[Title] ( Reflection by Prime Minister ) On the 80th anniversary of the end of the war

Reflection by Prime Minister

On the 80th anniversary of the end of the war

(Introduction)

80 years have passed since the end of the war.

Throughout eight decades, Japan has consistently walked the path of a peace-loving nation and made all possible efforts for peace and prosperity of the world. The peace and prosperity that Japan enjoys today was built atop the precious lives and the history of suffering of the people, particularly the war dead.

I paid visits to Iwo-To in March and the Japanese Memorial Garden in Caliraya in the Philippines in April. In June, I attended Memorial Ceremony to Commemorate the Fallen in Okinawa and Himeyuri Peace Museum. In August, I participated in the Peace Memorial Ceremonies held in Hiroshima City and Nagasaki City to console the spirits of the atomic bomb victims, and the National Memorial Ceremony for the War Dead on the anniversary of the end of the war. Through these experiences, I renewed my vow to engrave in my heart, remorse and lessons learned from the war.

To date, Statements by the Prime Minister have been issued on the 50th, 60th and 70th anniversary of the end of the war, and I uphold the positions articulated by the previous cabinets on history.

The past three Statements do not specifically address in depth why we could not have avoided the war. The 70th anniversary Statement said "(Japan) attempted to overcome its diplomatic and economic deadlock through the use of force. Its domestic political system could not serve as a brake to stop such attempts." No further details were provided in the Statement.

The unanswered question is: why our domestic political system could not serve as a brake to stop such attempts.

In a time where the world was engaging in total war, following World War I, Japan's defeat was inevitable, according to the predictions by entities such as the Total War Research Institute installed by the Cabinet before the war or so-called Akimaru Agency installed by the Army Ministry. Many experts also felt that the war would be difficult to wage.

Why did the leadership of the government and the military plunge headlong into a reckless war that resulted in the loss of so many innocent lives, both at home and abroad, and why were not they able to make decisions to avoid the war while recognizing such difficulty? Why could not they review the general direction while YONAI Mitsumasa, former Prime Minister, made a caution "not to fall into dire straits while trying to avoid steadily deteriorating"?

I would like to consider this question with all the people of Japan on the occasion of 80th anniversary of the end of the war.

(Problems with the Constitution of the Empire of Japan)

First, there were systemic issues at the time. Pre-war Japan lacked a mechanism to properly integrate politics and military.

Under the Constitution of the Empire of Japan, the supreme command of the Army and Navy, known as the authority to command the armed forces, was considered independent. Under the system, there was no "Civilian Control" principle that civilian authority, meaning civilians, must be superior in the relation between politics and military.

The Authority of Prime Minister was also limited. Under the Constitution of the Empire of Japan, all ministers of state, including Prime Minister, were considered equal. While the Prime Minister was designated as the head of the cabinet, the system did not grant him the command authority necessary to lead the cabinet.

Even so, the Genrō (elder statesmen) were playing a role to integrate diplomacy, military and economy until the Japan-Russo War. The Genrō with military experience as samurai were capable of controlling the military based on their full understanding of it. To borrow the words of MARUYAMA Masao, "the mediation of super- constitutional entities such as the Genrō and senior statesmen" played a crucial role in unifying the national will.

As the Genrō gradually passed away and these informal mechanisms declined, political parties under Taisho Democracy attempted to integrate politics and military.

Amidst the great upheavals brought by World War I, Japan became one of the main proponents of international cooperation and secured a permanent seat on the Council of the League of Nations. Government policies in the 1920s, as exemplified by SHIDEHARA's diplomacy, restrained imperialist expansion.

During the 1920s, public opinion was critical of the military, and political parties advocated for large-scale disarmament. Military officers felt marginalized, and this resentment is considered to be one factor behind the rise of the military during the Showa era.

Traditionally, the supreme command of the Army and Navy was limited to the Imperial military command concerning operation. Matters of military administration, such as budget and organizational structure, were interpreted and implemented as matters subject to the advice of the Minister of State, a member of the Cabinet. The absence of civilian control, an institutional defect, was effectively covered, by the Genrō and later by the political parties, through the practice of the institution.

(Problems of the Government)

However, the meaning of the supreme command of the Army and Navy gradually underwent an expansive interpretation, and the military began to use the independence of the supreme command as a means to exclude government and parliamentary involvement and to ensure control over overall military policy and budget.

During the era of party-led cabinets, political parties engaged in a battle to expose scandals in order to gain power, causing them to lose the trust of the people. In 1930, the opposition Rikken Seiyukai (Friends of Constitutional Government Party), seeking to destabilize the Rikken Minseikai (Constitutional Democratic Party) cabinet, allied with elements within the Navy. They fiercely attacked the government over the ratification of the London Naval Treaty, arguing that the ratification interferes the command authority. The government barely managed to ratify the London Naval Treaty.

