[Title] Press Conference by Prime Minister Ishiba

[Opening statement by Prime Minister Ishiba]

Today I released my Reflection as prime minister, titled "On the 80th anniversary of the end of the war."

The text has already been distributed to you in the media. I ask for your understanding as I talk about my Reflection in a slightly condensed format because of time constraints.

Eighty years have passed since the end of the war.

I have visited various monuments honoring the war dead both domestically and overseas, and I also participated in the Peace Memorial Ceremonies to console the spirits of the atomic bomb victims held in Hiroshima City on August 6 and Nagasaki City on August 9, as well as the National Memorial Ceremony for the War Dead on August 15. While doing so, I was once again struck markedly by questions I have long had in my mind, namely why Japan had been unable to stop that war, as well as the role politics played and the role it failed to play.

To date, Statements by the Prime Minister have been issued on the 50th, 60th, and 70th anniversaries of the end of the war, and I uphold the positions articulated by the previous cabinets on history.

At the same time, the past three Statements do not specifically address in depth why we could not have avoided the war. The 70th anniversary Statement said, "(Japan) attempted to overcome its diplomatic and economic deadlock through the use of force. Its domestic political system could not serve as a brake to stop such attempts." No further details were touched on or provided in the Statement.

The unanswered question is why Japan's domestic political system at the time could not serve as a brake to stop such attempts. The Reflection that I have just released is both a compilation of my own thinking regarding the questions remaining after the Statements by the Prime Minister issued thus far; it is also a tool for considering this question with all the people of Japan.

By what course of events did Japan plunge into that war? I believe that, at that time, there were problems with each of the Constitution of the Empire of Japan, the Government, the Imperial Diet, and the media.

I will first take up the Constitution of the Empire of Japan.

Under that Constitution, the supreme command of the Army and Navy, known as the authority to command the armed forces, was considered independent. Under that system, there was no "Civilian Control" principle. While the Prime Minister was designated as the head of the cabinet, the system did not grant him the authority necessary to lead the cabinet. For that reason, this was a mechanism which, to borrow the words of political scientist MARUYAMA Masao, required "the mediation of super-constitutional entities such as the Genrō and senior statesmen" in order to integrate politics and the military and unify the national will. These were systemic issues inherent to the Constitution of the Empire of Japan.

Over the course of the 1910s and into the 1920s, as Japan entered the era known as the Taisho Democracy, the role of "mediation" integrating politics and the military that I mentioned just now, which had been held by the Genrō until then, shifted to political parties.

At first, party-led cabinets, as exemplified by what is often called SHIDEHARA's diplomacy, restrained imperialist expansion. However, the meaning of the supreme command of the Army and Navy gradually underwent an expansive interpretation, and the military began to use the independence of the supreme command as a means to exclude government and parliamentary involvement and to ensure control over overall military policy and budget.

The struggle for power among political parties intensified, causing them to lose the trust of the people. In the 1930s, the opposition Rikken Seiyukai (Friends of Constitutional Government Party), seeking to destabilize the Rikken Minseikai (Constitutional Democratic Party) cabinet, allied with elements within the Navy. They fiercely attacked the government then in office over the ratification of the London Naval Treaty, arguing that supreme command authority also extended to military administration, namely, the budget and the organization of the military structure in addition to operations and deployment.

In 1935, the Rikken Seiyukai Party criticized the theory of the Emperor as an organ of the state, proposed by MINOBE Tatsukichi, by using it as ammunition to attack the government, which escalated into a political issue that also involved the military. OKADA Keisuke's Cabinet at the time attempted to distance itself politically from the issue, stating that academic debates "must be left to the scholars."

Ultimately, however, the cabinet yielded to the military's pressure and demands, and issued the Declaration on the Clarification of the National Polity twice, repudiating the theory of the Emperor as an organ of the state. Minobe's writings were banned.

In this manner, the government gradually lost its control over the military.

And what was the situation with the Imperial Diet?

The Imperial Diet, which, as the legislative assembly, also should have exercised control over the military, gradually lost its function in that regard. The most prominent example was the expulsion of Representative SAITO Takao in 1940. Representative Saito criticized the war's descent into a quagmire and harshly questioned the government about what on earth the war's objectives were.

The Army reacted fiercely, claiming the speech insulted the military, and demanded Saito's resignation. Many members of the House joined in this demand, and Saito was expelled by an overwhelming majority of 296 votes in favor of the expulsion and 7 against. Even today, close to two-thirds of the record at that time -- 61 percent -- remain deleted.

