.

Section 2 Security Environment Surrounding Japan

In order to realize the world that Japan strives for, the current international environment needs first to be analyzed so as to identify the problems that hinder the achievement of our objectives. After that, it is necessary to examine how to utilize available means to solve these problems.

(1)Basic Trends

Progress of Globalization

The globalization of economies and societies is proceeding. As interdependence between states is deepening, especially economically, it is almost impossible for an individual state to take upon itself the sole responsibility for its own activities. Nowadays, a situation rarely arises in which an individual state wins or loses; gains and losses are shared in most cases. As a favorable result of globalization, stability has been brought about among major powers and the possibility of large-scale war between them is small.

On the other hand, globalization has also allowed threats to spread worldwide. The whole world is now affected by problems that appear peculiar to a specific region. For example, a domestic problem in an area far from Japan, such as Somalia, affects the security of Japan and the world. Weakened governance may result in deteriorating public safety and then create a hotbed for international terrorism and crime. Although international cooperation for economic development has usually been understood from a humanitarian perspective, now more than ever it should be recognized in a security context.

Increasing Transnational Issues

While globalization is proceeding, transnational challenges are increasing, too. Challenges that cannot be resolved without international cooperation are increasing and growing more serious, including global climate change, environment problems, and new infectious diseases. Security threats include international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and piracy, each of which is transnational. An increase in transnational problems gives rise to a situation where no country is able to maintain peace under national isolation with closed borders. As a result, international cooperation and a robust international system are increasingly needed to solve new issues, which are different in quality from old ones.

Changing International System

There are signs of change in the international system itself, however. For the 65 years since the end of the Second World War, the United States has taken the lead in the international system, which has been constant until now. The United States is supported by many countries in various dimensions: politically, economically, socially, and culturally. The United States has continued to be the closest and most important country for Japan, and the Japan-U.S. alliance has provided strong bonds which go far beyond an expedient relationship to ensure security interests. Although the absolute superiority of U.S. power remains unchallenged, the power balance is undergoing a change caused by the emergence of rising powers, including China and India, and other factors. Moreover, because of an increasing number of problems that cannot be resolved by a single country, the scope of U.S. ability to solve problems unilaterally has become narrower than before. As for East Asia in particular, China has been building up its military power as its economy continues rapid development. It is important both for Japan and for the region as a whole that China's rising power will contribute to, rather than disturb, regional stability.

(2) Global Challenges

(a) Failed States, International Terrorism and International Crime

Failed States and Human Security*1*

One feature of the Post-Cold War security environment is that civil wars have increased. Conflicts caused by ethnic and religious antagonism, which did not emerge under the Cold War regime, have increased. In the early 90's, civil wars involving civilians broke out frequently, in former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda, etc. This type of conflict has been occurring in many parts of the world since 2000. Civil wars destroy the governance system of the affected country and can result in what is called a failed state. In such a case, it may take a long time to restore governance, even after a cease-fire, and as a result, what is called human security may be violated, whereby basic human needs, including food and safety, are not provided for.*2*

International Terrorism

Since the 9.11 terrorist attacks, failed states have been regarded as a serious threat to international security, from a new perspective: fragile governance could provide a sanctuary for international terrorist groups, and deteriorating public safety could harm the legitimacy of the government and prevent the recovery of governance. In the global fight against terrorism, the international community, including the United States, launched operations to remove threats from international terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda, to drive out regimes that overtly harbor terrorists, and to destroy bases of international terrorist groups. Some terrorist attacks were successfully prevented. However, the situation in Afghanistan is still not stable and the border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan is regarded as a hotbed for international terrorism. Grappling with these problems requires continuous international effort. In coping with terrorist groups whose major tactic is irregular warfare, such as suicide bombing and improvised explosive devise (IED) attacks, an integrated approach is recognized as increasingly important. This includes not only military operations but also law enforcement by the police and the stabilization of public welfare by the administration.

International Crime and Piracy

International criminal groups and pirates -in the same way as international terrorist groups -seek their sanctuaries in regions and areas where governance is fragile; thus their unlawful activities could facilitate transnational activities by international terrorist groups and their logistics support. For this reason, the perspective of counter terrorism has increasingly called for enhanced international efforts to provide law enforcement against international crimes, including monitoring money laundering and cracking down on smuggling and dealing in drugs and WMD-related materials.

The globalization of economies and societies is a new problem in that the impact of threats could reach anywhere in the world. The security of the world, including Japan, is affected by situations in distant countries and areas, such as the world-wide Al Qaeda network and piracy off the coast of Somalia.

Failed states, international terrorism and international crimes are interrelated problems. The international community, through cooperation between member states, has been supporting capacity building. In doing so, a comprehensive approach that combines civilian and military components is required. This means that military organizations are expected to play greater roles and provide capabilities other than military combat, while civilian activities are needed even where public order is unstable.*3*

In addition, the role that law enforcement agencies play in international cooperation has been expanding. Peacekeeping operations require a large number of civilian police officers to conduct public safety missions. The reform of the security sector also requires mentors from law enforcement agencies to reconstruct the police force.

(b) Threat of Proliferation of WMDs and Ballistic Missile

The proliferation of WMDs, particularly nuclear weapons, constitutes a serious threat to international security. The strategic nuclear forces of the United States and Russia have been drastically reduced since the end of the Cold War. At present, the United States and Russia are negotiating a new arms control treaty to replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I). The United Kingdom and France have also started nuclear disarmament. Nuclear disarmament is generally in progress among the five nuclear states, except that Chinese nuclear forces lack transparency and appear to be uncommitted to arms reduction.

On the other hand, some countries have newly come to possess nuclear capability; some have been detected developing nuclear programs, such as North Korea. The proliferation of nuclear weapons could result not only in a shift in power balance destabilizing the region, but also a nuclearization domino effect that gives birth to new nuclear powers. Especially ,North Korea's nuclearization would destabilize the area surrounding Japan and constitute a direct threat to Japan. North Korea's continuing adventurous provocation urges the international community to take strict measures to achieve denuclearization. Furthermore, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorist groups would be a grave threat to the whole world. Accordingly, ensuring the safety of nuclear-related facilities of states with nuclear weapons or nuclear technologies has become a major international security issue.

Compared to the Cold War era, the current international security environment seems characterized be more threats that are difficult to meet through traditional deterrence. New measures are necessary to maintain highly credible deterrence.*4* From the humanitarian point of view, the nuclear threshold is very high, making it very difficult for nuclear powers, including the United States, to actually cross it. In order to make deterrence more credible and effective, it is necessary to strengthen conventional deterrence and posture, in addition to traditional retaliatory nuclear deterrence, working out a multi-layered deterrent strategy.

(c)Changing Influence of the United States and Shortage of International Public Goods

The influence of the United States, once featured in the "unipolar era," seems to be changing amid the mountain of complicated security problems that cannot be solved in a short period. Since the 1990's, the United States has been proud of its tremendous power in political, economic, military and all other fields. However, the United States has taken on increasing military burdens, with the counter-terror activities, use of force in Iraq, etc., and been criticized for its unilateralist behavior. The decline of U.S. prestige has occurred both inside and outside the United States. The global financial crisis has accelerated the decline, and the perception is emerging that the United States may not be able to commit itself to international security as actively as in the past. In additions, U.S. relative power is declining as a result of the rise of emerging countries, such as China and India.

Militarily, the United States has controlled the international public space known as the global commons.*5* This capability has enabled the United States to intervene in conflicts, and the United States has been proud of its overwhelming power that remains almost unchallenged throughout the world. On the other hand, U.S. control over the global commons has assured other countries to enjoy freedom of navigation in the high-seas, providing international public goods. The absolute superiority of U.S. power remains unchallenged, but in certain areas movements are growing to deny U.S. intervention, as newly emerging countries gain power. This means that the United States will have to pay additional costs to continue to act as the "world's policeman," and might possibly make commitments selectively depending on its own benefits. In order to maintain a cooperative international system, it is necessary to provide international public goods: e.g., freedom of navigation, stability of the international financial system, maintenance of the free trade regime, and economic aid, as well as enforceable measures including military sanctions. If the U.S. commitment to the world declines, global and regional security and stability, as well as that of Japan, will be greatly affected as follows.

First, let us look at the impact on global security. The most important issue for the international community would be whether or not to maintain the sound international system and establish an international cooperation mechanism. A decline in U.S. influence would make solving this difficult problem even more difficult. A shortage of international public goods would allow failed states or rogue states and groups to increase in number, bringing with it the risk of the erosion of international security. Moreover, the insufficient provision of international public goods may cause emerging economies, such as China and India, to feel discontented with the existing international system and international rules created by developed countries. It is important to encourage emerging economies to bolster, rather than destroy, these systems and to become responsible stakeholders.

Second, radical subversive movements have been deterred in the Asia-Pacific region because of the U.S. commitment to the region, although the region is undergoing dynamic changes, with potential instability existing. However, if the perception that U.S. commitment to the region is declining were to spread among countries in the Asia-Pacific region, this could destabilize the region, regardless of the strength of U.S. will.

Third, this will also affect Japan's safety. The Japan-U.S. alliance is robust and the U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan is credible. In particular, it is inconceivable that the United States will refuse to defend Japan should a full-scale invasion of Japan occur. However, U.S. military resources directed to the region might be limited, depending on the situation in other regions, such as the Middle East, Afghanistan and Pakistan. As mentioned above, if the perception that U.S. commitment was in decline were to spread among countries in the region, this could lower deterrence and tempt a third country to invade Japan.

In order to avoid such a situation, it is important for major powers, such as EU member states and Japan, to tackle international problems in a way that they complement the United States. Specifically, they have to jointly take part in the provision of international public goods, together with the United States, which has been the leading provider. In the field of security, it is important to ensure the stable use of SLOC, space, and cyber-space so that states and groups hostile to the international community may not limit other countries' use of it.

(3) Security Environment Surrounding Japan

a) North Korea

North Korea is continuing its nuclear and missile development despite the condemnation of the international community, posing a serious threat to international peace and security. In particular, a possible miscalculation by North Korea is a matter for concern, as North Korea, with a closed system dependent on military power, is very antagonistic towards, and wary of, foreign countries and it is unclear whether it grasps the intention of the outside world correctly. As a result, feelings of anxiety have arisen as to whether deterrence will work on North Korea, which heightens the sense of danger felt by the international community. The Six-Party Talks tried to improve the situation but were not successful in stopping North Korea's nuclear development program. The situation has grown more serious. North Korea launched a missile, which flew over Japanese territory in April 2009, and in May it conducted its second underground nuclear test since October 2006. While some argue that North Korea's continued nuclear and missile development is aimed at gaining international bargaining chips and foreign currency, it exposes Northeast Asia to danger when combined with adventurist activities or accidents stemming from internal disturbance, suspicions or misunderstandings about the international community, etc.

The progress of North Korea's nuclear development and delivery means (ballistic missiles) is a direct threat to Japan's security. If North Korea continues to develop smaller nuclear weapons and acquires the capability to launch ballistic missiles carrying a nuclear warhead, the threat to the region, especially to Japan, would be tremendous.

The North Korean issues are not limited to nuclear and missile threats. North Korea has one of the largest special operation forces in the world, and if North Korea should use them to launch subversive activities against critical facilities in Japan, it would constitute another threat to Japan. The abduction issue has also not been resolved yet. Furthermore, the future of North Korea's regime is uncertain, and the breakup of the leadership or the collapse of the regime is possible depending on the result of the power succession. It is necessary to work out a contingency plan to prepare even for "Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan" in case the situation in the Korean peninsula becomes destabilized. In such a case, it will be important for the international community, including the United States and the ROK (Republic of Korea), to prevent the nuclear-related materials in North Korea from being misused by securing them and placing them under international control. In this regard, Japan needs to make preparations for various scenarios, working out what contributions it could offer.

b) People's Republic of China

China is undergoing rapid changes in various spheres, such as economic, political, and military. Many of these changes are favorable for Japan. Over recent decades, China has grown remarkably, become open internationally, stabilized domestically, and granted individual citizens more freedom than before. Between China and Japan, cooperation has been enhanced in many fields. In particular, China has become Japan's largest trade partner and the two countries have shared various common interests. Over the past thirty years, Japan has encouraged and supported China's economic development and internationalization, efforts which have now borne fruit. China's economic growth contributes to both the Japanese and the world economy, and continuing economic growth is welcomed by Japan. The two counties are important partners who cooperate with each other in security and diplomatic affairs, including the North Korea's nuclear problem, and continue efforts to build a "Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests." While China is sometimes a competitor for Japan, this constructive competition has a positive effect on the development of both countries and the region.

On the other hand, there are changes that are of concern for the region and for Japan. Along with economic growth, China is rapidly reinforcing its military power. China has been promoting military modernization since the end of the 1970's, and been accelerating it especially since the 1990's, strengthening air and sea powers.*6* Ballistic missiles, which are one means of delivering nuclear weapons, have been also improved both in quality and quantity. These reinforcements of military capabilities are a cause for concern as they lack transparency in terms of their purpose and size.

In addition, China has not sufficiently disclosed what its military capabilities really are. For example, China's official defense budget has shown double-digit increases for the past 21 consecutive years; however, the actual conditions are not known, as it is said that there are a lot of unannounced expenditures. While many countries disclose their whole weapon acquisition plan, China does not reveal in its medium- or long-term plans of how many fighters it will procure in the future, for example. The same is true of Chinese military operations. The Chinese navy and air force have increased their activities in Japan's territorial waters, EEZs and surrounding waters and airspace, but their purposes are not clear. There is also a lack of transparency in the decision-making process regarding security policy and party-military relations. China's non-transparent military build-up could lead to destabilization in the region.

Cross-Strait relations have been relatively stable since the Nationalist Party in Taiwan (KMT) came back to power after an 8-year interval. Hence, onetime tensions have eased, reducing the possibility of a cross-Strait conflict. While political stability is welcomed, China does not reject the possibility of using force against Taiwan and there is no major change recognized in the trend toward reinforcing the short range ballistic missile(SRBM) arsenal deployed across the Strait, and so on.

A good relationship between Japan and China is indispensable for regional stability. It is of course desirable for the stability of Japan and the region, as well as the world, that China become a responsible power. Japan expects China to choose that way for itself, and Japan should work hard to provide an environment that facilitates such a choice.

c) Russia

Russia is a major power that demonstrates a large presence in terms of diplomacy and security in the international community and is one of the key players that can influence security in the Asia-Pacific region. As such, its future direction draws attention. Although Russia does not necessarily share the norms and values of developed nations, including Japan, it has been democratizing since the end of the Cold War, being a member of the Group of 8 countries. While Japan and Russia have deepened economic relations, such as resource and energy development, there is an unresolved territorial issue.

Regarding military power, Russia still has large-scale military capabilities, including nuclear forces, in the Far East region. It has recently increased its defense expenditures and continues to modernize its nuclear capabilities and readiness force. Although Russia's military is less active in carrying out training and exercises, etc., than during the Cold War era, it has been seen to be reactivating training activities in recent years.*7*

The Russia-Georgia Conflict over South Ossetia in August 2008 increased tension between Russia and Western countries for a time, but did not result in crucial confrontation; it also did not directly affect the security environment in Northeast Asia. In this conflict, Russia demonstrated high capabilities of mobility and joint operations, deploying large-scale armed forces in a short period of time. Russia also has high technological capabilities, as shown by the fact that a lot of China's new equipment has been imported from Russia. In this sense, Russia's accumulated latent ability is high.

It is important to encourage Russia to act as a responsible major power so as to improve the security environment surrounding Japan and to promote Japan's national interests. In particular, expanded cooperation can be expected in, for example, maritime security. Defense exchanges currently conducted between the two countries, including search and rescue exercises, should be enhanced to further deepen the bilateral relationship of confidence in the region.

d) Asia-Pacific Region

In the Asia-Pacific region, politics, economies and societies are changing dynamically, bringing coexisting causes of association and confrontation. On the one hand, intra-regional economic relations have deepened and ties between countries have been strengthened, as shown by the holding of the East Asian Summit. Bilateral defense exchanges are also progressing, and Japan has been carrying out bilateral defense exchanges with a variety of countries: China, Russia, the ROK, Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Timor-Leste, India, New Zealand, etc. On the other hand, some territorial disputes remain in this region, such as in the South China Sea. Against the backdrop of economic development, many countries in the region have been conducting military modernization since the 1990s, and attention should be paid to regional trends.

Japan and the ROK have deep cultural and historical relations, and are geographically close to each other. As both countries have many security issues in common, such as the threat of North Korea, they have recently been promoting security cooperation. The first meeting of Japan-U.S.-ROK defense ministers was held in May, 2009. It is hoped that the cooperative relationship between the two countries will further deepen.

In the Asia-Pacific region, a bundle of bilateral alliances with the United States called the "hub and spokes" architecture has played a role in guaranteeing regional security and order. However, regional security frameworks are still fragile: connections between states and multilateral security cooperation are still limited, partly because the United States centers on "hub and spoke" alliances. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a multilateral regional security framework, has grown into a venue for security dialogue. It is developing from Stage 1, targeting confidence-building, to Stage 2, targeting preventive diplomacy. It has yet to reach Stage 3, targeting the establishment of a conflict-resolution mechanism. The lack of a cooperative framework in the region that is changing in various ways makes relations between regional countries fragile. In order to improve security cooperation, cooperation has to be developed with regard to specific areas such as terrorism, infectious diseases, the prevention of international trafficking in weapons and drug, ensuring the safety of maritime traffic, climate change, the economy, and disaster relief assistance. It should be also noted that it takes a long time to construct an effective regional security framework.