However, in 1935, the Rikken Seiyukai Party criticized the theory of the Emperor as an organ of the state, proposed by a constitutional scholar and House of Peers member MINOBE Tatsukichi, by using it as ammunition to attack the government, which escalated into a political issue that also involved the military. OKADA Keisuke's Cabinet at the time attempted to distance itself politically from the issue, stating that academic debates "must be left to the scholars." Ultimately, however, the cabinet yielded to the military's demands and issued the Declaration on the Clarification of the National Polity twice, repudiating the previously accepted theory of the Emperor as an organ of the state. Minobe's writings were banned.

In this manner, the government gradually lost its control over the military.

(Problems of the Imperial Diet)

The Imperial Diet, which also should have exercised control over the military, gradually lost its function.

The most prominent example was the expulsion of Representative SAITO Takao. During the plenary session of the House of Representatives on February 2, 1940, Representative Saito criticized the war's descent into a quagmire and harshly questioned the government about its objectives. This was the so-called anti-military speech. The Army reacted fiercely, claiming the speech insulted the military, and demanded Saito's resignation. Many members of the House joined in this demand, and Saito was expelled by an overwhelming majority of 296 votes in favor and 7 against. This was a rare instance of a member attempting to fulfill his role in the Imperial Diet, yet even today, two-thirds of the record at that time remain deleted.

Even in the budget deliberations, which is crucial as a vital parliamentary check on the military, it was almost totally not the case that the Imperial Diet at that time was effectively fulfilling its oversight function over the military. After 1937, a Special Account for Extraordinary Military Budgets was established. From 1942 to 1945, nearly all military expenditures were recorded in the special account. During the deliberations on the special account, the breakdown of expenditures was not shown in the budget documents. Both the House of Representatives and the House of Peers usually conducted their deliberations in secret sittings, with extremely limited time allocated. These proceedings scarcely deserved the name of deliberation.

Even as the war situation deteriorated and the public finance became strained, the Army and Navy fiercely contested over securing budget, staking their organizational interests and pride.

Furthermore, we must not forget that during the late Taisho and early Showa era, spanning 15 years, numerous statesmen, including three sitting prime ministers, were assassinated by ultranationalists and young military officers. Those assassinated were all statesmen who emphasized international cooperation and sought to control the military through politics.

Needless to say, these incidents, including the May 15 Incident and the February 26 Incident, significantly hindered the environment where civilians, including Imperial Diet members and government officials, could freely discuss military policy and the military budget and take action thereafter.

(Problems of the Media)

Another issue that must not be underestimated is the role of the media.

In the 1920s, the media was critical of Japan's overseas expansion, and ISHIBASHI Tanzan, when he was still a journalist, argued that Japan should abandon its colonies. However, around the time of the Manchurian Incident, the media's stance shifted to actively supporting the war. This was because war reporting "sold well," and newspapers significantly increased their circulation.

The 1929 Great Depression in the United States severely damaged Western economies. As these nations adopted high tariff policies to protect their domestic economies, Japanese exports suffered a major blow.

Nationalism surged against the backdrop of severe depression. In Germany, the Nazis rose to power; in Italy, the Fascist Party gained prominence. Observing that only the Soviet Union among major nations was developing economically, arguments spread in intellectual circles that the era of liberalism, democracy and capitalism had ended, and that the era of the United States and Britain was over. This fostered a climate receptive to totalitarianism and national socialism.

Amidst this climate, elements of the Kwantung Army instigated the Manchurian Incident, seizing territory several times larger than Japan's mainland in just about a year and a half. Newspapers reported this extensively, captivating many citizens and further heightening nationalism.

Regarding Japanese diplomacy, there were some sharp criticisms – YOSHINO Sakuzō criticized the military's actions in the Manchurian Incident, while KIYOSAWA Kiyoshi harshly condemned MATSUOKA Yōsuke's withdrawal from the League of Nations. Subsequently, starting around autumn 1937, tightened speech controls silenced criticism of government policies, ensuring only voices actively supporting the war reached the public.

(Problems in Information Gathering and Analysis)

It is also necessary to reexamine whether Japan, including the government, accurately understood the international situation at the time. For example, Japan, which was still negotiating a military alliance with Germany targeting the Soviet Union, faced the new reality of conclusion of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact in August 1939. The HIRANUMA Kiichirō Cabinet resigned, stating that "a complex and bizarre new situation has arisen in the European landscape." Questions remain: Did Japan gather sufficient information on the international and military situation? Did it correctly analyze the information obtained? And was that information appropriately shared?

(Lessons for Today)

In postwar Japan, civilian control has been institutionally established. The Constitution of Japan stipulates that the Prime Minister and other Ministers of State must be civilians. Furthermore, under the Self-Defense Forces Act, the Self-Defense Forces are placed under the command of the Prime Minister.

The Constitution explicitly states that the Prime Minister is the head of the Cabinet and that the Cabinet bears collective responsibility to the Diet, thereby institutionally ensuring the unity of the Cabinet.

Furthermore, the National Security Council was established to strengthen the overall coordination of foreign affairs and security policies. The government's systems for information gathering and analysis have also been improved. These will be required to be further advanced in line with the times.