Naturally, budget deliberations are crucial as a vital parliamentary check on the military. It would be extremely difficult to say that the Imperial Diet at that time was effectively fulfilling its oversight function over the military budget. From 1942, the second year of the war, to 1945, the year the war ended, nearly all military expenditures were recorded in the Special Account for Extraordinary Military Budgets. During the deliberations on the special account, the breakdown of expenditures was not shown in the budget documents. Both the House of Representatives and the House of Peers usually conducted their deliberations in secret sittings, with extremely limited time allocated. These proceedings scarcely deserved the name of deliberation.

This situation emerged against a background of political terrorism. During the late Taisho and early Showa era, spanning 15 years, numerous statesmen, including three sitting prime ministers, were assassinated by ultranationalists and young military officers. These incidents, including the May 15 Incident and the February 26 Incident, significantly inhibited the environment where civilians, including Imperial Diet members and government officials, could freely and unreservedly discuss military policy and the military budget and take action thereafter.

I will comment on problems with the media next. In the 1920s, the media was critical of Japan's overseas expansion. For example, ISHIBASHI Tanzan, a rising-star journalist at the time, famously argued that Japan should abandon its colonies. However, nationalism spread after the Great Depression, fostering a climate receptive to totalitarianism in intellectual circles as well.

Around the time of the Manchurian Incident, the media shifted to actively supporting the war. This was because war reporting "sold well." Newspapers significantly increased their circulation, with their publication volume increasing severalfold. Many citizens were captivated by war reporting, further heightening nationalism.

Subsequently, starting around autumn 1937, tightened speech controls silenced criticism of government policies, with voices actively supporting the war becoming dominant.

In addition, there were problems in the systems for information gathering and analysis. This too is a well-known story, but what did the HIRANUMA Kiichirō Cabinet say in 1939 in reaction to the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact? The entire cabinet resigned, stating that "a complex and bizarre new situation has arisen in the European landscape." I consider this one of the most unambiguous examples of failing to correctly grasp the international situation.

With this history in mind, what should we alive in the present day learn from it?

First, under our current constitution -- under the Constitution of Japan -- civilian control has been institutionally established, and the Self-Defense Forces are placed under the command of the Prime Minister. The unity of the Cabinet is also ensured under the Prime Minister. The National Security Council was established to strengthen the overall coordination of foreign affairs and security policies. Systems for information gathering and analysis have also been improved.

That said, although systems are in place, unless they are properly implemented, they serve no purpose.

The political side must possess sufficient capability and insight to effectively utilize the Self-Defense Forces, an armed organization. Politicians must refuse to yield to irresponsible populism. I believe the Self-Defense Forces must actively explain and offer opinions in their capacity as experts on issues relating to the international situation surrounding our nation as well as issues concerning equipment and the operation of units.

Politics bears the responsibility to transcend organizational divisions and achieve integration. We must learn from history: our entire nation was led into war while being unable to unify its will as a state.

Politics must always consider the interests and welfare of the entire populace, striving for rational judgments grounded in a long-term perspective. As we saw in the process leading up to the outbreak of war, when responsibility is unclear and situations become deadlocked, bold voices and reckless solutions tend to gain traction, even if the chances of success are low and the risks are high. We must never repeat the history of misguiding the nation's course by prioritizing emotional and sentimental judgments while disregarding rational ones.

Second, parliament and the media serve as checks to prevent the government from making erroneous decisions.

The Diet is required to fulfill its role of appropriately scrutinizing government activities by exercising the powers granted to it by the Constitution. Politics must never succumb to partisan interests or self-preservation that would harm the national interest. It must not be driven by self-preservation.

In our relationship with the media, healthy discourse, including mission-driven journalism is necessary. We must not fall into excessive commercialism, or tolerate narrow-minded nationalism, discrimination, or xenophobia.

We absolutely cannot tolerate the suppression of politics through violence, nor discriminatory rhetoric that threatens free speech.

An attitude of learning from history is essential as the foundation for all of these. I believe what matters most are the courage and integrity to squarely face the past, classical liberalism that values the tolerance of listening humbly to the arguments of others, and a healthy and robust democracy.

Democracy is by no means a perfect form of government, as it has a tendency to be extremely fragile in the face of armed organizations. It is not impossible for civilian politicians to make misjudgments and plunge headlong into war. Precisely for that reason, and indeed now, as the number of people who remember the war dwindles each year, I believe that the foundation of our nation as a peace-loving nation will be further strengthened by having every citizen proactively reflect on the previous war and the nature of peace, and apply these lessons to the future.

There is a quotation of former Prime Minister TANAKA Kakuei that I cite from time to time. He said, "As long as those who went to that war make up the heart of this nation, Japan will do just fine. What worries me is when those people are no longer around. That's why I want young people to study the war properly." In my view, these words are invaluable for present-day Japan.

As I also stated in my General Debate speech at the United Nations General Assembly, without squarely confronting history, a bright future cannot be forged. I am firmly convinced of that. Underscoring that resolute belief of mine once again, I will end my opening statement here.