Section 3 The "Multilayered Cooperative Security Strategy"

Under this security environment, then, what kind of a security strategy should Japan adopt?*8*

In the new security environment, in order to realize the world which Japan strives for, as explained in Section 1 of this chapter, there are three goals to attain. The first goal is to ensure Japan's own security. This goal requires an effort to eliminate threats and risks to Japan to prevent them doing harm. The Second goal is to prevent threats from materializing. This goal necessitates preventive efforts to address an issue that is not a threat at the present moment and keep it from developing into a threat in the future by improving the international security environment. The third goal is to maintain and strengthen the international system. With this goal, Japan aims to maintain the current international system and construct a new institution within which security cooperation is conducted much more effectively. "Basic Principles of Japan's Security Policy" described in the 2005 NDPG set two goals: defense of Japan and improvement of the international security environment. Now that there are more security challenges, such as the proliferation of WMD and its means of delivery and international terrorism, which threaten the free and open international system, and that the influence of the United States which has to date supported and led the international system seems to have changed, Japan's efforts to maintain and construct sound international systems matter more to the whole international community.

To achieve these three targets, what kind of approaches should Japan take? The first thing to do is for Japan to take actions by itself. However, it is impossible for Japan to solve all threats and challenges to security on its own, simply considering the fact that transnational threats are increasing. Hence, Japan needs the cooperation with other states. Cooperation with its allies is deemed priority, which is the second approach. The alliance with the United States remains a key pillar of Japan's security strategy, along with Japan's own defense efforts. The third approach involves regional cooperation and the fourth, cooperation with the global community. Though Japan has participated in several international peace cooperation activities, henceforth Japan should play a more proactive role in international activities, recognizing that its own security is founded on cooperation with the international community.

The third approach, regional cooperation, did not appear clearly in the "Basic Principles of Japan's Security Policy" in the 2005 NDPG. However, due to geographical proximity and other reasons, Japan shares many security issues with other countries in the region. Many issues are difficult to settle without regional cooperation. Thus the Council considers that cooperation in the region should be deemed another approach to achieving the goals. Taking examples from other regions, a multilateral organization on security cooperation is deemed to be an effective vehicle to promote regional cooperation and restrain and potential rivalries. Though the Asia-Pacific region is one of the most rapidly developing and changing areas in the world with lively intra-regional economic activities, the region lacks an effective regional security framework, such as the one that exists in Europe. Recognizing both limitations at present and possibilities for future development, it would be desirable to create an effective policy to promote cooperation in the region.

Therefore, the new security strategy demonstrates how to get rid of threats to Japan, how to prevent threats from materializing and how to maintain and strengthen the international system, by combining the following four approaches:

- Japan's own efforts

- Cooperation with its allies

- Cooperation with other countries in the region

- Cooperation with the global community

The matrix below shows the concepts of the three goals and four approaches that the Council proposes.

It should be noted that the three goals overlap in many areas and cannot be completely separated. The same is true for the four approaches. Today's security environment is not as characterized by geographical notions as it once was, and there is a less clear distinction between peace time and war time. Additionally, the speed at which situations develop is increasing. Hence, it is important to combine four approaches in synergy and make them function in a multilayered and seamless manner.

This section presents the ways (strategies) to cope with the threats and challenges facing security. The four approaches are discussed in combination, not individually, because each agenda should be addressed by using all the four approaches in a combined and multilayered manner.

Needless to say, Japan's security strategy is never to be pursued in a way that threatens other countries' security. However, because of geographical proximity and other factors, it is a fact that a security dilemma could easily occur in the area surrounding Japan.*9* Japan must implement its security strategy fully aware of this fact. Recalling world history, the international community tends to be unstable when the power of a status-quo country declines and the power of an emerging country rises. The former feels cautious and impatient with the latter, which amplifies the dissatisfaction of the latter and the relationship deteriorates in most cases. Past large-scale wars can be attributed in part to the failure of the international community to manage the changing balance between powers. If there is another failure, the world will possibly end. Now that cooperation is seen between major powers, a comprehensive, multilayered, and effective strategy, namely a "multilayered cooperative security strategy" is needed. The purpose of this strategy is to construct a framework that cultivates "buds" of cooperation and eliminates "seeds" of confrontation and risk.

(1) Japan's Security: Responses to Direct Threats and Issues to Japan

Japan never invades other countries. At the same time, Japan never allows itself to be invaded by other countries. The most important thing for Japan's security is to ensure that Japan is safe vis-à-vis external threats. This goal is achieved through two measures: the first, deterrence, is to force an adversary to abandon its intentions of invasion and to deter hostile actions by demonstrating readiness and a determination to repel (or deny) any attack; the second is to minimize the damage of attack and prevent the adversary from achieving its political goal if deterrence should fail and result in an actual attack.

In the security environment surrounding Japan, North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles and an attack by the special operations forces (SOF) have already posed a threat to Japan. Also the possibility of an international terrorist group attempting an attack targeting Japan cannot be denied.

There are also security challenges arising from Japan's geographical conditions. Japan's isolated islands and offshore islands are mostly located far away from bases of the SDF and Japan Coast Guard, and in fragile situations in terms of their defense.

In Japan natural disasters such as earthquakes and typhoons frequently occur. Large-scale natural disasters that bring about damage are a serious threat to the security of Japan as well.

These security threats and challenges that Japan is facing are different in nature and quality and it is difficult to classify them into peacetime or wartime; in many cases they are positioned somewhere in between. Therefore, it is necessary to pay attention to implementing a seamless response by using both hardware, such as SDF equipment, and software, such as Japan's domestic legislation and the alliance framework.

Prescriptions for these threats and challenges are as follows.

Multi-functional and Flexible Defense Force

The 2005 NDPG presents the idea that Japan should possess a multi-functional, flexible and effective defense force to respond to new threats that emerged after the Cold War, while maintaining those elements of the Basic Defense Force Concept that remain valid.*10*

This concept envisions a defense force that is ready for duty, mobile, adaptable and multi-purpose, and equipped with state-of-the-art technology and intelligence capabilities. The force should be able to operate its various units and equipment to effectively respond to new threats and diverse situations. Domestic factors - such as the declining number of young people and low economic growth - that Japan faces have also supported the idea of flexible operations that do not depend on expanding the size of the defense force.

If one compares the security environment which the 2005 NDPG presupposed to the present one, the abovementioned changes have emerged. It is necessary for Japan to possess a defense force that is capable of defending the country proactively and to build up a posture that can make effective use of them in operations abroad to realize the security of the international community. Regarding domestic situations, demographic, economic, and fiscal conditions have worsened since 2004, particularly the financial situation, which due to such factors as increasing expenditures for social welfare is expected to remain unchanged in the mid- and long-term. Therefore, under the new security strategy, it is necessary to develop an effective and efficient defense force by clearly defining priorities in terms of threats and challenges to Japan's security, while persisting in trying to create a multi-functional and flexible defense force.

Maintain Deterrence to North Korea's Nuclear and Ballistic Missile and Others*11*

The aim of deterrence is to break the will of an opponent. Concerning the nuclear and ballistic missile threat directed at Japan from North Korea, the Japanese government has to break North Korea's will, to prevent it from actually using them.

To do this, first, it is necessary to enhance deterrence by denial, through the improvement of the credibility of Japan's missile defense (MD) capabilities. By generating a situation where launched missiles are intercepted, making it impossible for North Korea to attain its aim, North Korea will give up trying to attack Japan. At the same time, this will be the best measure for defense if Japan is ever actually attacked. Secondly, an information dissemination system should be continuously developed in order to minimize damage and urge the Japanese people to respond calmly. Thirdly, it is necessary to enhance deterrence by punishment. U.S. extended deterrence, the so-called nuclear umbrella, is at the core of this kind of deterrence. Japan and the United States should closely consult on deterrence through other strike powers and confirm the individual roles and missions of the two sides in detail in order to enhance its credibility.

To reliably deter North Korea's use of nuclear weapons and missiles, it is necessary to assemble multilayered nets of deterrence and it is extremely important to effectively combine Japan's own efforts and cooperation with those of its allies.

One example of a situation where Japan must independently deter and respond with its own defense force is in the case of a SOF attack. If the tension heightens in the Korean Peninsula, it will be necessary to defend important national assets from assault, and improve preparedness to detect and destroy the SOF units.

Security and Defense Cooperation with the United States

The alliance with the United States is as important a pillar for Japan's security as its own efforts. Even though U.S. influence seems to be changing, its importance remains unchallenged.

In 2010, the current Japan-U.S. Security Treaty will have been in effect for 50 years.

Japan and the United States, who once fought each other, have overcome the past, and are now enjoying a relationship of mutual trust that only few alliances can achieve. Both states share not only political and economic benefits but also diverse values, including cultural and ethical ones. For the next 50 years of the alliance, Japan should act in cooperation with the United States for the security of the entire world, to which both Japan and the United States belong. Until now, Japan, with the lead of the United States under the alliance, has remained at peace. However, it is necessary for Japan to autonomously work for its security and for world peace as well as to act with United States from now on. Concerning the security of Japan, while aiming to autonomously defend its territory, it is important to cooperate with the United States on issues which Japan cannot solve alone.

It is important for the two countries to take steps toward common targets and maintain capabilities while confirming each other's thoughts continuously, both strategically and tactically. Bilateral efforts have been made on tactics and equipment in order to enhance interoperability. At the strategic level, the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) set Common Strategic Objectives. Henceforward it is important to set common strategic objectives bilaterally and to steadily realize the roles, missions, and capabilities necessary to achieve them. It is particularly important to discuss in detail force requirements, bilateral operations, and other issues so as to maintain a high level of defense readiness. Also, in order to maintain Japan's security through the Japan-U.S. alliance, stable stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ) is indispensable, and appropriate cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ plays a supporting role.

Pressing on North Korea

In order to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear and missiles through diplomatic means, the international community should act cooperatively, and Japan should encourage this in a multilayered manner. Japan should implement UNSC resolutions steadily, and actively make diplomatic approaches to the countries concerned.

At the Six-Party Talks, Japan has sought solutions jointly with the United States, China, the ROK, and Russia. Whether or not the Six-Party Talks are in session, coordination among the five states should continue, and Japan, the U.S., and the ROK should associate with each other to defuse the threat of North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles in particular. At the same time, the relationship between Japan, China, and the ROK should be strengthened, too. The trilateral relationship has been developed through a summit meeting in Fukuoka in 2008, ASEAN+3, and so on, and it is necessary to make use of it to solve North Korean problems. Intelligence cooperation with the two countries that have strong ties with North Korea is important as well. Also, the network of the United States and its allies in such forms as Japan-U.S., Japan-ROK, and Japan-Australia should be used to address North Korean issues. Australia and the ROK announced their full participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a U.S.-led initiative for the counter-proliferation of WMD, and further cooperation in this area is important, as well.

Control of International Crimes and International Terrorism

In many cases, international crimes, such as drug trafficking and money laundering, are sources of funding for terrorists. The suppression of international terrorism can be achieved through steady and long-lasting regulatory efforts, such as cracking down on these international crimes, intercepting illegal money flow and preventing illegal immigration to Japan.

International terrorism aims to destroy current stable international systems and order, and Japan is one of potential targets. As it is said that a chain breaks at its weakest link, what is easy to attack is likely to be targeted. Law enforcement agencies, such as the police, immigration, and customs, should maintain a constant watch. Japan should take part in international cooperation to eradicate terrorists affiliated with Al Qaeda and to nullify their activities.

Integral Approach

What is crucial to enable Japan to respond to threats is domestic coordination among ministries and agencies. The Japanese government has improved its posture underpinning crisis management to counter such emergencies as the violation of territorial waters, large-scale disasters and critical accidents. Though such measures are effective in strengthening coordination among agencies that are apt to make sectionalistic responses, this sort of integral approach should not be limited to crisis management but be exerted to security issues in general, by functionally combining defense capabilities, diplomatic power, police forces, economic measures and others. Specifically important is how to respond to situations in the gray area between peace time and war time.

Concerning Japan's offshore islands, to prevent conflicts of opinions over sovereignty from escalating into military confrontation, first of all Japan should exercise its diplomatic power. At the same time, The SDF and Japan Coast Guard should conduct continuous surveillance activities, and improve response capabilities through the enhancement of deployability to offshore islands, posting of units, and so on.

In time of a large-scale disaster, not only the Japanese government, but also the whole nation must try to minimize damage. Especially if Tokyo is shocked by an earthquake, damage will be tremendous: according to damage estimations of the Cabinet Office, a total collapse of approximately 85,000 buildings and a death toll of more than 10,000 are foreseen. The SDF can be dispatched for disaster response activities upon the request of the governor of an affected prefectural government. It is important for the national and local governments to develop cooperative relationships by enhancing information collection and transmission systems and conducting joint disaster prevention exercises.

Strengthening Intelligence Functions

In order to cooperate with the United States and the international community and to implement complementary security policies, Japan should possess the ability to independently collect information, analyze it, and make policy decisions. In order to enhance collection and analysis capabilities, the decision-making side should cast appropriate questions to the intelligence side, and then the latter should centralize answers and provide them to the decision makers. Intelligence collection on national security is conducted by the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office (CIRO), National Police Agency (NPA), Public Security Intelligence Agency, Ministry of Foreign affairs (MOFA), Ministry of Defense (MOD), Financial Services Agency, Ministry of Finance (MOF), Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), Japan Coast Guard (JCG), and others. While strengthening these agencies' collection functions, it is necessary to expand the system in which collected information is centralized to Kantei (Prime Minister's office) promptly and accurately. Measures for strengthening intelligence collecting functions as well as intelligence security are elaborated in detail in Chapter 3, Section 5.

Strengthening Civilian Control

A barometer to measure the effectiveness of a defense force is how many political targets can be achieved by using it. Therefore, to achieve this with the SDF, civilian control that functions soundly is indispensable.

A system with which civilian control functions well should be enriched through on-going reforms of the Ministry of Defense and other relevant initiatives. Civilian control has two targets: "to use the military for the safety of people and for international peace"; and "to keep the military from going its own way by its will." Though in Japan the latter is apt to be emphasized, another important feature of civilian control is the guarantee that political targets will be realized. With SDF missions increased at home and abroad, sound civil-military relations will be much more important. At this stage, political leaders-as civilians-should try to keep involved in security issues and extend their knowledge, thus heightening the effectiveness of civilian control.

(2) Preventing Threats from Materializing

To prevent threats from materializing, the "seed" of a threat must be addressed at an early stage to prevent it from growing into a real threat. To achieve this goal, the overall security environment must be improved through indirect means and by increasing mutual understanding as well as through direct pressure.

To prevent threats from materializing, the overall security environment must be stabilized. Maintaining a U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region is vital to the stability of this region. If a perception were to emerge that the U.S. commitment to the region was in decline, adventuristic behaviors might emerge. While the Asia-Pacific region continues to change dynamically, there are potentially destabilizing factors. Japan should make its own efforts, such as undertaking shared roles in the context of the alliance, to maintain U.S. presence and commitment in the region. At the same time, efforts should be made to improve the security environment of the region by deepening cooperative relationships among states in the region through disaster relief, reconstruction activities, and so on.

Maritime security is of vital interest for Japan, a country that depends on imports for its supplies of natural resources and food. Hence, Japan needs to commit proactively to cooperation with concerned states to guard ships from piracy and secure the safety of sea lines of communication. At the same time, there are transnational threats and risks, such as international terrorism and proliferation of WMDs and their means of delivery, in today's international community. International cooperation to keep such threats and risks from reaching Japanese shores is also necessary.

Methods for responding to these challenges are as follows.

Realignment of the U.S. Forces in the Asia-Pacific Region

Both the Transformation and the Global Posture Review (GPR) are programs carried out by the U.S. Forces in order to better respond to new threats that emerged after the end of the Cold War. In the West Pacific region, the main pillars of the realignment of the U.S. Forces are reducing U.S. Forces in Korea, moving U.S. Marine Corps from Okinawa to Guam, and naval and air reinforcements in Guam. Guam, serving as the "east entrance" to the geographical space that extends from Southeast Asia to the Middle East, where U.S. permanent infrastructure has been thinly situated, will become an operational base that will sustain U.S. Forces' rapid deployment to the area.

Along with the realignment of U.S. Forces, transformation of the Japan-U.S. alliance was also sought. The SCC joint document of October 2005 describes the importance of bilateral cooperation in improving the international security environment and strengthening cooperation with other partners to contribute to international activities. Japan and the United States should cooperatively maintain a stable regional security environment through international peace cooperation activities and multinational military exercises.

The realignment initiatives of the U.S. Forces in Japan include the relocation of the headquarters of the U.S. Marine Corps from Okinawa to Guam. The implementation of these initiatives will not only reduce the burden on local communities in which bases are located, but also help to maintain the presence of U.S. Forces in the region, making their realization advantageous from the viewpoint of Japan's security. The Japanese government should continuously make its utmost efforts to steadily implement the realignment initiatives.

Collaboration and Cooperation in the Region

In order to keep a regional problem from growing into a destabilizing factor for the region, countries in the region should take cooperative action. First, they should deepen mutual confidence. Reduction of distrust can be achieved by each state heightening the transparency of its policies and clarifying its intent. For this purpose, such measures as the institutionalization of relationships and establishment of a code of conduct are beneficial.

Such an attempt has been progressing in the field of maritime security. ASEAN and China have agreed on the "Declaration on Conduct," wherein principles for solving disputes in the South China Sea are stated. Codes of conduct for areas including the East China Sea should be made and their institutionalization pursued. This would serve as a tool to prevent an accidental contingency, and keep it from escalating to a crisis.

Japan has been contributing to regional efforts toward counter-piracy in the Straits of Malacca. Japan led initiative through the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) has proven successful as the number of piracy incidents in the area has decreased for five consecutive years since 2003. Japan should continue to promote such efforts.

Japan shares many common security interests with the ROK and Australia, both of which are allies of the United States. Japan has agreed to cooperate with the ROK in such fields as international peace cooperation activities, international disaster relief, and with Australia in maritime and air security and other areas. By strengthening bilateral security cooperation with them and other forms of cooperation with the U.S. as a hub, and by associating with them in individual disaster relief efforts and so on, Japan should contribute to the stability of the region.

