"The World and Japan" Database (Project Leader: TANAKA Akihiko)
Database of Japanese Politics and International Relations
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS); Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia (IASA), The University of Tokyo

[Title] 2026 Joint Ministerial Statement on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

[Place]
[Date] September 22, 2026
[Source] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
[Notes]
[Full text]

1. We welcome the holding of the Ministerial Meeting of the "Friends of the CTBT" on September 22, 2026, emphasising the importance of the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty (CTBT). We appreciate the leadership of the Article XIV Conference co-presidents, the Philippines and Sweden, in advancing this shared goal.

2. As we celebrate the 30th anniversary of the CTBT, we underline the Treaty's significant contribution to international peace and security. The entry into force of the CTBT remains an essential step in our shared commitment towards the full implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The recent NPT Review Conference reaffirmed the CTBT's central role in the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation agenda with strong support from the States Parties. We reaffirm our full support for and our commitment to the Treaty's legally-binding, universal and verifiable ban on "any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion". This ban will constrain the proliferation, development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, bringing us closer to a world without nuclear weapons.

3. With signature by 188 States and ratification by 179 States to date*1*, the CTBT is approaching universality. We applaud the efforts of Dr. Robert Floyd, Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), to achieve further signatures and ratifications. We welcome ratification by the Kingdom of Tonga, completing universalisation across the Pacific region. We continue to urge all States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty without further delay nor precondition, particularly the nine Annex 2 States.*2* We dedicate ourselves individually and jointly to continue raising awareness among the general public and to advocate for the CTBT's entry into force at the highest political level.

4. We underscore that any nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion by any State would be harmful and destabilizing for international peace and security, erode confidence in the multilateral disarmament framework and risk igniting and accelerating a new nuclear arms race. The humanitarian and environmental concerns associated with a resumption of nuclear weapon test explosions further underline the importance of achieving the Treaty's entry into force.

5. Pending entry into force, we call upon all States to refrain from any action that would defeat the object and purpose of the CTBT. We furthermore call upon relevant states to adhere to their existing national moratoria against all nuclear weapon test explosions and any other nuclear explosions. We underscore the importance of developing and implementing new concrete measures to restore confidence in these moratoria. Voluntary transparency measures, including the sharing of relevant national seismic data where possible, can make an important contribution to confidence in the Treaty's verification architecture and to the global norm against nuclear testing.

6. We recall our condemnation of the six nuclear tests conducted by the DPRK since 2006 that undermine the CTBT's object and purpose, and strongly urge the DPRK to fully comply with all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, and to take concrete actions towards the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of its nuclear weapons, ballistic missile and related programmes. We reiterate that any new DPRK nuclear test would be irresponsible and unacceptable and call on the DPRK to sign and ratify the CTBT.

7. We urge the Preparatory Commission to continue implementing and sustaining the verification regime's capabilities, and its ongoing programme of capacity-building and training for national authorities. The International Monitoring System (IMS) and the International Data Centre (IDC) have been established to provide the international community with independent and reliable means of verifying compliance with the Treaty, within their technical capabilities and provisional nature, which would be complemented by On-Site Inspection (OSI) once the Treaty enters into force. We stress the importance of Integrated Field Exercise 26, to be held in Namibia in October-November 2026, which will help to further develop On-Site Inspection capabilities.

8. We also celebrate the IMS' diverse scientific and civil applications that benefit all States, including monitoring nuclear accidents and detecting volcanic activity, earthquakes and tsunamis. We underline the importance of IMS sustainment to ensure the viability and core functioning of this critical system.

9. We recognise the importance of individual States' financial commitments to the regular budget of the Organization to ensure its proper functioning, as well as the completion and maintenance of the regime. We reaffirm our commitment to support the long-term sustainability of all elements of the verification regime, pending the entry into force of the Treaty. In light of the Organization's challenging financial situation, we call on all States Signatories to pay their assessed contributions in full and on time as a matter of utmost priority and express our gratitude for the voluntary contributions made towards the sustainment and development of the verification regime. We also highlight the importance of continued efforts to enhance efficiencies, streamline processes, and maximise the effective deployment of resources.

10. We will continue promoting cooperation among States to support the verification regime, raise awareness of the Treaty and its benefits among the general public, including youth, and advocate for the Treaty at the highest political levels.

11. The CTBT has served us now for three decades. But until the Treaty enters into force and becomes legally-binding for ratifying and acceding States we cannot take for granted the global norm against nuclear testing. As such, in celebrating its 30th anniversary we also re-commit ourselves to achieving the Treaty's entry into force as soon as possible.


{*1* As of Sept 22, 2026}

{*2* There are nine Annex 2 states, whose ratifications are necessary for entry into force, which have yet to ratify the Treaty: China, DPRK, Egypt, India, Iran (Islamic republic of), Israel, Pakistan, the Russian Federation and the United States of America.}