Proactive Participation in International Peace Cooperation Activities

Because a failed state could offer a sanctuary to international terrorist groups, it is more and more important to lend a helping hand to a country under a fragile government with a view to addressing the "seed" of threat. A united international community should offer failed states comprehensive support, including peace negotiation and peace consolidation, until it accomplishes reconstruction. Economic aid and support for the education sector play a significant role in the stabilization of post-conflict societies, and Japan has extensively contributed to such areas. On the other hand, in Afghanistan, Japan, since the immediate stages of conflict, has been engaged in peacebuilding, including disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR). Japan should continue to participate in such activities in the future as well.

Needless to say, Japan should contribute more actively to UN peacekeeping.

However, Japan is not in a good position because of its internal and external environment, the change in the characteristics of UN peacekeeping operations, and other reasons. It is time for serious discussions to build a national consensus on how Japan should act to realize international peace and security. This topic will be raised again in Chapter 3, Section 2.

Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

To prevent the proliferation of WMDs, it is important to promote and strengthen international regimes for arms control, including those for nuclear weapons. Now, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime has been shaken by moves toward nuclear development programs attempted by some countries. The regime for controlling nuclear proliferation should be comprehensively strengthened. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducts inspections based on international agreements such as the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol and UNSC resolutions, but its exertion of compulsion is not irresistible. Japan should contribute in association with concerned states and international authorities to enhance the effectiveness of arms control regimes.

Since the end of the WWII, Japan has been consistently advocated the total abolition of nuclear weapons, and it should be welcomed that an atmosphere toward nuclear disarmament has recently emerged, following U.S. President Obama's speech. In proceeding with this, though the cooperation of the United States and Russia is very important, it must also be linked to the nuclear disarmament efforts of China and other nuclear powers. On the other hand, in the process of moving toward the ultimate total elimination of nuclear weapons, it will be necessary to pay attention to preserving the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence, including by means of conventional weapons.

Japan cannot simply stand by and watch, but must engage in the realization of nuclear disarmament and bring various issues to the table.

Confidence-Building with Neighboring Countries

Through its military build-up, China will possess the capability of affecting surrounding countries security. On the one hand, China's sustained economic growth is of great interest to Japan, but on the other, China is expected to continue military modernization alongside economic growth. Japan should try to possess defense capabilities that cover Japan's territory and surrounding areas to prevent war. Japan's intention to build-up its force should be made transparent through defense exchanges and other methods. At the same time, Japan should ask its counterparts to do the same thing. Confidence-building measures result in improving Japan's security levels. Based on an understanding that defense exchanges and military deterrence work together inseparably, Japan should earnestly engage in defense exchange programs. Ideas that defense exchanges merely involve coming and going or are a method to attain information should be abandoned.

A New "Comprehensive Security"

Since 9/11, the world has recognized that security cannot be achieved without military power, nor exclusively with it. The United States, upon such reflection, is trying to attain its own security by exerting a "smart power" that combines various powers, both hard and soft. Japan once discussed "comprehensive security" in the late 1970's.*12* Japan should realize its security goals by combining highly effective defense power with others such as diplomatic and economic power, cultural attractiveness, etc. , in a comprehensive and consistent manner. When Japan's immaterial assets - experience of economic recovery following the devastation of WWII, possessing universal values of freedom, democracy, etc, sophisticated science and technology, contribution to the UN, its peace-oriented security policy - are recognized by the outside world, Japan's security level will be further improved.

(3) Maintenance and Strengthening of the International System

When discussing the third goal of maintaining and strengthening the international system, the concept of our security strategy should be recalled. Japan envisions first of all a world where international conflicts are solved peacefully; secondly, a world where freedom of transportation is assured to all people, including Japanese people, and free economic activities are encouraged; and thirdly, a world where the freedom and dignity of humanity are universally protected and human security is ensured in all circumstances.

In order to realize such a world, the current open and free international system should be maintained. Economic growth in the present world would be unthinkable if the world lacked a free trade regime, and it is deemed that the most effective way to counter such challenges as poverty and the spread of infectious diseases that threaten human security is to use UN organizations, while improving its effectiveness, as lead agencies supported by each member state.

At the same time, as current challenges are becoming more and more transnational, it is conceivable that the current international system cannot address them competently. Therefore, it is also important to establish a complementary system to better counter such new and transnational challenges. For example, PSI is an initiative that does not target the creation of new international norms, but focuses on multilateral cooperation among states that share a common will to prevent the proliferation of WMDs. Japan should devote itself to building new complementary systems to realize the world Japan strives for.

In its endeavor to contribute to the international community, it should be noticed that the "historical" issue is at times a limiting factor before implementing Japan's initiatives, and deepen common understanding through joint historic research projects with concerned countries.

Two Methods of Maintaining the International System

The best way of maintaining the international system is to reduce the number of states and groups that harbor discontent with the current system. If more states come to support the international system and fewer exhibit destructive behavior, the international community will be more stable. There are two methods to achieve this. One is to create a situation where destructive behavior does not pay. To be precise, with this method one should establish a regime that punishes violations of rules, deters by compulsory power including military might, and forces a potential challenger of international systems to give up its idea. The other is to create a situation where a potential destructor perceives that the international systems are beneficial and so chooses to observe international rules voluntarily. To adopt this method, it is necessary to provide various public goods, including economic aid, education sector support, reduction of poverty, and so on, in addition to traditional ones such as free trade and monetary regimes and freedom of navigation. Up to now, the United States has mainly provided such international public goods, but hereafter, Japan and other major states should provide them together with the United States. Newly emerging countries are facing their own domestic challenges, and will be unlikely to contribute actively to the provision of public goods. While underpinning the international system, Japan and other major states, together with the United States, should encourage newly emerging states to shift toward providing support.

Significance of Multilayered Approach

The maintenance and strengthening of the international system is a newly adopted goal, but it is not necessary to prepare a set of tools to achieve it from scratch. For example, Japan's international peace cooperation activities were already discussed from the viewpoint of preventing threats from materializing, but, Japan's engagement in such efforts will also result in the maintenance of an international system that does not allow infringements on freedom and human rights. U.S. realignment and the maintenance of U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific region are mentioned in the same subsection. These are important in rule setting for the peaceful resolution of regional conflict, too, thus leading to the maintenance of an international system in the region that is favorable to Japan.

What is important is to implement a variety of security-related programs in a multilayered manner, while testing whether such programs are consistent with Japan's third goal of the maintenance and strengthening of preferable aspects of the international system.

The UN Structural Reform

Japan should work harder to realize structural reform of the UN including the Security Council. The UN is an organization for the purpose of administering international regimes based on international norms, and it is universal and it enjoys a high degree of legitimacy despite its many flaws. That the UN is functioning soundly is important for both the maintenance of the international system and preserving Japan's security.

In its attempts to maintain and strengthen the international system, it is vital for Japan to contribute to the UN decision making process more actively with a view to realizing a better world. This explains the necessity of Japan's further efforts to achieve UN structural reforms, through which Japan will obtain permanent membership in the Security Council.

Additionally, more Japanese citizens are encouraged to join and work for international organizations. Japanese representation in international organizations is lower than that of other countries. The number of Japanese staff who work at the UN Secretariat, for instance, is less than half of the lower limit of the desirable range that the UN suggests. The number of senior-level officials is also low. The Japanese government should take necessary measures to provide Japanese people with opportunities to work for international organizations.

Regional Security Framework in the Asia-Pacific Region

Since it is difficult and time-consuming to establish a comprehensive regional security framework in the Asia-Pacific region, one should begin with cooperation in achievable areas, based on the segmentation of regional cooperation by characteristics. First, one should construct a multilayered cooperative relationship, then, desirably, bond them organically in the future. Japan has tended to act modestly in regional security. From now on, however, Japan has a responsibility to contribute to the security of the region in order to construct a more stable relationship within it.

To integrate China into the international system and regional frameworks as a constructive member is of great importance for stable regional order. For this purpose, two efforts will be important: to construct a mechanism in which China, in association with other countries, contributes to regional stability; and to let China learn the cost of non-cooperative action through regional norms and frameworks.

As the first step toward the construction of a regional security framework, Japan should construct a network of allies and partners of the U.S., such as the ROK, Australia, and the Philippines. Through constructing a network, the U.S. commitment can be secured and security cooperation among U.S. allies can be promoted. It is important for these countries to deepen associations and to share strategic objectives toward regional stability. In Northeast Asia, in particular, there are two alliances: Japan-U.S. and U.S.-ROK. Japan should strengthen its bilateral cooperative relationship with the ROK by enhancing the trilateral cooperative structure. It is necessary to prepare for cooperation to cope with concerns and challenges surrounding regional security by upgrading the Japan-US-ROK trilateral dialogue from working-level to ministerial-level and so on.

Simultaneously, Japan should try to build a framework for inclusive multilateral security cooperation in the region. Existing frameworks of the ARF and other frameworks should be associated with one another in a multilayered manner. Based on the effectiveness of the alliance with the U.S., it is indispensable to establish a comprehensive regional security framework in the long run as a tool for a multilayered guarantee of regional stability. Once a comprehensive framework is created, one can expect it to facilitate confidence building with countries that are not allied with the U.S., and result in a mitigation of security dilemmas. The framework should be an inclusive one that many countries feel free to join and at the same time, a robust framework which is empowered to resolve conflicts and create an Asia in which "attack does not pay."

To be more concrete, the ARF should try to evolve from a mere venue for consultation into a conflict resolution mechanism. In addition, multilayered regional frameworks should take shape based on each cooperative relationship of ASEAN+3, bilateral cooperation between Japan and India based on their strategic global partnership, associations among G20 member states, which include Japan, the ROK, China, Australia, India, and Indonesia, and so on.

Furthermore, Japan should try to organize a cooperative structure in the field of disaster relief in order to materialize a functional regional cooperative framework. Japan, with its high-quality expertise in disaster relief, is expected to lead the region in this field. Though the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) takes charge of the coordination of humanitarian assistance in times of conflict or disaster, regional institutions are also necessary from a viewpoint of quicker response to disaster in the region. Rapid actions become possible through prior registration and designation of materiel and personnel employable for disaster relief activities. Moreover, by establishing such a multilateral organization which has a coordination function, disaster relief activities can be conducted regardless of the individual political issues between certain countries. Natural disasters are not tied to values or political standpoints; therefore, it is relatively easy to collaborate with each other to counter them. It is expected that disaster relief activities will facilitate association and cooperation between regional military and aid authorities, which will help lay the foundation for a regional security framework.

Cooperation with the U.S. and a Core Group

The United States has bolstered today's international systems by providing international public goods including assurance of access to the global commons for all countries. However, the U.S. alone will not be able to provide the same level of public goods in the future.

Japan has underpinned the international system with the U.S. in such spheres as economy and finance. Yet, Japan, as an open oceanic state, has profited greatly from the security of sea and air transportation routes, and any threats to them will strikingly injure Japan's economic interests. Hereafter, Japan, cooperating with other states, should complement the roles the United States has undertaken in order to secure the global commons. Actually, Japan has conducted continuous surveillance of its surrounding sea and air space for a long time, and it can assume a more positive role in securing global security. Furthermore, amid the continued information communications revolution, society, economy, and civic life as a whole are becoming more dependent on the Internet, thus the security of cyberspace should be regarded as an international public good. Japan's role in such an area will be a future theme.

To maintain and strengthen the international system, a few states should form a "core group" and take action in association. Though no such a framework has been established, a core group of states, including Japan, the United States and a few other states, should be organized to enable prompt decision making and action. The core group should reach out to G8, G20, including newly emerging powers such as India, China, and Brazil, and other UN member states.

CHAPTER 2 THE MODALITY OF JAPAN'S DEFENCE FORCE

Roles of Japan's Defense Force

(1) Basic Ideas on Roles of Japan's Defense Force

The previous chapter proposed a multilayered cooperative security srategy as Japan's new security strategy. In line with the direction prescribed by this strategy, Japan must achieve the three goals, i.e., Japan's security, preventing threats from materializing, and maintaining and strengthening the international system, by utilizing its defense force in a more agile and effective manner as a part of Japan's security policy.

The three goals and four approaches that this report proposes are all interlocked seamlessly and need to function in combination, as stated in the previous chapter. Chapter 2 gives a detailed explanation of the roles the defense force plays in achieving the three goals. Specifically, it describes the roles of the defense force in the first approach, Japan's own efforts, and then, those in the other three approaches: cooperation with its allies, with countries in the region and with the global community. This section presents the roles of the defense force categorized into three geographical domains where defense capabilities are used: areas surrounding Japan, the Asia-Pacific region, and the whole world.

When the security environment is observed in each of the three domains based on the analysis discussed in the previous chapter, first, issues exist around Japan's territory, such as increasing threats from North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missiles, the North-South problem in the Korean Peninsula, and the Cross-Strait issue. Furthermore, territorial disputes remain unsolved and large-scale military forces, including SOF, continue to be concentrated. Also lingering is the possibility of terrorism and large-scale disasters. Japan's defense force must deal with these challenges effectively.

Secondly, the Asia-Pacific region is considered to have elements of non-transparency and uncertainty in military situations and runs the risk of engendering arms races in light of each country's military modernization. It cannot be denied that possible changes in the international environment may bring disadvantages to Japan. In addition, there are no robust multilateral political, economic, and security frameworks, such as the EU and NATO, and existing frameworks are all dialogue-oriented. Thus Japan should cooperate with its allies and countries within the region to promote the construction and activation of a security framework and proactively contribute to initiatives for stabilizing the region by utilizing defense capabilities.

Thirdly, the international community is faced with challenges in the global security environment, such as international terrorism and failed states, which directly affect Japan's interests as in the case of piracy off the coast of Somalia. Traditionally, Japan has responded to these challenges through contributions focused in non-military fields. However, experience in the field of international efforts, as in Afghanistan, shows that there are certain kinds of activities that only military forces can carry out, such as reconstruction assistance in dangerous areas, and the protection of civilians who work there. It is indispensable for Japan to use its defense force more proactively in the field of international peace cooperation, so that Japan can assume responsibility for maintaining and constructing an international system .

Based on these arguments, the next section describes the roles of Japan's defense force according to the three categories: a) deterrence and effective response to contingencies on and around Japan's territory; b) further stabilization of the environment and order of the region; and c) improvement of the global security environment.

(2) Roles of Japan's Defense Force

a) Deterrence and Effective Response to Contingencies On and Around Japan's Territory

In order to sustain effective deterrence against threats, which tend to be increasingly diversified and multilayered, three factors should be taken into consideration: the importance of situations in the gray area between peacetime and wartime is growing; there are fewer signs detected and less warning time allowed in certain contingencies; and the operational tempo from planning to execution is accelerating owing to the progress of military technology. These factors have made it likely that a defense force with a low level of readiness will be unable to respond effectively to a rapidly deteriorating situation. This seriously necessitates putting priority on deterrence by operations - dynamic deterrence - through activities under normal circumstances, in addition to deterrence by existence of the defense force - static deterrence.

For example, it is of considerable importance in constructing effective deterrence in the current security environment that Japan continues to demonstrate its vigilant posture on security matters in peacetime by conducting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations and by responding to attempted intrusions into Japan's airspace, while carrying out exercises to improve readiness. This will result in the constant demonstration of Japan's capabilities to prevent the intrusion of armed operatives and violations of Japan's sovereignty on offshore islands.

In the gray area between peacetime and wartime, SDF units should be able to not only accomplish their normal tasks but also to respond seamlessly to situations as they develop. Unless the units on the scene can react in a timely and appropriate manner, they will be unable to thwart the adversary's intent. It is necessary to gather information transmitted from local units and pass it on to the center of the government, the Prime Minister's Office. Accordingly, the headquarters needs to make a swift decision and give appropriate authorization to the units, and both the hardware, including C4 systems at each of the command and control phases from the center to the front units, and the software, including legal frameworks, must be strengthened.

If deterrence should fail and a violation of Japan's sovereignty were to occur, Japan would need to expel it by exerting its defense capabilities effectively. Japan should steadily build up a defense force that is able to cope effectively with possible contingencies.

Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks

North Korea's ballistic missiles, in conjunction with its nuclear development, are a serious threat to Japan's peace and security. In order to counter this threat, Japan needs to build a defense structure to cope with ballistic missile attacks, improving ballistic missile defense capabilities, with U.S. deterrence as a basis, and strengthening the posture for consequence management in association with local governments, including police and fire management agencies.

The most important way to counter the threat of ballistic missiles is deterrence, which is aimed at preventing North Korea from using them as a tool of attack or intimidation. Japan continues to rely on the United States for nuclear deterrence by punishment. While Japan expects the United States to contribute its other strike capabilities as deterrents, Japan should also conduct operational collaboration and cooperation, which makes deterrence more effective. In addition, upgraded denial capabilities by missile defense systems and consequence management through civil protection activities in the case of an actual missile launch contribute to forming another layer of deterrence, in that they diminish the effectiveness of the attack.

In this way, the composition of deterrence to ballistic missile attacks is multilayered, with Japan-U.S. bilateral cooperation as a prerequisite. In order to make such deterrence work more effectively, it is necessary for Japan and the United States to share threat perception and assessments through continuous dialogue and to appropriately combine denial by missile defense and deterrence by strike, having common understanding on roles and missions and operational procedures of each side. Regarding attack by means other than ballistic missiles or unlawful activities by military force, Japan should improve its own capabilities to cope with such contingencies, and also should implement Japan-U.S. operational and intelligence cooperation, and enhance support of U.S. Forces, to increase the credibility of deterrence.

Missile defense systems are the most important pillar of Japan's ballistic missile defense capability. Japan should steadily continue its current build-up program of equipping Aegis destroyers with missile defense capabilities and introducing PAC-3 missiles to surface-to-air missile units, and also promote the Japan-U.S. co-development program for a new sea-based interceptor missile (SM-3 Block IIA).

With regard to functions to complement the missile defense system or to reinforce deterrence by strike, such as the capability to strike bases of the adversary, the Council thinks that Japan should conduct studies of possible weapons systems, operational concepts and cost-effectiveness, taking it as a given that operations will be executed together with the United States, while discussing and confirming appropriate roles and missions sharing. As for information gathering to defend against ballistic missiles, Japan should build up capabilities that are complementary to those of the United States, leading to enhanced combined intelligence, rather than expending scarce resources to obtain a system that merely replicates U.S. capabilities.

Response to Attacks by Special Operations Forces, Terror Groups, etc.

To counter subversive activities, such as sabotage, murder, or injury, which the North Korean special operations forces (SOF) and international terror groups could intend against Japan, Japan should strengthen its intelligence capabilities to sense indications of them and cope with them promptly when an actual attack comes about. In the early stages of the action, the SDF should assist law enforcement agencies in information gathering to detect terrorist activities, surveillance to check intrusion, preventing terrorists from entering the country, and so on. When a terrorist attack is imminent or already in action, the SDF needs to respond quickly through undertaking surveillance in coastal areas, protection of Japan's important facilities, and relief activities. Particularly against the SOF and chemical/biological/nuclear attacks, the SDF should perform the central role in countermeasures such as surveillance, repelling the enemy, and consequence management.

Security of Surrounding Sea and Air Space and Offshore Islands

Japan has issues concerning territories and the delimitation of its EEZ in surrounding waters. Japan should strive to resolve them peacefully and to establish an order for the utilization of the sea according to international law, as well as prevent unilateral attempts by force to change the status-quo. Thus, Japan should improve the surveillance and anti-air / anti-surface / anti-submarine capabilities of its SDF units in order to maintain its qualitative superiority. At the same time, it is necessary to deploy units of an appropriate size to carry out constant surveillance activities and assist police agencies in intelligence and other functions.

Moreover, Japan should consider posting new Ground / Maritime / Air SDF units and enhancing mobility for the security of its offshore islands.

Maintaining a Basis for Japanese People's Security and Sense of Safety through Responses to Large-Scale Disaster and Other Measures

Recognizing the high frequency of natural disasters in Japan, the SDF is expected to assume an important role in large-scale disasters, including rescue, relief, medical activities, and coordination with other agencies, making good use of its nationwide deployment, organizational ability, and readiness.

In addition to the SDF's responsive capabilities, its presence, such as camps located throughout Japan, is a source of relief and security for the Japanese people, and the SDF should further strengthen its ties with local communities, whose ability to counter disasters tends to be low.

Preparedness for a Full-scale Invasion

A full-scale invasion that could threaten Japan's national existence is unlikely in the current international situation. Preparedness for such a situation is, however, a function that an independent state must maintain intrinsically; Japan should be mindful of the maintenance of such a function because Japan is situated in the region where large-scale military forces are concentrated. Japan should continue to possess the minimum level of capabilities necessary to counter this type of invasion as a precaution against unforeseeable changes in the international situation that may give rise to a full-scale invasion. Maintaining such capabilities could also provide a basis for coping with various situations.

b) Further Stabilization of Regional Environment and Order

Establishing Constant Intelligence Superiority

Events such as an increase in China's maritime activities and Russian Air Force's patrol flights in the area surrounding Japan, including the East China Sea and the West Pacific, have been observed. It is necessary to pay close attention to the increased military activities of these countries to prevent them affecting Japan's security or becoming a destabilizing factor in the region in the future.

It was pointed out in subsection a) of this section that the constant operation of the defense force is an important factor of deterrent for Japan's defense and security. This is also important for the stabilization of the regional security environment and order. Japan should establish its intelligence superiority by ascertaining neighboring countries' military movements through ISR activities. ISR activities also provide common ground for Japan and the United States to strive cooperatively to stabilize the regional security environment and order, and thus coordination between the SDF and US Forces should be enhanced.

Enhancing Defense Exchanges and Cooperation in the Region

The significance of confidence building to stabilize the regional security environment was discussed in detail in the Chapter 1, Section 3. Japan's defense exchange efforts, such as mutual visits of Japanese and Chinese naval vessels, have been successful in promoting confidence building with other countries in the region. In addition to the significance of confidence building, recent defense exchanges place emphasis on establishing and enhancing international cooperation aimed at solving various challenges.

In the Asia-Pacific region, cooperation in such areas as maritime security and disaster relief would carry much significance. Such initiatives to cope with common regional challenges require participation from many countries, and at the same time, it is easy to call for participation as they are less likely to be affected by political stances. As for anti-piracy measures-one of the most urgent issues in maritime security-Japan and China have already dispatched vessels to address the issue of piracy off the coast of Somalia. The two countries share the same sea lines of communication from the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea, and two countries cooperating to provide a shared international asset, such as the safety of sea lines of communication, will bring about favorable influence, not just in the context of the bilateral relations, but also to the region as a whole.

At the same time, it is important to broaden cooperation with regional countries that share values with Japan. Japan, the ROK, and Australia must take initiatives in a variety of issues in the region, enhance international cooperation in the region, including with the United States, and lead the region. The ROK and Australia are allies of the United States and share equipment and operational concepts with the United States and Japan in many respects; therefore, they already have common grounds on which to foster practical cooperation with Japan. Japan should take concrete steps for the future to cooperate with the two countries in intelligence and logistics support, including procurement, supply, transportation, and medical services. In addition, the SDF's experience of cooperation with the ROK armed forces in Timor-Leste and with the Australian Defence Force in Iraq indicates that international peace cooperation activities provide the perfect opportunity to expand and deepen cooperation between units of each country. Japan should consider dispatching SDF units more actively to places where it can cooperate with these two countries.

Regional Security Frameworks

The Ministry of Defense of Japan has been enhancing dialogues between defense authorities, not only by continuing to host the Tokyo Defense Forum, which is a Director-General level meeting with ARF participating countries, but by initiating a vice-ministerial level meeting with ASEAN countries last year. Japan should lead such frameworks to contribute to the stabilization of the region by setting agreeable agenda, such as the transparency of military power or the prohibition of changing the status-quo by force, and by exerting efforts to achieve them.

The mutual participation or observation of exercises and multilateral joint exercises for such purposes as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, counter-terrorism, and maritime control are an effective means of building confidence among the countries in the region, and could be a "bud" for a future multilateral cooperative framework. Japan should support multilateral joint exercises by providing ideas and other forms of assistance, while respecting the motivation of each ASEAN country.

c) Improving the Global Security Environment

Counter-Terrorism

Countering international terrorism, specifically the elimination of Al Qaeda, is a long-term activity. Whether or not counter-terrorism efforts are successful affects the stability of the Middle East and Southwest Asia, which are important areas for Japan. Cooperation in such activities is an important issue for Japan, as it represents the unanimous will of the international community and demonstrates the credibility of the Japan-U.S. alliance. Japan has contributed to counter-terrorism activities by conducting support activities for maritime interdiction operations in the Indian Ocean. Japan should strengthen its capability to sustain such activities, including, but not limited to, these operations for an extended period of time.

Supporting Rehabilitation of Failed States, Participating in UN Peacekeeping Operations, etc.

Japan has been committed to such international activities as peacekeeping in Cambodia and the reconstruction of Iraq, taking into consideration expectations from the international community. In order to improve its international leadership as a "peace fostering nation," *13* Japan should participate in such efforts as the reconstruction of failed states more actively. In doing so, the SDF should put greater emphasis on the protection of civilians and support for building up security capabilities, in addition to humanitarian assistance and support for economic and social recovery, for which the SDF can use its expertise. Recently Japan registered in the UN Standby Arrangements System,*14* and should continue to create conditions that facilitate more active participation in UN peacekeeping operations, including sending Japanese personnel to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, etc.

Furthermore, it is said that global warming will cause sea levels to rise and bring more frequent floods, droughts, and typhoons and other tropical storms. There is also concern about explosive outbreaks of diseases, such as a new type of influenza (pandemic). Hence, the importance of disaster relief is likely to increase in the future. The SDF should actively take part in international disaster relief activities, where the SDF can make effective use of the know-how accumulated from previous disaster relief operations.

Responding to Proliferation of WMDs

Preventing the proliferation of WMDs and its means of delivery and controlling the transfer of arms and military technology are urgent issues that the international community should tackle cooperatively. Japan should assign the SDF actively to efforts such as PSI to prevent the proliferation of WMDs and missiles, and consider more proactively posting SDF officers as military experts to international organizations which deal with arms control and disarmament.

Expanding Global Defense Exchange and Cooperation

Japan should more keenly promote not only policy dialogue on security but exchanges and cooperation on global security issues with NATO and European countries. Such efforts are expected not only to contribute to speedier and smoother implementation of international peace cooperation activities, but to result in the establishment of a cooperative order.

Section 2 New Functions and Posture of the Defense Force

(1) Guiding Principles for the Buildup of Japan's Defense Posture

There are a wide variety of contingencies that should be dealt with by the defense force in the current security environment. A terrorist attack may take place at any time, which makes it difficult to draw a distinction between peacetime and wartime. It is also expected that it may be difficult to gather indications of certain kinds of armed attacks, such as ballistic missile attacks or SOF attacks. Japan should respond to such situations in a seamless manner in order to prevent them from worsening.

An idea has been fully established since the NDPO of 1995 that the roles of the defense force should not be limited to national defense, but rather should include various activities aimed at Japanese people's safety. Recently, the role of Japan's defense force in ensuring Japanese nationals' security has been broadening to include not only disaster relief and evacuation of Japanese nationals overseas, which were assumed from the beginning, but also evacuation of local residents in the case of a terrorist attack. In addition, the defense force is requested to conduct law enforcement activities in cooperation with the Maritime Safety Agency, after the enactment of the Anti-Piracy Law this year (2009).

The SDF needs to act not only domestically, but also overseas, where the surrounding environment is totally different. The SDF must conduct various non-combat activities (military operations other than war), including counter-terrorism, peace building, and disaster relief, and is requested to deploy quickly in distant areas where the natural conditions are severe, and to sustain prolonged operations.

Accordingly, today's defense force should develop into a multi-functional one that is able to carry out various missions and that can quickly and appropriately react to a sudden crisis, in a flexible manner. From this viewpoint, the current SDF, which is in the process of transformation under the NDPG of 2004, needs further structural transformation to be able to play the roles mentioned above.

Reviewing the past NDPO or NDPG, the NDPO of 1995 prescribed "rationalization, effectiveness, and compactness" in defense capabilities, premised on its qualitative improvement. The NDPG of 2004 decided to reduce the personnel and equipment earmarked for a full-scale invasion, and the transition of the defense capabilities under the 2004 NDPG is still ongoing. Against the background of this progress, the review of the current NDPG should verify the level of current defense capabilities and formulate a defense posture that meets the demand of the times, while taking into account the fact that the roles of the defense force are broadening, with greater importance being attached to sustained activity and quick response in the new security environment.

Because there will be less warning time before the occurrence of certain contingencies and the required skill level of units and personnel is becoming higher and more professional, an SDF unit must react to contingencies with its usual line-up, not relying on wartime call-up. Therefore, the personnel fill rate of the SDF should be kept high even in peacetime in order to ensure the readiness of the defense force. Effectiveness must not be put at risk by a low personnel fill rate.

In pursuing the transformation of the defense force into a more multi-functional and flexible one, it goes without saying that defense expenditures should be efficiently used by setting clear priorities in terms of equipment and unit organization and proceeding with the procurement reform. At the same time, the defense budget can no longer be decided under a fixed standard-as a ratio to GNP-as in the past. The Japanese government must allocate appropriate resources to the defense sector so that the defense force can maintain necessary equipment and personnel and operate them to fulfill its functions properly.

(2) Common Requirements for the Defense Force to Fulfill Functions

Taking into consideration the situation in East Asia, where large-scale military forces are concentrated, and trends of the national power of neighboring states relative to Japan, Japan should attach greater importance to the quality rather than the quantity of equipment, while adding the perspective of roles and missions sharing with the United States. At the same time, it should build up a defense force with high cost-effectiveness giving priority to software that allows equipment to function at its maximum capacity. Listed below are priority items as common requirements for pursuing this objective.

First, Japan should gather information and analyze and assess situations more precisely and promptly than the adversary. In other words, by establishing intelligence superiority, Japan's defense force should fulfill its functions effectively. For this purpose, it is necessary to introduce ISR assets such as aircraft and vessels, and link them into a network. In doing this, it is appropriate to utilize outer space effectively and efficiently. The Japanese government should actively exploit advanced civil technology, including commercial imagery satellites that have high resolution, and carry out research into dual-use technology.

Secondly, Japan should enhance its C4 function, which connects battlefields and the command center, and its information security function, which is the other side of the former function. In order to seamlessly respond to any situation, the battlefield and the command center should be directly connected through invulnerable broadband communication. At the same time, priority should be assigned to the improvement of communication capabilities between overseas units and the home country and among overseas units, as a basis for more active participation in international peace cooperation activities.

Threats to information networks have been increasing recently. Because the attacker can launch an attack without revealing its identity and the attack does not require a huge system, it constitutes an imminent threat to the defense force. Therefore, it is indispensable to form an attack-resistant network and maintain a posture that adapts itself according to the evolution of threats, recognizing that information security is a prerequisite for accomplishing any mission.

Thirdly, high-quality science and technology should be utilized. Bearing in mind neighboring states' military powers, Japan should move away from increasing quantity to ensure security, and instead improve the quality of defense capabilities by utilizing Japanese high-quality science and technology and remaining attentive to global trends in military technology such as stealth, network, and precision-guidance technology. Besides, the Japanese private sector has high technological standards in the fields of energy conservation and renewable energy. The application of such new technologies should be studied for merits such as a reduction in fuel costs and workload for supply to the extent that it will not lower defense performance.

Fourth, the geographical conditions of Japan should be taken into account, such as its being an island chain of over 3,000 kilometers in extent and possessing many offshore islands. Maneuvering capabilities to deploy units rapidly should be improved in order to overcome the distance between the mainland and outlying islands. At the same time, Japan's possession of outlying islands is advantageous in terms of ISR and other operations, as suggested by the fact that Air Self-Defense Force radar sites are located on such islands. Japan should pursue a defense build-up that incorporates these two sides.

(3) Enhancing Joint Operations and Increasing Jointness

To better cope with such contingencies as ballistic missile attacks, where the situation changes in a moment, the assets of the three services of the SDF should be closely coordinated. In doing so, it is essential that the operations be jointly executed under the Joint Staff and a joint task force command (major command), composed of the Ground, Maritime, and Air SDF.

Based on lessons learned since the Joint Staff was established and centralized its operational functions some 3 years ago, joint operations capabilities should be further strengthened at the major command level in addition to enhancing the functions at the Joint Staff.

Moreover, in order for the defense force to exert its multi-functionality through jointness, it is necessary to set clear operational doctrines for each possible scenario and incorporate them into education and training, while diversifying unit composition according to missions. From this point of view, the SDF should establish methods for education/training and unit composition that contribute to smooth and effective joint operations.

Also necessary for the effective demonstration of the SDF's ability under joint operations is for the Joint Staff in charge of the operations to have the authority to make recommendations for defense build-up, based on judgments on priorities from an operational perspective.

(4) Defense Build-up that Contributes to Strengthening Japan-U.S. Alliance

The SCC Joint Document of October 2005 depicts the ways of cooperation to achieve the two countries' common strategic objectives, and recommends that their bilateral planning be specific. Through bilateral planning, the roles and missions sharing for contingencies between Japan and the U.S. have been specified, and this provides a basis for considering mutual complementarities of capabilities of both countries. The SDF and the U.S. Forces have complemented each other in extensive areas. For example, when a U.S. carrier battle group, a core of the U.S. strike power, is deployed for the defense of Japan, the SDF can provide the anti-submarine warfare and mine-sweeping capabilities that the United States lacks in the region. When the two countries conduct a bilateral air campaign, for which interoperability of the aircraft of each side is indispensable, the SDF's theater-wide warning and control information will support the operation.

Thus, whenever Japan thinks of building up its defense force, it is important to take into consideration roles and missions sharing and the improvement of interoperability with the United States.

(5) International Peace Cooperation Activities

International peace cooperation activities were given the status of one of the main roles of the defense force in the NDPG of 2004, and were stipulated as a primary mission of the SDF in 2007.

However, recent records of participation in these activities are not satisfactory in comparison with other major states. Japan needs to participate more actively, as a state that plays a role in the maintenance and construction of international systems. The Council thinks that the SDF should sustain a posture that enables it to always be in a position to dispatch troops to multiple large-scale and multi-dimensional peacekeeping missions.

The GSDF should improve its capabilities to respond to international peace cooperation activities quickly and for a prolonged period, with equipment suitable for overseas operations. At the same time, it should maintain postures of unit rotation and logistics support that enable the continuous dispatch of units of a certain size. The MSDF should maintain a structure for conducting international peace cooperation activities properly in distant areas such as the Indian Ocean, and at the same time ensure logistics support and other necessary postures in dispatched areas, including at sea. The ASDF should build up an efficient transportation posture for the mobile deployment of GSDF units and quick lift of relief supplies for international peace cooperation activities in distant areas, such as the Middle East and Africa. At the same time, it should broaden the scope of its activities, including surveillance for securing safety of dispatched units.

In order to conduct such international operations smoothly, the joint operational structure and C4 function need to be strengthened. Moreover, according to increasingly diversified and complicated needs on the frontline of disaster relief or reconstruction activities, it is necessary to seek to improve coordination and liaison with foreign units and international organs, gather local topography information, acquire the language skills that contribute to these needs, and better understand the culture and customs of areas of operation. In addition, as overseas operations expand, a support structure should be developed not only for personnel on the mission, but also for injured or repatriated personnel and their families.

Section 3 Infrastructure that Bolsters the Defense Force

When the defense force fulfills its functions, various types of infrastructure that bolster it play important roles. This section will evaluate the current status of human, material, and social infrastructure that is indispensable for the defense force to work, and will examine what will be needed in the future.

The previous section examined the kind of functions and structures that are expected of the future defense force, based on the roles of the defense force discussed in Section 1. In order to materialize these visions, capable personnel as well as high-tech equipment adaptable to enhanced application of information technology and expanded networking are needed. However, the decline in the number of young people is diminishing the supply of competent human resources, and the high prices of weapons and the advancement of technology levels worldwide is altering the context of the procurement of equipment. Accordingly, this section will examine measures to address the human infrastructure issue of the declining birth rate and the material infrastructure issue of defense production and the technology base.

Also examined is the social infrastructure issue of public support and local cooperation. For the SDF to maintain a high degree of proficiency, the cooperation of local communities is indispensable as they provide the space for stationing and training as well as support for the activities of the units. The support and understanding of the Japanese people is also required to maintain the morale of SDF organizations and personnel as SDF units are likely to be tasked with increasingly tough missions, such as overseas operations under severe conditions.

(1) Personnel Infrastructure (Response to Decline in Number of Young People, and Other Issues)

The SDF is facing two urgent challenges with regard to personnel infrastructure. The first challenge is the rapid decline in the number of young people in Japan. The population of males from 18 to 26 years old-the main source of SDF recruits-has dropped by about 30 % since the previous NDPG was formulated in 1995. This means that, under the traditional recruitment policy, it will be impossible to recruit the targeted number of personnel while maintaining a certain degree of qualification.

The second is the maladjustment of the age structure and rank promotion system in the SDF. Unlike countries with a conscription system, whereby young soldiers regularly and orderly enter and retire from the armed forces, or the United Kingdom or the United States where there is a volunteer system but age limits are set for each rank, Japan has extended the retirement ages of SDF uniformed personnel and promoted noncommissioned personnel to commissioned officers in their advanced years. As a result, the average age of the commissioned officers, including company officers who serve as front-line commanders, in the SDF is higher than that of armed forces of other countries. This is problematic from the viewpoint not only of the maintenance of the SDF's strength, but also of flexible response to increasingly diversified and complicated missions.

To recruit smoothly amid the decreasing proportion of young people, it is necessary to make a career in the SDF seem more attractive young people by providing stable employment opportunities. On the other hand, if the SDF shifts its focus of recruitment from 2-year-fixed-term privates to non-fixed-term NCOs, who may stay until the mandatory retirement age, it will aggravate the second problem of the maladjustment of the age structure. Therefore, the two problems should be dealt with in a comprehensive manner.

As a measure to respond to the decline in the number of young people, we recommend that the recruitment and promotion of women be further expanded. It is necessary to open up more occupational specialties to women, taking the needs of female personnel and maternity protection into account, and to increase the ratio of female personnel strength.

Secondly, it is essential to take measures to enhance the attractiveness of recruitment, offering a long-term and stable employment system at the recruitment phase. In doing so, the overall personnel management system should be redesigned presupposing an increase in non-fixed term recruitment, while taking into account the promotion of fixed term personnel (E-1, E-2, and E-3) to non-fixed term NCOs (E-4 (SGT, PO3, SSgt) or higher).

To adjust the second problem associated with the age structure of the SDF, it is necessary to review the SDF's promotion system with a view to reducing the number of NCOs promoted to officers. At the same time, it is desirable to try to motivate and revitalize NCOs by introducing a new salary system that distinguishes between NCOs and commissioned officers and creating a new rank that offers a career goal for NCOs. Moreover, the introduction of an early retirement system for non-restricted term personnel is a matter for consideration, and this could be implemented by introducing an age limit for each rank, for example, as in the United States and the United Kingdom. Yet, the key to making the new system work is ensuring that society is geared to accept retired SDF personnel, so that they do not feel anxious about retiring early. In this regard, reliance on goodwill of society is by no means the only answer; government-wide efforts are also important to help retired personnel find new jobs based on the expertise, skills, and experience they have acquired during their service.

Lastly, it is becoming more important to develop human resources by educating and training SDF personnel, as SDF's activities are becoming increasingly diversified and complicated and the Japanese people's expectations for the SDF are growing. Whether the SDF can train its men and women, who are recruited in a strict environment, to be competent depends entirely upon the appropriateness of the education and training system. An individual SDF member being able to establish positive professionalism, which is referred to in the report of the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense, through effective education and training is indispensable for the SDF to maintain high morale and foster a robust and sound organization. In addition, for each service member to establish professionalism is a significant asset that can be returned to society after his/her retirement and reemployment. Also important in this connection are such efforts as sending SDF officers to private companies to exchange personnel with society, letting technical officers study at educational or research institutes both in Japan and abroad to acquire expertise, and inviting experts with special knowledge and experience from the private sector to the SDF to revitalize the organization, so that the SDF can improve of its levels of professionalism. To implement these measures, the SDF should consider introducing a fixed-term active duty system that is similar to the fixed-term employment system in the administrative service.

The Council has raised some points for discussion concerning the human infrastructure of the SDF and offered suggestions to improve the current situation, expecting that the government as a whole will consider this matter and take necessary measures, in view of the significant security implications of the problem.

(2) Materiel Infrastructure (Defense Production and Technology Infrastructure)

In its early days, the SDF was equipped with arms lent or supplied by U.S. Forces. After that, the SDF gradually promoted the domestic production of weapons, with a view to acquiring equipment that suits Japan's own defense concept and maintaining wartime sustainability intact by reducing dependence on overseas supplies. Such efforts toward domestic production have played an important role in ensuring latent deterrent capabilities, in that they provide a reliable logistics infrastructure to supply and support operations domestically and enable the expansion of defense capabilities by Japan's own defense force in an emergency. However, the environment related to the procurement of equipment is changing. Prices of SDF equipment are becoming more expensive while defense expenditure continues to decrease gradually. There are some companies that withdrew from defense production as the reduction in defense acquisition made it difficult for them to maintain technicians and skilled workers.

After the end of the Cold War, advanced countries sought to improve methods of defense acquisition to introduce high-tech weapons while reducing costs. The methods include the application of COTS (commercial off the shelf) and participation in international joint development programs. The integration of defense industries often takes place at the same time since even advanced countries find it quite difficult to maintain a defense production and technology infrastructure that covers all of the countries' defense equipment.

Now in Japan, the dependence of major defense enterprises on defense demand is extremely low, and thus there are few movements toward an integration of defense enterprises. Moreover, because the level of MOD's R&D investment is quite low compared to that of other advanced countries, R&D for defense equipment has tended to depend on the private sector's creativity. These tendencies have contributed to the application of dual-use technology to defense equipment. On the one hand, the companies sometimes had to suffer from fluctuations in defense demand. However, Japanese defense production and technology infrastructure-until now dependent on the private sector-is now at the crossroads of whether it can accommodate itself to these external changes.

In order for the SDF to acquire low-cost advanced weapons, new policies that match changes in the environment inside and outside Japan should be worked out. Reforms of defense programming and procurement should continue to be carried out steadily, including the promotion of the IPT (Integrated Project Team) concept, which was suggested in the report of the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense. At the same time, it is necessary to consider a more rational procurement method of defense equipment, based on an understanding that defense equipment is not suited to general competitive tendering procedures.

In addition, if it is impossible to maintain domestic development and production for all the equipment essential for Japan's defense, it will be even more important to set up a basic policy direction for Japanese defense production and technology infrastructure. Then, Japan should specify priority areas of infrastructure to be sustained and nurtured, by setting criteria with a focus on elements that are: decisive in determining the outcome of an individual battle; of high confidentiality; and would disable the defense force unless they are maintained domestically because of maintenance and repair requirements. Accordingly, the MOD should decide procurement methods (domestic production, import, co-development, etc.). Bearing in mind the defense production and technology infrastructure of the kind that should be maintained domestically, the government should spell out a comprehensive defense industrial policy on how to maintain and develop it. Additionally, the government should pursue the realization of infrastructure from which the government would ultimately be able to acquire state-of-the-art equipment at a moderate cost, through such measures as predictability to enable domestic defense enterprises to plan investments, R&D, and human resource development from a long-term perspective.

In order to catch up to world-class advanced technologies, and to reduce the risks and costs that independent development entails, it is necessary to decide to actively join the circle of international joint development. In this connection, it is necessary to review such issues as the Three Principles of Arms Export, etc., contracting methods to enable prior investment in defense equipment, mutual protection methods of classified information, and soon.

A review of the Three Principles of Arms Export, etc. will be presented in detail in Chapter 3, Section 4.

(3) Social Infrastructure (Support from Japanese Nationals, and Local Cooperation)

Though it appears that the Japanese people understand and support the SDF's role in Japan's defense, there may be only a rather small number of people who understand that they presumably need to bear their share of the burden and cooperation. Moreover, there are conflicting views among the Japanese people on how actively Japan should be involved in the realization of world peace, as was indicated in domestic debates on the dispatch of SDF units for Iraq reconstruction support activities. Thus far, Japan has tended to avoid engaging in arguments on security and defense issues and to be unable to discuss these issues calmly in a time of need. Now that the security environment has changed greatly, there should be broad discussion on various aspects of Japan's security policy, and for that reason accurate information and appropriate explanations from the government should be provided.

With regard to public relations, not only the MOD but the government as a whole should strive to communicate to the public the importance of SDF activities in a way that is easy to understand. It is important then to give consideration to raising the morale and sense of responsibility of SDF personnel who carry out noble missions. The SDF should be always aware of the eyes of the Japanese people, show itself as it is, and win public sympathy. Continuous education is important in raising awareness of the significance of transparency and accountability.

The Japanese people and local residents have high expectations of the SDF's disaster relief operations and support for civilian activities, among the important missions of the SDF. In addition, they provide a chance to demonstrate its high capabilities to the international community. A unit with close ties to local communities built through training and daily exchanges will work with all its might in case of an actual disaster, gaining assistance from the local community.

From a different point of view, it should be also noted that the existence of an SDF unit underpins the local economy and employment, and that a close relationship between SDF personnel and their families and the local community has a favorable influence on the morale of the unit.

Today, the SDF is expected to respond in a quick and mobile manner to a variety of missions. Thanks to improvements in the deployment capabilities of units, the Japanese government now can assign the location of each unit more flexibly. Accordingly, when the GOJ makes a decision on the stationing of units, it should take into account whether the location is convenient for daily training and whether the location is conducive to forming strong ties with the local community.

Thus, it should be recognized once again that the Japanese people's understanding and support for the SDF, as well as cooperation from local communities, have had multilayered meanings and have now become important elements of Japan's defense capabilities.

CHAPTER 3 REVIEW OF BASIC PRINCIPLES OF JAPAN'S NATIONALSECURITY

Chapter 1 proposed a multilayered cooperative security strategy as a new strategy for Japan. This strategy aims to defend Japan's security, prevent threats from materializing, and maintain and strengthen the international system through a combination of Japan's own efforts, cooperation with its allies, cooperation in the region and cooperation with the global community. It was recommended that Japan's power, including its defense force, be positively exerted to achieve peace and security. Based on these ideas, Chapter 2 reviewed the roles of the defense force, and recommended that appropriate functions and structures be prepared to achieve goals through the effective operation of the defense force as the execution of the national will of Japan.

It is necessary to wisely prioritize among instruments to implement this strategy, bearing in mind the limitations of national resources. In order to make full use of the limited resources, it is important to review policies and legal systems. Therefore, in Chapter 3, the Council analyzes political and legal agendas that require particular attention as national or governmental issues, and recommends that these policies and legislations be restructured.

Section 1 Guiding Principles for National Security Policy

The "Basic Policy for National Defense" is a cabinet document which stipulates the fundamental principles of Japan's national security policy. Since it was adopted more than 50 years ago, there has not been a single modification of the document.

This fact could be interpreted as an indication that the contents stipulated in the Policy have been suitable for the enduring conditions of Japan. On the other hand, it could also mean that the Policy provides only very general guidance that does not have to be modified according to changes in national security policy. It would be appropriate to judge that the Policy is not specific enough to provide substantial guidance in setting Japan's national security policies.

In 1987, the year after limitations on defense spending to within 1% of GNP were abolished, Japan made a cabinet decision on "the Future Build-up of the Defense Force," and declared that it set up a new standard to put the brakes on Japan's defense build-up, listing a set of principles, each of which had been generated in different contexts, as follows:

- Exclusively defense-oriented policy

- Not becoming a military power which threatens other countries

- Ensuring civilian control

- The Three Non-Nuclear Principles.

Since then, these four principles, together with the "Basic policy for National Defense," have been introduced as the basics of Japan's defense policy in Japan's Defense White Papers and been faithfully repeated in major government documents including the 2004 NDPG.

These principles have been significant as putting the brakes on Japan's defense policy, with their negative style of not becoming a military power or not possessing nuclear weapons, while they need to be verified in the context of changes in objectives and subjective circumstances. They give little explanation of what Japan should do when actively addressing international challenges.

Concerning putting the brakes on Japan's defense policy, the Council believes that there is nothing more effective than the Japanese people's confidence in their own democracy and their resolve to make it function. In this sense, civilian control has been one of the most important basics of Japan's defense policy until now, and its value will never change in thefuture. The policy of not becoming a military power is also an important aspect of Japan's peace-oriented message at home and abroad, and the maintenance of this policy is meaningful in that it enhances the credibility of the direction of Japan's defense build-up.

The term "exclusively defense-oriented policy," for example, was often used to explain the position of the Japanese government whereby Japan will only defend itself, for which purpose it will build up the minimum necessary defense capabilities and never invade any other country, right after the establishment of the SDF when its constitutionality was repeatedly questioned in the Diet and other venues. Since the Sato Cabinet defined it as the "essence" of Japan's national defense,*15* this term has become established as a "posture of passive defense strategy in compliance with the spirit of the Constitution." Nevertheless, it must be noted that the nuance of this term has been a factor hindering frank and free thinking and ideas in discussing what type of weapons systems and operations are needed for Japan's defense. Regardless of the Japanese people's persistence in reiterating the exclusively defense-oriented policy, the international security environment is changing every moment. Today's world, where threats are increasingly global and transnational and ballistic missiles are proliferating, is quite different from the one the exclusively defense-oriented policy originally assumed.

Though it should be further discussed in the future whether Japan should retain its exclusively defense-oriented policy as a principle of its national security policy, it is at least unfavorable if the term is interpreted unnecessarily broadly. It is deemed useful to clarify the meaning of the "exclusively defense-oriented policy," understanding basic elements such as developing an effective defense force while paying attention not to generate an unnecessary arms-race and defending with indomitable determination against aggression without exerting the "pre-emptive attack" that the Constitution prohibits.

The security environment surrounding Japan has changed drastically since the adoption of the "Basic Policy for National Defense." At the same time, the subjective conditions of Japan have also shifted from being a beneficiary of international systems to a stakeholder. In the context of these changes, the establishment of a national security policy that is transparent and persuasive to the Japanese people and the international community is essential. Based on this recognition, the Council considers it necessary that Japan establish the "basic principles for national security policy," explain them at home and abroad, and at the same time examine the ideas that have represented Japan's basic stance, such as the exclusively defense-oriented policy, from today's viewpoint.

Section 2 Guidelines and Frameworks for International Peace Cooperation Activities

(1) Japan's Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations at Present

It is obligatory for Japan, aiming to be a "peace fostering nation," to be involved in international efforts, such as peace consolidation in fragile states on the verge of failure, and reconstruction assistance for states that have failed.

On the one hand, international peace cooperation activities were stipulated as a primary mission in 2007 and the SDF has been preparing various structures to undertake international peace cooperation activities proactively, such as establishing the International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit and the Central Readiness Regiment. On the other hand, recent records of Japan's participation in UN peacekeeping operations are not satisfactory.

Since its participation in UNTAC (United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia) as its first attempt, Japan has participated in a variety of UN peacekeeping operations and expanded its range of contributions under the International Peace Cooperation Law. In Timor-Leste Japan dispatched personnel to the headquarters, had civilian police advise the police commissioner, and provided logistics support and welfare assistance with an engineer unit composed of up to 680 personnel. These activities combining economic assistance and technical instruction were highly appreciated by the local governments and the United Nations. Though Japan has provided high-quality contributions, the scale and scope of Japan's activities is still limited in comparison with other advanced countries. While the legal limit of the number of personnel that may participate in international peace cooperation activities is 2,000, the number of personnel actually dispatched is 54 (as of May 2009).*16* Japan has to make appropriate efforts, as other G-8 countries do.*17*

Traditionally, Japan has made decisions on whether or not to dispatch Japanese personnel to a UN peacekeeping operation according to the Five Principles (See Reference 2), taking into account what are called Miyazawa's Four Principles (See Reference 3). Since the 1990s, however, UN peacekeeping operations have transformed from traditional operations that cope with inter-state conflicts to large-scale multi-functional operations that respond to intra-state conflicts or conflicts with non-state actors, and as a result, an increasing number of cases are beyond the scope of the Five Principles. In addition, positive policy decisions were not necessarily made on the dispatch of the SDF because many missions were to take place in areas so distant from Japan, such as Africa, that they did not seem to have a direct connection with Japan's security and interests. So, it is necessary to review the legal and political criteria which have been used to decide whether or not to dispatch the SDF to a UN peacekeeping mission, including the Five Principles and Miyazawa's Four Principles, so as to bring them in line with international standards.

(2) Revision of Criteria for Participating

The Five Principles were formulated when the International Peace Cooperation Bill was drafted, and the idea was incorporated into the provisions of the Law. It was formulated bearing in mind the UN peacekeeping missions in operation when the International Peace Cooperation Law was enacted in 1992. Out of the five, three principles were worked out on the assumption that conflicts would take place between states or between a few parties that were well-organized. These three principles are agreement to a ceasefire, consent to the UN forces' operations and Japan's participation, and impartiality, each of which had relevance to the parties involved in the conflict. However, in cases of disputes in fragile states or failed states, there are very often many parties involved in the conflict. In order to achieve Japan's active participation, it is necessary to change how these principles are applied so that the requirements of the principles are applied not to all parties but only to those parties recognized by the United Nations or regional unions.

There is another principle that provides that the use of weapons should be limited to the minimum and necessary extent to protect Japanese personnel. However, the protection of local residents and refugees is required in a failed state. Protecting civilians and foreign military personnel who participate in civil-military cooperation is also a key to the multi-functional peacekeeping, which involve a number of such people. It is necessary to review the use of weapons for operations that include the protection of civilians and other countries' personnel.

The Council recommends that the Five Principles be reviewed and that the International Peace Cooperation Law-the other side of the same coin- be revised in order to resolve the abovementioned issues and bolster Japan's participation in peacekeeping operations.

Miyazawa's Four Principles constitute the political criteria for deciding whether or not to participate in peacekeeping operations including:

- support of the Japanese people and appreciation from the international community;

- safety of dispatched personnel; and

- appropriate fields for Japan to dispatch personnel.

However, it is a fact that it has often been difficult to get support for sending Japanese personnel to remote areas such as Africa. Actually, Japan has not sent SDF units to Africa since 1995, though the majority of UN peacekeeping operations are conducted in the African continent these days. The Council considers that it is also necessary to review Miyazawa's Four Principles from the following perspectives.

If Japan's participation in peacekeeping operations is reviewed here, the first criterion for Japan to consider in making a decision on whether to participate in a peacekeeping operation should be whether it is legitimate or not. For Japan to participate in a peacekeeping operation, it ought to have its international legitimacy confirmed by UN resolutions or regional agreements. The second criterion should be whether the safety of personnel in the peacekeeping mission will be ensured by guarding operations of SDF units, etc. It is important to ensure the safety not only of Japanese personnel but also of the foreign civilians who need protection. The third criterion should be whether Japan's potential ability, e.g., leadership and administrative competence including SDF's capabilities, will be performed in a suitable manner in the mission. Based on these three estimates, Japan should decide whether participation in the peacekeeping mission in question is consistent with Japan's national interests or not.

The Council considers that discussions need to be carried out in various venues so that the Japanese people may widely accept the understanding that Japan's participation in international peace cooperation activities, including peacekeeping operations, prevents potential threats to Japan from materializing and is a means to maintain the free and open international system to which Japan belongs. At the same time, it would be also significant, from the viewpoint of expanding the support of the Japanese people, to make it clear that as a matter of the modality of Japan's participation, Japan does not directly undertake any missions of compulsory measures, such as combat operations.

It should be added that there has been a problem from the outset that the scope of the use of weapons authorized by the International Peace Cooperation Law is different from that indicated by a UN document on peacekeeping operations.*18* According to the document, the scope of the use of weapons of a unit participating in a peacekeeping operation includes not only self-defense, including the protection of other personnel in the mission, but also resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent the peacekeeping operation from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council. Furthermore, it is also difficult under the current International Peace Cooperation Law to participate in such activities as protecting civilians and others, protecting local residents, and the Security Sector Reform, all of which are necessary to provide seamless support from settling a dispute to reconstructing a state. The Council also considers that Japan should actively conduct these activities. Therefore, it is recommended that in revising the Law, not only the scope of the use of weapons be reviewed but also expansion of the scope of tasks be examined, taking into consideration civil-military cooperation, coordination with ODA and cooperation with foreign units.

(3) Enactment of a Permanent Law for International Peace Cooperation

The forms of international peace cooperation activities are becoming more diversified and now include not only UN peacekeeping operations but also multinational activities based on UNSC resolutions and non-UN initiatives conducted by at the request of contending countries aiming to achieve regional stabilization outside the framework of the United Nations. Japan has responded to multinational activities on the requests of UNSC resolutions other than PKO by adopting special measures laws which provide limited objectives and expiration dates, such as the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq. However, making individual special measures laws each time is problematic because of time loss, influence of political situations, and uncertainty of dispatch criteria. It is also problematic because legislative procedure must be repeated whenever amendments due to changes in the situation or extension of the expiration date are needed.

In order for Japan to conduct international peace cooperation activities more keenly, it is necessary to enact a permanent law early that stipulates the international framework for Japan's activities, scope of tasks, criteria of the use of weapons, modalities of the Diet's involvement, etc., with a view to expanding the scope of activities that SDF's can take part in. Enacting such a permanent law is also important in demonstrating Japan's basic policy on international peace cooperation at home and abroad.

(4) Establishment of a Legal Basis for International Peace Cooperation

The Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security (Panel on Security Legislation) recommended that international peace cooperation activities that are part of UN collective measures do not concern international disputes in which Japan is involved and therefore should not be construed as permitting the "use of force as means of settling international disputes" prohibited under the Constitution. The panel also concluded that the concept of "Ittaika" ("form an integral component of," an argument that logistics support, such as supply and medical services, is construed as an unconstitutional use of force when deemed to be an integrated part of the use of force by a third country) is far away from international understanding and the real world situations of international cooperation, and thus has to be corrected. The Council strongly supports this conclusion of the report of the Panel on Security Legislation and expects the Japanese government to reflect it in the Japanese legal system in the future.

Section 3 Policies on Response to a Ballistic Missile Attack

(1) Importance of U.S.-Japan Cooperation

To defend Japan against ballistic missiles attacks, Japan needs multilayered measures such as diplomatic dissuasion, deterrence by retaliatory strike capabilities, strikes on enemy's bases and others, denial by interception of missiles and consequence management.

While Japan relies on the United States for deterrence by retaliation, Japan itself should play a significant role in the other fields. Regarding diplomatic dissuasion, Japan should make more efforts to make international sanctions more effective. As for missile interception, Japan should play the principal role while getting support from the United States in the field of C4ISR. Consequence management through such measures as civil protection is something Japan should take full responsibility for.

In Chapter 2, Section 1, Subsection (2), the Council described its thoughts on the functions to complement missile defense systems or to enhance deterrence by strike capabilities including strikes on enemy bases. Even if Japan decides to introduce a new weapons system, cooperation with the United States including intelligence exchange will be necessary for its actual operation, and the modalities of the cooperation have to be developed through consultations on roles and missions sharing between Japan and the U.S.

Regarding information collection on missile launches, it is and will continue to be effective to utilize information from Japan's own sensors (radar systems onboard Aegis-equipped destroyers and radars deployed on the ground) as well as early warning information provided by the United States. When North Korea launched a ballistic missile in April 2009, early warning information was transmitted to Japan from U.S. Forces instantly. This fact explicitly proves the high credibility of Japan-U.S. cooperation and should be appreciated positively. For the future, Japan should further strengthen Japan-U.S. cooperation to diversify and improve the means of detecting launches.

(2) Establishment of a Legal Basis

The Panel on Security Legislation recommended that the traditional constitutional interpretation of the right of collective self-defense be changed, without relying on the logics of police power or defense of SDF's weapons and other equipment, as to enable at all times the interception of a ballistic missile on its way to the U.S. and the defense of jeopardized U.S. vessels during Japan-U.S. bilateral operations, both of which are tasks to be undertaken by Japan as an ally. The Council strongly supports these recommendations and considers these points as follows.

(a) Interception of Ballistic Missile on Its Way to the United States

The range of North Korea's ballistic missiles have expanded to cover not only the whole of Japan but also parts of the United States, such as Guam and Hawaii, which puts Japan and the United States in a position where they are confronting a common threat. Japan is required to intercept a missile on its way to the United States for its own security purposes and to do so by any measures possible. The reason for this is that Japan's missile defense systems are operated in close cooperation with the U.S. and that Guam and Hawaii are bases of U.S. force reinforcement when Japan is under attack. By reviewing traditional constitutional interpretations regarding the right of collective self-defense, Japan should interpret such an interception as lawful.

(b) Defense of U.S. Naval Vessels

When North Korea launched a missile in April 2009, Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force vessels and U.S. naval vessels were deployed for an operation on the Sea of Japan. However, if an armed attack on Japan had not yet happened and that the U.S. vessels were attacked on the high seas, which is difficult to be recognized as an attack on Japan's vessels, it would be very difficult to find a legal basis to defend U.S. vessels with SDF vessels.

Nevertheless, as stated above, responses to ballistic missiles are conducted through close cooperation between Japan and the United States. If SDF vessels cannot defend U.S. vessels engaged in warning and surveillance operations for missiles, the confidence in bilateral relations would drop and effective military measures against North Korea would become impossible; the security of Japan would be damaged considerably. In order for the SDF to defend U.S. vessels in such a situation, it is necessary to examine and establish appropriate legislation by taking such measures as reviewing the traditional constitutional interpretation of the right of collective self-defense.

Section 4 The Three Principles on Arms Exports, etc.

(1) Today's Problems Surrounding Arms Exports

Japan has dealt cautiously with arms exports in accordance with the Three Principles on Arms Exports, etc., (see Reference 4) in order to avoid exacerbating international conflicts, mindful of its position as a nation of peace derived from the ideals of its Constitution. Furthermore, it has taken a similar position on the export of military technologies, investment, and construction work, in accordance with the Three Principles on Arms Exports, etc. The Council considers that the Principles have been meaningful in controlling arms exports from Japan, and at the same time contain some issues to be addressed in terms of their compatibility with Japan's security requirements.

First, looking at global trends on defense equipment, the United States and European countries aspire to an international division of labor, recognizing that it is no longer practical for a single country to acquire high-end and high-priced equipment at its own cost and risk, as the possibility of conflict between leading countries has diminished. Both advanced technology and equipment produced in international joint research and development (R&D) and production are likely to be either shared by only the countries participating in the project or provided to those countries preferentially. If Japan cannot participate in such a framework of international joint R&D and production because of the restrictions of the Three Principles on Arms Export, etc., the risk of Japan's being left behind in international technological development will increase.

In addition, if Japan can participate in such an international R&D and production project or a joint project with the United States that has already been permitted on a case by case basis, the projects would not be able to maintain their possibilities of future growth unless Japan permits the outcomes of the joint R&D and production to be transferred from Japan's partner to a third party.

Furthermore, if a Japanese enterprise is allowed to export to the United States certain equipment that was originally licensed by the United States and is now produced in Japan or if the United States is allowed to transfer the equipment to a third party, such Japan-U.S. equipment cooperation could lead to a deepening of the bilateral relationship.

The Japanese government has been trying to balance the Three Principles on Arms Exports, etc. and security requirements. For instance, it decided to supply weapons technology to the United States in 1983, and permitted the export of arms to the United States in 2004 concerning the joint development and production of missile defense systems. Since 2004, the Japanese government has taken a stance of examining on a case-by-case basis whether to permit joint development and production with the United States other than those relating to missile defense systems and assistance to counter-terrorism and anti-piracy operations, taking into consideration the basic ideas of a peaceful nation that aims to avoid exacerbating international conflicts. However, over 4 years have passed since then and there has been only one export case that contributed to counter-piracy operations. The method of examining on a case-by-case basis is, in fact, a hurdle which is difficult to clear at the entrance stage. Products which make use of Japanese science and technology, such as detection and identification equipment useful for counter-terrorism operations, cannot be exported if they are regarded as weapons. In this respect it is pointed out that Japan cannot fully contribute to international efforts to fight against terrorism.

(2) Revision of the Three Principles on Arms Exports, etc.

The Council considers that Japan should not aim to export all kinds of weapons but to adhere to its restrictive policy since such full-scale exporting would be incompatible with basic idea of Japan as a nation of peace that aims to avoid exacerbating international conflicts.

On the other hand, unless Japan addresses the abovementioned problems, Japan will not be able to access the most advanced technologies and face obstacles to deepening Japan-U.S. cooperation; Japan's defense capabilities could possibly decline. It also would not be appropriate to place excessive restraints on the domestic defense industry with the Three Principles on Arms Export, etc., with a view to maintaining and developing a sound domestic defense industry as an infrastructure for Japan's security, as discussed in Chapter 2, Section 3.

At present, Japan participates in the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA)*19* and executes export control in accordance with international arrangements on export control of conventional arms. By participating in all the international export control regimes, including WA, Japan fulfills its international duty sufficiently. Given that, the Council considers that it is appropriate to set a new guideline that directs the arms export control policy.

The new guideline should include the following:

- strict observance of international rules on arms exports;

- continuation of its restrictive policy on arms control; and

- admittance of arms exports that accommodate security requirements or contribute to international peace and security.

However, even if the present policy framework based on the Three Principles on Arms Exports, etc. survives until then, individual issues mentioned in (1) of this section must be addressed quickly, at least by exempting the application of the Three Principles as was practiced in the past.

(3) The Scope of Exemption from the Three Principles on Arms Exports, etc.

International joint R&D and production should be exempted from the application of the Three Principles on Arms Exports, etc., since they generally contribute to the maintenance and development of Japan's defense capabilities, ensuring access to the most advanced technology. In such cases, it is necessary to ensure that Japan's ideals as a nation of peace are not to be contravened by setting a condition that strict control be enforceable by the Japanese government, as well as that the partners of international joint R&D and production be limited to countries that share values such as freedom and democracy and respect basic human rights.

Not only international joint R&D between governments but also pioneering joint technology development in the private sector and participation in other countries' equipment development and production projects by private enterprises should be treated similarly.

Furthermore, the following areas should be exempted from the application of the Three Principles on Arms Exports, etc., on the condition that strict control be similarly enforced in the following cases: transfer of the outcome of joint R&D and production from a partner country to a third party; export of U.S. licensed products to the United States; transfer of them from the United States to a third party.

Regarding joint R&D and production with the United States other than missile defense systems and assistance to counter-terrorism and anti-piracy operations, which have needed to be examined on a case-by-case basis, it is appropriate to exempt them from the application of the Three Principles on Arms Exports, etc. on the condition that strict control be enforced.

Section 5 Foundation for Realizing the New Security Strategy

(1) Strengthening Function of the Kantei (Prime Minister's Office)

National security is attained by integrating various powers, not only defense, but also diplomatic, economic, and cultural. Also necessary is a process of clearly defining national objectives to be attained, sharing mid- and long-term strategies within the government, and constantly verifying the strategies through reactions to individual issues. The key to implementing an integrated national security policy is the strengthened functions of the Kantei as a command post that controls Japan's comprehensive power and manages reciprocal processes between strategies and policies. Though the Council on the Strengthening of the Functions of the Prime Minister's Office regarding National Security*19* in 2007 and the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense in 2008 recommended strengthening the functions of the Kantei, the measures have not been fully implemented.

The functions of the Kantei as a command post can be strengthened by combining active commitments to security issues by the Prime Minister and related ministers and competent experts supporting them. From this point of view, there are measures executable within the constraints of the current system, such as establishing a regular ministerial meeting aiming to activate and revitalize the existing Security Council or appointing aides or advisors to the Prime Minister on national security. The Council expects the Japanese government to begin undertaking these measures as soon as possible.

The Report by the Council on the Strengthening of the Functions of the Prime Minister's Office regarding National Security also recommended establishing a permanent secretariat that supports ministerial meetings on security. This recommendation is significant in that it gives definite authority to a few selected experts on security and allows them to demonstrate their abilities. This should continue to be considered as a future problem.

(2) Strengthening the Functions of Intelligence and Information Security

As stated in Chapter 1, Section 3, intelligence is a basis that supports decision-making on security issues. While certain progress has been seen recently in Japan's intelligence collection and analysis structure, such as the enhancement of the capability of the Information Gathering Satellites (IGS), establishment of Cabinet Intelligence Analysts, and expansion of the intelligence community, intelligence capability should further be reinforced in a well-planned way, led by the Cabinet.

Above all, the objectives of Japan's information gathering are increasingly widening, because it is not only essential for Japan's security to grasp unforeseeable political and military trends of surrounding countries in a timely and appropriate manner, but also increasingly necessary these days to counter new threats, such as international terrorism and piracy, and to respond to risks arising in states and regions Japan has not been very involved in so far. In order to appropriately meet such expanding intelligence needs, Japan should drastically strengthen and improve human intelligence (HUMINT) and further enhance the capability of IGS, by increasing the number of satellites and other means. It is also necessary to enhance frameworks of intelligence cooperation and information security with foreign countries, as high-quality intelligence can be acquired through information exchange with foreign governments and institutions. What is more, the government should strive toward the development of necessary infrastructure to strengthen open source intelligence (OSINT), so as to enable broader information collection and analysis. Lastly, it is also necessary to train analysts and researchers of international and security affairs, in order to enhance intelligence analysis capabilities.

Strong intelligence capability is supported by solid frameworks for information security. In a recent information leakage case, classified information on Japan's security was leaked by a government employee. National security and interests could also be threatened by intelligence activities of foreign governments toward not only government institutions but also universities and private enterprises. In order to guarantee the effectiveness of the information security of the Japanese government, it is necessary to promptly develop an integrated legal system that imposes severe penalties, particularly for leaking classified information of national importance, and stipulates the handling of classified information through, for example, a security clearance system for the people who handle it; and it is critical to strengthen protective measures for important secret information possessed by non-governmental institutions, counter-intelligence measures and countermeasures against illegal access and leakage via computer networks.

(3) Strengthening Civilian Control by the Diet

Under what is called the "1955 system" in Japanese politics, debates among Diet members tended to focus on constitutional interpretation and procedures for defense issues rather than strategic perspectives. A negative way of thinking on how to watch and restrict the activities of the SDF also hindered ideas of actively utilizing the SDF's capabilities.

Concerning national security, consensus among political parties is needed on the objectives, even if their opinions on means and priorities are divided. In these days, when comprehensive efforts to ensure national security are required in the complicated security environment, it is important for the Diet not only to discuss specific legislative bills, treaties or their approval, but also to offer guidelines on national security policy through substantial policy debates, including debates between party leaders. This will result in strengthened civilian control by the Diet, from the standpoint of not only how to restrict the defense force but also how to make use of it.

In the process of deepening the substantial commitment of the Diet on security policy, it is anticipated that debates based on sensitive information are necessary. In preparation for such a situation, it is also desirable to discuss the procedures for holding secret sessions and setting rules for handling secret information in the Diet.

Reference 1: Basic Policy for National Defense (Adopted by the National Defense Council and the Cabinet on May 20, 1957)

The objective of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect aggression, but once invaded, to repel such aggression, and thereby, to safeguard the independence and peace of Japan based on democracy. To achieve this objective, the following basic policies are defined:

(1) Supporting the activities of the United Nations, promoting international collaboration, and thereby, making a commitment to the realization of world peace.

(2) Stabilizing the livelihood of the people, fostering patriotism, and thereby, establishing the necessary basis for national security.

(3) Building up rational defense capabilities by steps within the limit necessary for self-defense in accordance with national strength and situation.

(4) Dealing with external aggression based on the security arrangements with the U.S. until the United Nations will be able to fulfill its function in stopping such aggression effectively in the future.

Reference 2: Five Principles on Japan's Participation in UN peacekeeping Operations

1. Agreement on a cease-fire shall have been reached among the parties to armed conflict.

2. Consent for the undertaking of UN peacekeeping operations as well as Japan's participation in such operations has been obtained from the host countries as well as the parties to armed conflict.

3. The operations shall strictly maintain impartiality not favoring any of the parties to armed conflict.

4. Should any of the requirements in the above mentioned guideline cease to be satisfied, the Government of Japan may withdraw its contingents or personnel.

5. The use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect the personnel's lives, etc.

Reference 3: Miyazawa's Four Principles on Japan's Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations ( replied by the then Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono to Councillor Kubota (the Socialist Party) on the 31st of March 1993 at the House of Councillors)

1. Activities will be conducted within the framework of the Constitution and International Peace Cooperation Law

2. Activities will be supported by the Japanese people and be appreciated by the international community

3. Dispatched personnel will be able to conduct its duties effectively and safely.

4. Japan can contribute appropriately in the expected fields.

Reference 4: The Three Principles on Arms Exports, etc.

The Three Principles on Arms Exports is a governmental policy on arms exports declared in 1967. The principles provide that arms exports to the following countries shall not be permitted:

- Communist Bloc countries;

- Countries to which arms exports are prohibited under U.N. resolutions; or

- Countries which are actually involved or likely to be involved in international conflicts After that the "Unified View of the Cabinet" concerning to the Three Principles on

Arms Exports was announced in1976. Therefore, at present the GOJ shall not permit any export of weapons in principle whether it is for the countries described in the Three Principles on Arms Export or not.

However, the cases below are exempted from the Three Principles on Arms

Exports, etc. based on a statement of the chief cabinet secretary and so on:

- Exports based on the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies to the United States of America;

- Exports based on the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement between Japan and the United States (ACSA) and the revised agreement;

- Exports of goods necessary to conduct humanitarian antipersonnel-landmine clearance;

- Exports of weapons necessary to implement projects to dispose abandoned chemical weapons in China based on the Chemical Weapons Convention;

- Exports of weapons necessary to implement activities based on the former Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and the Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq;

- Exports in certain cases, including missile defense systems;

- Exports of patrol boats to Indonesia to implement measures for counter-terrorism and counter-piracy, etc.

The Council on Security and Defense Capabilities

-Members and Meetings-

Council members

Chairperson

Tsunehisa Katsumata         Chairman, Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO)

Members

Setsuko Aoki         Professor, Faculty of Policy Management, Graduate School of Media and Governance, Keio University

Chikako Kawakatsu Ueki         Professor, Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University

Ryozo Kato         Commissioner, Nippon Professional Baseball (Former Japanese Ambassador to the United States )

Shinichi Kitaoka         Professor, Graduate Schools for Law and Politics, Tokyo University

Ken Sato         Deputy Chairman, Institute for International Policy Studies(Former Administrative Vice Minister of Defense)

Syoji Takegochi         Corporate advisor, Japan Airlines International (Former Chairman, Joint Staff Council, JDA)

Akihiko Tanaka         Professor, Interfaculty Initiative in Information Studies, Tokyo University

Hiroshi Nakanishi         Professor, Graduate School of Law, Kyoto University

COUNCIL MEETINGS

Session 1(January 9)

Remarks by Prime Minister Taro Aso

Topic -Past National Defense Program Outlines and National Defense Program Guidelines

Session 2 (January 26)

Topic -International Security Environment

Session 3 (February 12)

Topic -Challenges and Responses of International Community

Session 4 (February 24)

Topic -Intelligence and Decision-making

Session 5 (March 3)

Topic -Issues Concerning Japan-US Alliance

-Activities Based on the Law Concerning International Peace Cooperation

Session 6 (March 26)

Topic -Infrastructures that Bolsters the Defense Force Part 1: Defense Production and Technology Infrastructure

Session 7 (April 9)

Topic -Infrastructures that Bolsters the Defense Force Part 2: Bases of Self Defense Forces and Local Governments

Session 8 (April 24)

Topic -Future Structure of Self Defense Forces Part 1

-Japan's Financial Condition and Defense Build-up

Session 9 (May 15)

Topic -Future Structure of Self Defense Forces Part 2

Session 10 (May 29)

Topic -Wrap-up Discussions

Session 11 (Aug 4 )

The Report Presented by the Council to Prime Minister Taro Aso

The Council on Security and Defense Capabilities

(SUMMARY)

CHAPTER 1 JAPAN'S NEW SECURITY STRATEGYS

Section 1 Concept and Goals of our Security Strategy: The World that Japan Strives for

In the world that Japan strives for, Japan's own security must be protected. Safety of the Japanese people must be achieved wherever they may be, inside and outside of Japan. To maintain the free and affluent lives of the Japanese people, free economic activities and freedom of transportation should be ensured under an international system that is free and open.

In order to maintain Japan's security and its prosperity, stability of Japan's neighbors, the region and the global society are prerequisite. A secure supply of food and materials, access to markets, and the safety of the sea lines of communication (SLOC) are all necessary to sustain Japan's prosperity. Maintaining stability of important trading partners is also indispensable.

Material well-being is not the only objective. Free and democratic values should be promoted, basic human rights advocated, both domestically and internationally. States sometimes disagree over their national interests, but the international community, though still imperfect, has adopted rules to mitigate disputes. Japan should contribute to further strengthen international organizations and help establish international norms. Japanese people renounce the use of force as means of settling international disputes, and it is a goal of Japan that this idea prevails in the world.

Since we cannot build walls between people, it follows that world peace is necessary for Japan's own security.

Section 2 Security Environment Surrounding Japan

(1) Basic Trends

Globalization of economies and societies is proceeding and interdependence between states is deepening. This has resulted in stability among major powers and the possibility of large-scale war between them is small. On the other hand, globalization has also allowed threats to spread worldwide. A problem in a distant area has come to affect the security of Japan and the world.

Transnational challenges are increasing. International terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), and piracy are some of those challenges we face. To solve these problems, international cooperation is vital and a robust international system is needed to spur such cooperation. There are signs of changes in the international system itself caused by emergence of rising powers and other factors.

(2) Global Challenges

Challenges in the Post-Cold War security environment include the issue of civil wars. Civil wars can result in a failed state, and the fragile governance not only leads to deprivation of individual rights and security but could also provide a sanctuary for international terror and crime groups. Impacts of these threats could reach anywhere in the world. International community must cooperate in restoring governance in affected areas, and military organizations are expected to play greater roles.

Proliferation of WMDs, particularly nuclear weapons, constitutes a serious threat to international security. Proliferation of nuclear weapons could result in a nuclearization domino effect and increase the risk of acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorist groups.

The United States has been the leader and provider of global security. The United States has controlled the international public space known as the "Global Commons," which has enabled it to provide such international public goods as freedom of navigation in the high-seas. Today, the United States enjoys absolute superiority and U.S. primacy seems to remain unchallenged into the foreseeable future. If the U.S. commitment to the world declines, this could result in an erosion of global and regional security. Regardless of the strength of U.S. will, if a perception were to spread among the countries in the Asia-Pacific region that U.S. commitment to the region was in decline, it could destabilize the region and lower deterrence of the Japan-U.S. alliance.

In order to maintain a current cooperative international system, it is important for major powers such as EU members and Japan to tackle international problems together with the United States. At the same time, it is important to encourage emerging powers to be responsible stakeholders actively bolstering the international system.

(3) Security Environment Surrounding Japan

North Korea continues its nuclear and missile development. This is a serious threat to international peace and security. From Japan's point of view, in addition to nuclear and missile threats, subversive activities by North Korea's special operation forces (SOF) would constitute another threat. The future of North Korea's regime is uncertain and the collapse of the regime is a possibility.

China is undergoing numerous changes. Many of these changes are favorable for Japan. The two countries are continuing efforts to build a "Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests." On the other hand, rapid reinforcement of its military power while lacking transparency in terms of their purpose and size, is a concern for Japan and the region. It is Japan's expectation that China chooses to be a responsible power, and Japan should work hard to provide an environment that facilitates such a choice.

Russia, a member of the G8, is one of the key players who can influence security in the Asia-Pacific region. Russia's military is less active than during the Cold War era, but still maintains its latent ability. While there is an unresolved territorial issue between Japan and Russia, in order to improve the security environment in the neighborhood, Japan should enhance confidence with Russia in the region.

In the Asia-Pacific region, a bundle of bilateral alliances with the United States has played an important role in guaranteeing regional security and order, but regional security frameworks are still fragile. It is necessary to develop cooperation with regard to specific areas such as terrorism and infectious disease into regional cooperation on security.

Japan's relations with the Republic of Korea are very important. We hope that the Japan-ROK security cooperation, which has been growing recently, will further deepen.

Section 3 The "Multilayered Cooperative Security Strategy"

The "Multilayered Cooperative Security Strategy" proposes a way to realize three goals by combining four approaches. The three goals are maintaining Japan's security, preventing threats from materializing, and maintaining and strengthening the international system. The four approaches are Japan's own efforts, cooperation with its ally, cooperation with other countries in the region and cooperation with the global community.

In today's security environment, compared to that of 2004 when the current "National Defense Program Guidelines" was adopted, threats to international systems are increasing and the U.S. influence that has supported and led the international system seems to have changed. Japan shares many security interests with countries in the Asia-Pacific region, but unlike in Europe, the region lacks an effective regional security framework. Therefore, this Strategy sets a new goal, "maintaining and strengthening the international system, " and adds a new approach, "cooperation with other countries in the region." These three targets overlap with each other in many ways and are mutually reinforcing. In addition, today's security environment is less characterized by geographical notions and there is less clear distinction between peacetime and wartime. Hence, it is important to combine four approaches in synergy and make them function multilayeredly and seamlessly.

(1) Japan's Security: Responses to Direct Threats and Issues to Japan

To prevent threats that vary in kind and quality from harming Japan's security directly, Japan should respond to these threats and challenges seamlessly. Hardware and software must be combined to bring about the maximum result. Means to achieve the goals include: building up Multi-functional and Flexible Defense Force while defining priorities among threats and risks; to set up a web of multilayered deterrence to counter the threat of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles; and strengthen the alliance with the U.S. through identifying both strategic and tactical common objectives.

In the new era of Japan-U.S. alliance, Japan should not always be led by its ally, but take its own initiatives proactively for Japan's own security in particular, and cooperate with the United States on issues which Japan cannot solve alone.

To realize abandonment of nuclear and missile development of North Korea through diplomatic means, Japan should make multilayered efforts, including implementation of UNSC resolutions, and diplomatic approaches to the countries concerned. International terrorism should be suppressed through regulatory efforts by law enforcement agencies and other organizations.

An integral approach that requires domestic coordination among ministries and agencies is highly important to address such emergencies as the violation of territorial waters, large-scale disasters. Other important elements include intelligence functions with which Japan can independently gather and analyze information to make policy decisions, and civilian control that enables wide-ranging use of the SDF in order to achieve political targets.

(2) Preventing Threats from Materializing

To prevent threats from materializing, the "seed" of a threat must be addressed to prevent it from growing into a real "threat." To achieve this goal, the overall security environment must be improved through indirect means and by increasing mutual understanding.

U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region is vital to the stability of this region. Realignment of U.S. forces and transformation of the Japan-U.S. alliance should be implemented steadily. In addition, Japan and the United States should cooperatively maintain a stable regional security environment through international peace cooperation activities and multinational military exercises.

In order to keep a regional problem from growing into a destabilizing factor for the region, countries in the region should strengthen relationship based on mutual confidence. For this purpose, such measures as institutionalization of the relationship and establishment of a code of conduct are beneficial. Japan has already contributed to this in the field of maritime security, and should continue to promote such efforts. Japan should contribute to the stability of the region by strengthening security cooperation with ROK and Australia. Japan shares many common security interests with the two countries, both of which are allies of the United States.

Once becoming a failed state, comprehensive support should be given to the country until it accomplishes reconstruction. Japan should participate in the peace building activities from immediate stages of post-conflict. Japan should also contribute more actively to the U.N. peacekeeping operations. Moreover, Japan should commit more positively to arms control regimes aimed at non-/counter-proliferation of WMDs as well as efforts in nuclear disarmament.

Confidence-building measures result in improving Japan's security level. Based on an understanding that defense exchanges and military deterrence work together inseparably, Japan should engage in defense exchange programs earnestly. At the same time, Japan should envision a new "Comprehensive Security" that increases effectiveness by combining defense power with other powers such as diplomatic and economic power, and cultural attractiveness.

(3) Maintenance and Strengthening the International System

In order to realize the world Japan strives for, the current open and free international system should be maintained. At the same time, it is important to establish a complementary system in order to better counter new and transnational challenges. Japan should devote itself to establishing such a new system. In its endeavor to contribute to the international community, Japan should make efforts not to allow the so-called "historical" issue to hinder Japan's initiatives in foreign policy.

To play a more active role in establishing and strengthening the international system, a variety of initiatives should be implemented multilayeredly. First, Japan should work harder to achieve UN structural reforms. Japan should make more efforts to obtain permanent membership in the Security Council in order to contribute to the UN decision making process more actively. Additionally, more Japanese citizens are encouraged to join and work for the international organizations.

Since it is difficult to establish a comprehensive regional security framework in the Asia-Pacific region, one should begin with cooperation in achievable areas. To integrate China into regional frameworks as a constructive member is of great importance for a stable regional order. As the first step toward the construction of a regional security framework, Japan should construct a network of allies and partners of the U.S., and upgrade the cooperative relationship with the ROK. Japan should envision establishment of a robust framework which is empowered to resolve conflicts as a long-term target, being premised on effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. alliance. Multilayered regional frameworks should be taken shape based on the ARF, ASEAN+3, Japanese-Indian cooperation, association among G20 member states, and so on. Furthermore, Japan should try to organize a cooperative structure in the field of disaster relief.

Japan has underpinned the international system with the U.S. in such spheres as economy and finance. Hereafter, Japan, cooperating with other states, should complement the roles that the U.S. has undertaken in order to secure the global commons. Many security issues of today require prompt decision making and action. A "core group" of states including Japan, the United States, and a few other states should be organized to achieve such an end.

CHAPTER 2 THE MODALITY OF JAPAN'S DEFENSE FORCE

Section 1 Roles of Japan's Defense Force

a) Deterrence and Effective Response to Contingencies On and Around Japan's Territory

One of the features of the current security environment is the growing importance of situations in gray area between peacetime and wartime due to less warning time allowed in certain contingencies. Japan should put its priority on "deterrence by operations" - dynamic deterrence as opposed to static deterrence - through activities under normal circumstances. The SDF must have the hardware and software that enables them to respond seamlessly to situations as they develop. If an invasion of Japan's sovereignty were to occur, Japan would need to expel it by exerting its defense capabilities. Japan should steadily build up a defense force that is able to cope effectively with possible contingencies.

To counter the threat of North Korea's ballistic missiles, deterrence is the most important tool. Japan continues to rely on the United States for nuclear deterrence by punishment. While Japan expects the United States to contribute its other strike capabilities as a second layer of deterrent, Japan should also conduct operational collaboration and cooperation with the United States. In addition, denial capabilities by missile defense systems and consequence management contribute to forming another layer of deterrence. To make such multilayered deterrence work more effectively, Japan-U.S. bilateral coordination is important. To defend against missiles, Japan should steadily continue its build-up program of missile defense system and promote the Japan-U.S. co-development program for a new sea-based interceptor missile. As for strike capability, Japan should conduct studies of possible weapons systems, etc., taking it as a given that operations will be executed together with the United States. Japan should also build up its information gathering capabilities that are complementary to those of the United States.

Japan should be able to sense indications of subversive activities by North Korean SOF and international terror groups, and cope promptly with them. While assisting law enforcement agencies in earlier stages, the SDF should perform the central role in operations such as protection of Japan's important facilities.

In relation to the issues of territories in surrounding waters and of delimitation of EEZ, while carrying out constant surveillance activities, Japan should maintain its qualitative superiority in operational capabilities. Moreover, Japan should consider posting of new SDF units and enhance maneuvering capabilities for the security of its offshore islands.

Recognizing the high frequency of natural disasters in Japan, the SDF is expected to assume an important role in large-scale disasters. The SDF, as a source of relief and security for the Japanese people, should further strengthen its ties with local communities, whose ability for countering disaster is deteriorating due to such factors as aging population.

A full-scale invasion against Japan is unlikely in the current international situation. A state, however, must intrinsically remain prepared to defend itself from a possible invasion. Japan should continue to possess the minimum level of capabilities necessary to counter this type of invasion as a precaution against unforeseeable changes in the international situation.

b) Further Stabilization of Regional Environment and Order

Since it is necessary to pay attention to increased activities of China and Russia in the area surrounding Japan, Japan should establish its intelligence superiority by ascertaining neighboring countries' military movements through ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) activities.

Recent defense exchanges place emphasis on international cooperation aimed at solving common challenges. Japan-China cooperation in such fields as maritime security will bring about a favorable influence to the whole region. At the same time, Japan, with ROK and Australia, must take initiatives in a variety of issues in the region. Japan should take concrete steps to cooperate with the two countries in intelligence and logistics support. Japan should consider dispatching SDF units more actively to places where it can cooperate with these two countries in international peace cooperation activities.

Japan should also contribute to efforts toward regional stability through regional security frameworks including ASEAN. Japan should actively support multilateral exercises, particularly for such purposes as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

c) Improving the Global Security Environment

Countering international terrorism is an important security objective for Japan. Japan should make long-term contribution in international efforts, including its support activities for maritime interdiction operations in the Indian Ocean.

In participating in reconstruction efforts in failed states, the SDF should put greater emphasis on the protection of civilians and support for building up security capabilities in addition to humanitarian assistance and support for economic and social recovery. It is also necessary to prepare conditions that facilitate more active participation in the PKO. As the importance of disaster relief is likely to increase in the future, the SDF's international disaster relief activities will also be important.

Japan should assign the SDF actively in efforts such as PSI to prevent proliferation of WMDs and their delivery means. Japan should also more keenly promote exchanges and cooperation with NATO and European countries.

Section 2 New Functions and Posture of the Defense Force

(1) Guiding Principles for the Build-up of Japan's Defense Posture

Recently, roles of Japan's defense force in ensuring Japanese nationals' security is broadening. In addition, the defense force is requested to conduct law enforcement activities. Today's defense force should develop into a "multi-functional force" that is able to carry out various missions, and one that can react to a sudden crisis quickly and appropriately, in a "flexible" manner. From this viewpoint, the current SDF needs further structural transformation.

Because required skill level of units and personnel is becoming higher and more professional, an SDF unit must react to contingency with its usual line-up, not relying on wartime call-up. Therefore, personnel fill rate of the SDF should be kept high even in peacetime.

In pursuing the structural transformation, the Japanese government must allocate appropriate resources to the defense sector so that the defense force can maintain necessary equipment and personnel and operate them, while setting clear priorities and efficiently using defense expenditure.

(2) Common Requirements for the Defense Force to Fulfill Functions

Japan should build up its defense force with high cost-effectiveness giving priorities to quality and software. Listed below are common requirements for pursuing this objective.

- Establishing intelligence superiority: introduce ISR assets such as aircraft and vessels and link them into a network; utilize outer space effectively and efficiently.

- Enhancing C4 and information security: as a basis of both seamless response to an aggravating situation and more active participation in international peace cooperation activities.

- Utilizing high-quality science and technology: Japan should move away from increasing quantity and improve the quality of the defense capabilities being attentive to trends in military technology.

- Considering geographical conditions: improve maneuvering capabilities, and seek to take advantage of outlying islands for ISR and other operations.

(3) Enhancing Joint Operations and Increasing Jointness

Based on lessons learned since the Joint Staff centralized operational functions, the SDF should continue to improve its joint operations capabilities, and establish methods for education and training and unit composition that contribute to joint operations. Also important is for the Joint Staff to have authority to make recommendations for defense build-up, based on judgment of priorities from operational perspective.

(4) Defense Build-up that Contributes to Strengthening Japan-U.S. alliance

Roles and missions sharing for contingencies between Japan and the United States have been specified, and this provides basis for considering mutual complementarities of capabilities of both countries. Whenever Japan thinks of building up its defense force, it is important to take into consideration roles and missions sharing and improvement of interoperability with the United States.

(5) International Peace Cooperation Activities

Though international peace cooperation activities became one of the SDF's primary missions, recent record of participation is not satisfactory. The SDF should sustain a posture that enables it to always be in a position to dispatch troops to multiple large-scale and multi-dimentional PKO missions.

Section 3 Infrastructure that Bolsters the Defense Force

(1) Personnel Infrastructure (Response to Decline in Number of Young People, and Other Issues)

The SDF is facing two urgent challenges with regard to personnel infrastructure: decline in the number of young people; and maladjustment of the age structure and rank promotion system. To respond to the decline in the number of young people, the SDF should expand recruitment of women and open more occupational specialties to them, and change its hiring condition to one with longer terms of contract. To adjust the age structure, the SDF should reduce the number of NCOs promoted to officers, as well as try to motivate and revitalize the NCOs. Introduction of an early retirement system is a matter for consideration, and government-wide efforts to help retired personnel earn new jobs would be the key to making the new system work. Establishing professionalism among the SDF personnel is another important issue.

The Council expects the Japanese government to consider this matter and take necessary measures, in view of the significant security implications of the problem.

(2) Materiel Infrastructure (Defense Production and Technology Infrastructure)

Prices of SDF equipment are becoming more expensive while defense expenditure continues to decrease gradually. There are trends toward international joint development programs in other advanced countries. Japanese defense production and technology infrastructure is now at the crossroads of whether it can accommodate itself to these external changes.

Reforms of defense programming and procurement should continue to be carried out steadily, including promotion of IPT (Integrated Project Team) concept. In addition, the Japanese government should spell out a comprehensive defense industrial policy that decides which part of the infrastructure is priority for Japan and to be sustained and nurtured, and pursue the realization of infrastructure from which the government would be able to acquire state-of-the-art equipments at a moderate cost. Also important is to decide to join the circle of international joint development.

(3) Social Infrastructure (Support from Japanese Nationals, and Local Cooperation)

Japan has tended to avoid engaging in arguments on security and defense issues, and to be unable to discuss calmly in a time of need. There should be broad discussions on various aspects of Japan's security policy, and for that reason accurate information from the government should be provided.

The Japanese people and local residents have high expectations of the SDF's disaster relief operations and support for civilian activities. Thanks to improvements in the deployment capabilities of units, today the Japanese government can assign the location of each unit more flexibly. When the Japanese government makes a decision on the stationing of units, it should take into account whether the location is convenient for daily training and whether the location is conducive to forming strong ties with local community.

We should recognize that Japanese people's understanding and support for the SDF, and cooperation from local communities have now become important elements of Japan's defense capabilities.

CHAPTER 3 REVIEWS ON BASIC PRINCIPLES OF JAPAN'S NATIONALSECURITY

Section 1 Guiding Principles for National Security Policy

Since the "Basic Policy for National Defense" was adopted more than 50 years ago, there has not been a single modification of the document. The Basic Policy is not specific enough to provide substantial guidance in setting Japan's national security policies.

There is a set of principles that has been regarded as Japan's "basics of defense policy."

- Exclusively defense-oriented policy

- Not becoming a military power which threatens other countries

- Ensuring civilian control

- The Three Non-Nuclear Principles

These principles have been significant as putting the brake, but explain little on what Japan should do. Civilian control and the policy of not becoming a military power have not lost their importance. Due to changing security circumstances, however, today's world is quite different from the one the exclusively defense-oriented policy originally assumed.

We should decide the basic principles for national security policy, and explain them at home and abroad. We should also examine the ideas which have represented Japan's basic stance, such as exclusively defense-oriented policy, from today's viewpoint.

Section 2 Guidelines and Frameworks for International Peace Cooperation Activities

Japan's commitment to U.N. peacekeeping operations has not been very active recently. In order to increase Japan's participation in U.N. PKO, it is necessary to review legal and political criteria which have been used to decide whether or not to dispatch the SDF to a PKO mission.

The "Five Principles" that is the legal standard contains several ideas to be reviewed such as scope of "parties in conflict" and the way of use of weapons. The "Five Principles" and the International Peace Cooperation Law, which are two sides of the same coin, should be revised. Japan's new political criteria should include estimate of legitimacy of the mission, safety level and whether Japan's potential ability will be performed in a suitable manner.

Based on these estimates, Japan should decide n these estimates, Japan should whether participation in the mission in question is consistent with Japan's national interests or not.

To manage needs for international peace cooperation activities by making individual special measures laws is problematic. Early enactment of a so-called "permanent law" is necessary for Japan to more keenly conduct international peace cooperation activities.

The Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security ("The Panel on Security Legislation") recommended that international peace cooperation activities should not be construed as "use of force as means of settling international disputes" and that the concept of "ittaika" ("form an integral component of") is far away from the real world situations, thus it has to be corrected. The Council expects the Japanese government to reflect the conclusion of the Report into Japanese legal system in the future.

Section 3 Policies on Response to a Ballistic Missile Attack

To defend Japan against a ballistic missile attack, while Japan relies on the U.S. for deterrent by retaliation, Japan should play its own role i interception of the missile and consequence management.

The Panel on Security Legislation made recommendations on interception of a ballistic missile on its way to the U.S. and defense of U.S. vessels during Japan-U.S. bilateral operations, and the Council strongly supports them.

Advancement of capability of North Korea's ballistic missiles makes Japan and the U.S. to confront a common threat. For its own security purposes, Japan is required to intercept a missile on its way to the U.S. By reviewing traditional constitutional interpretation on the right of collective self-defense, Japan should interpret such an interception as lawful.

If SDF vessels could not defend U.S. vessels which are engaged in warning and surveillance operations for missiles, the confidence in bilateral relations would drop, and subsequently security of Japan would be damaged considerably. In order for the SDF to defend U.S. vessels in such a situation, it is necessary to examine and establish an appropriate legislation by taking such measures as review of the traditional constitutional interpretation on the right of collective self-defense.

Section 4 The Three Principles on Arms Exports, etc.

The United States and European countries are now trying to acquire high-end technology and equipment by setting up international division of labor. If Japan could not participate in such a framework of international joint research and development (R&D) and production because of the restrictions of the Three Principles on Arms Export, etc., the risk of Japan being left behind in international technological development would increase. In addition, if a Japanese enterprise is allowed to export the United States certain equipment that was originally licensed by the U.S. and is now produced in Japan, such Japan-U.S. equipment cooperation could lead to a deeping of bilateral relationship, but for now the Three Principles hinder such initiatives.

Since 2004, the Japanese government has taken a stance of examining on a case-by-case basis and deciding whether to ease the Three Principles on Arms Export, etc. for certain equipment related to support of counter-terrorism and counter-piracy. However, this method of examining on a case-by-case basis is, in fact, a hurdle at the entrance stage.

Unless Japan addresses these problems, Japan's defense capability could possibly decline. The Council considers it appropriate to set a new guideline that directs the arms export control policy. However, even if the present policy framework survives until then, the abovementioned individual issues must be exempted application of the Three Principles on Arms Export, etc. on the condition that strict control be enforced, at the least.

Section 5 Foundation for Realizing the New Security Strategy

(1) Strengthening Function of the Kantei (Prime Minister's Office)

The key to implementing an integrated national security policy is the strengthened functions of the Kantei as a command post. Recommended measures stated by "the Council on the Strengthening of the Function of the Prime Minister's Office Regarding National Security" and "the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense" have not been fully implemented. The Japanese government should implement as soon as possible measures that are executable within current constraints, as well as continue to consider establishing a permanent secretariat that supports ministerial meetings.

(2) Strengthening the Functions of Intelligence and Information Security

In order to appropriately address expanding needs for intelligence, Japan should strengthen and improve human intelligence (HUMINT), capability of Information Gathering Satellites, frameworks of intelligence cooperation and information security with foreign countries, and infrastructure of open source intelligence (OSINT).

Strong intelligence capability is supported by solid frameworks for information security. It's necessary to develop an integrated legal system that stipulates the handling of classified information of Japan and to strengthen countermeasures against illegal access and leakage via computer network.

(3) Strengthening Civilian Control by the Diet

Under what is called the "1955 system" in Japanese politics, debates among Diet members tended to lack strategic perspectives and ideas about actively utilizing the SDF capabilities to realize a political end. It is of importance that the Diet, through substantial policy debates, offers guidelines on national security policy. This will result in strengthened civilian control by the Diet. It is also desirable to discuss the procedures for holding secret sessions and setting rules for handling secret information in the Diet.

*1* "Human Security" is a concept which was born out of a comparison to national security, and its purpose is to secure the safety of each human being. In 1994 it was advocated by the United Nations Development Programme(UNDP) for the first time. As a result of the development of globalization and outbreaks of civil wars and regional conflicts, one nation cannot secure a sufficient level of individual safety. In some cases, a nation violates its own individual safety. For human security, it is necessary to comprehensively tackle human issues arising from both sides of the conflict and development, and it aims to protect from individual starvation and fear. The Japanese government advocated the importance of human security in 1998 and has since been tackling it. The Report of the Commission on Human Security in 2003 (Mrs. Sadako Ogata, Prof. Amartya Sen co-chairpersons) recommended protecting people from conflict and proliferation of weapons, supporting the security of people on the move, working to provide minimum living standards, ensuring universal access to basic health care, empowering all people with universal basic education.

*2* The international community has been tackling these civil wars from a humanitarian point of view, but there is a difference in the degree of support given to areas where a close relationship to national interest is obvious and areas where it is not. Violations of human rights tend to occur in countries and regions that do not attract the interest of the international community. The resolution adopted by the General Assembly at the 2005 World Summit confirmed the concept of "Responsibility to Protect: R2P." This says that each individual state has the responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity through appropriate and necessary means. However, the situation has not yet improved.

*3* For example, within the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan, the military wing supports civilian officials working under bad security circumstances, while supporting Afghan security forces. The PRT's role has been expanding to civil services, including quick impact, as well as to the civilian-military cooperation(CIMIC).

*4* Though the United States and the Soviet Union were enemies during the Cold War era, both could confirm the other's intention to some extent through nuclear disarmament and arms control negotiations. But most of the countries that have carried out nuclear development in the Post-Cold War era are countries that were not able to bring about the condition necessary to establish deterrence. This condition is being able to confirm each other's intentions and to share the same perception of the situation. If nuclear weapons were attained by a terrorist group or a non-state actor with no territory, deterrence would be very difficult because there would be no geographical objects.

*5* The concept of the "global commons" refers to an international public space which is used as a communication routes by countries all over the world. At present, it means the high seas and Exclusive Economic Zones and the airspace above them. "Command of the commons refers to a state having the capability to deny access, even though any country is permitted access. The U.S. military currently possesses command of the commons, in the same way that the former British Empire took control of the seven seas. While controlling it, the United States assures any country the use of the global commons

*6* The number of fourth generation modern fighters, whose capabilities are equal to F-15 fighters, is rising sharply. China has a license to import and produce the Su-27 and Su-30 fighters from Russia. It is also deployingJ-10 domestic fighters. The Chinese Navy acquires quiet submarine and combatant ships with improved air defense and anti-ship missile capabilities and is interested in acquiring aircraft carriers. In addition, by mechanizing its ground force and advancing IT technology, the mobility of the Chinese Army is improving.

*7* Regarding recent activities surrounding Japan, the number of scrambles for Russian operations is higher than for other countries, but the level is low compared to the peak time. Russia has resumed patrols by nuclear submarine and surveillance flights by bombers and patrol aircraft, and there are indications of changes in activities and a case of airspace violation by Russia has occurred.

*8* Strategy is an overall approach comprising an appropriate combination of means to achieve a desired goal. The goal and measures connect like a chain. Even if there are a lot of goals the means are limited, so it is necessary to give priority to certain goal or in some case to modify part of goal. That is to say, to think about a new strategy under new international circumstance means defining security goals and thinking about what kind of means and what kind of approach is needed to realize it.

*9* A security dilemma arises when one country unilaterally upgrades its own defense force based on its own military logic and another country, observing this, reinforces its national defense force, resulting in a further arms race. The bottom line is that apparently rational behavior of each country escalates the arms race, thereby decreasing each other's security levels. A security dilemma is thought to be intensified in the following cases:

- When it is difficult to distinguish between offensive weapons and defensive weapons.

- An attack dominated era when technology for attack such as missile technology advances.

- When countries distrust each other because of events that have occurred in the past.

*10* The "multi-functional and flexible defense force" is a concept presented in the 1976 National Defense Program Outline. With a backdrop of lessened tension between the United States and the Soviet Union and so on, without assuming any specific threat, it presents the minimum necessary level of defense capabilities that an independent country should have.

The effective part of the Basic Defense Force Concept is thought to be that Japan's defense force does not directly oppose a threat to Japan and that Japan possesses a defense force considering strategic circumstances and geographical features such as military trends and so on.

*11* The objective of deterrence is to prevent a potential aggressor from attacking by showing preparedness for either denial or punishment of the aggressor's attack. There are two kinds of deterrence: denial; and punishment. In deterrence by denial one shows that an offensive action will fail because of firm defense. In deterrence by punishment one threatens that any offensive action will be rewarded with retaliation. In contrast to offense and defense, deterrence does not always use actual force: the method of deterring an attack is the potential use of force. Conditions for deterrence to succeed include: one possesses capabilities strong enough to inflict on an aggressor higher cost than perceived merit; one has the will to exert the capabilities; and the aggressor is informed of and understands one's capabilities and will and the two sides share a common perception of the situation.

*12* The National Security Study Group which was commissioned by Prime Minister Ohira in 1979 studied a variety of topics including international relations, provision of energy and food, countermeasures against large-scale earthquakes, and published a report in 1980.

*13* In January 2008 then Prime Minister Fukuda declared in a policy speech in the Diet that Japan would play a responsible role in the international community as a "peace fostering nation" that contributed to peace and development in the world.

*14* The United Nations Stand-by Arrangements System (UNSAS) is based on conditional advance commitments by Member States regarding specified resources within the agreed response times for UN peacekeeping operations. These resources can be military formations, specialized personnel (civilian and military), services as well as material and equipment. UNSAS was established in order that UNDPKO could ask member states to cooperate swiftly and smoothly. UNSAS started in 1994 and 88 states have since registered. Japan registered in July 2009.

*15* The Defense Agency published the Defense of Japan under the Sato Cabinet in 1970 (then Minister of State for Defense was Nakasone) and it stated that "the principal object of the defense of our country is an exclusively defense-oriented policy."

*16* 3 staff officers in UNDOF, 1 transport unit composed of 43 personnel, 6 military observers in UNMIN, 2 staff officers in UNMIS. In addition, 6 liaison and coordination personnel have been dispatched.

*17* Statistics for the UN are as follows. Canada 183, France 2,253, Germany 308, Italy 2,762, Japan 39, Russia 350, the United Kingdom 290, the United States 95 (as of June 2009). The data do not include participants in international peace cooperation activities which are not PKOs but are authorized by UN Security Council resolutions. For your reference, participants in ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) are as follows. Canada 2,830, France 2,780, Germany 3,380, Italy 2,350, the United Kingdom 8,300, the United States 28,850. (as of June 15, 2009)

*18* In March 2008, the UN published "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines" (so-called Capstone Doctrine) which described characteristics and tasks in peacekeeping operations.

*19* The Wassenaar Arrangement, established in July 1996, is an international export control regime to prevent excessive transfer and accumulation of conventional weapons that would cause destabilization by promoting responsible export control on conventional weapons and dual-use goods and technologies.