In light of the bitter experiences of the past, where the military acted at its own will under the guise of the independence of supreme command due to the absence of mechanisms for properly integrating politics and military affairs, institutional safeguards were put in place. On the other hand, these are merely systems; unless they are properly implemented, they serve no purpose.

The political side must possess sufficient capability and insight to effectively utilize the Self-Defense Forces. It requires constant effort to correctly understand and appropriately implement the current system of civilian control. Politicians must maintain their pride and a sense of responsibility, refusing to yield to irresponsible populism or be swayed by the prevailing tide.

The Self-Defense Forces must actively explain and offer opinions to the political side in their capacity as experts on issues relating to the international military situation surrounding our nation as well as issues concerning equipment and the operation of units.

Politics bears the responsibility to transcend organizational divisions and achieve integration. Organizations should never be fragmented and antagonistic with each other, then losing sight of Japan's national interests. We must learn from history: when the Army and Navy clashed by prioritizing their respective organizational logics, and even within each branch, military command and administration failed to coordinate, our entire nation was led into war while being unable to unify its will as a state.

Politics must always consider the interests and welfare of the entire populace, striving for rational judgments grounded in a long-term perspective. When responsibility is unclear and situations become deadlocked, bold voices and reckless solutions tend to gain traction, even if the chances of success are low and the risks are high. Marshal Admiral NAGANO Osami, Chief of the Navy General Staff, is said to have likened the decision to go to war to surgery, arguing that "there is considerable cause for concern, but to cure this grave illness, we have no choice but to resolve with great determination to overcome this national crisis," and "The government judged that not fighting would lead to the nation's demise, but fighting might also lead to the nation's demise. However, if the nation perishes without fighting, it is a true national collapse where even the soul is lost." Minister of the Army TOJO Hideki was also said to have pressed Prime Minister KONOE Fumimaro, stating "sometimes a man must close his eyes and leap from the stage at Kiyomizu Temple." We must not repeat the history of misguiding the nation's course by prioritizing emotional and sentimental judgments over calm and rational ones.

Parliament and the media serve as checks to prevent the government from making erroneous decisions.

The Diet is required to fulfill its role of appropriately scrutinizing government activities by exercising the powers granted to it by the Constitution. Politics must never succumb to partisan interests and self-preservation, pandering to fleeting public opinion and pursuing popularity-seeking policies that would harm the national interest.

Healthy discourse, including mission-driven journalism is necessary. During the war, the media stirred up public opinion, ultimately leading the nation into a reckless war. We must not fall into excessive commercialism, or tolerate narrow-minded nationalism, discrimination, or xenophobia.

We absolutely cannot tolerate the suppression of politics through violence, including the incident in which former Prime Minister Abe lost his precious life, nor discriminatory rhetoric that threatens free speech.

All of these are founded on an attitude of learning from history. What matters most are the courage and integrity to squarely face the past, classical liberalism that values the tolerance of listening humbly to the arguments of others, and a healthy and robust democracy.

As Winston Churchill rightly observed, democracy is by no means a perfect form of government. It demands cost and time, and it sometimes makes mistakes.

That is precisely why we must always remain humble before history and deeply engrave its lessons in our hearts.

Retaining armed organization is of paramount importance for self-defense and deterrence. I cannot take a position that rejects deterrence theory. The theory is a reality behind implementing responsible security policy under the current security environment.

At the same time, If the armed organization possessing unparalleled strength in a country were to run amok beyond democratic control, democracy is fragile and could collapse instantly. Conversely, it is not impossible for civilian politicians to make misjudgments and plunge headlong into war. The necessity and importance of civilian control and the appropriate relation between politics and military cannot be overstated. The government, parliament, armed organization, and the media must all constantly recognize this.

In his anti-military speech, Representative SAITO Takao argued that world history is the history of war, and that war is not about justice prevailing but about the strong conquering the weak. He asserted the importance of policies based on realism by saying that we must not ignore this and, hiding behind the noble name of holy war, jeopardize the nation's long-term plans for the next hundred years. For this, he was expelled from the House of Representatives.

In the following year, during the House of Representatives Air Defense Law Committee, the Army Ministry stated that civilian evacuation during air raids would signify a collapse of the will to continue the war, and rejected the notion.

While both events belong to a distant past, they powerfully convey the dangers of abandonment of parliamentary duty, rampant spiritualism, and the horrors of disregarding human lives and rights. Without squarely confronting history, a bright future cannot be forged. The importance of learning from history must be reaffirmed now, precisely as our nation faces its most severe and complex security environment since the end of the war.

Now, as the number of people who remember the war dwindles each year and the fading of memory is feared, I believe that the foundation of our nation as a peace-loving nation will be further strengthened by having every citizen, including the younger generation, proactively reflect on the previous war and the nature of peace, and apply these lessons to the future.

Drawing on the various lessons of the last war, together with the people of Japan, I will make every possible effort to ensure that such calamities are never repeated.

October 10, 2025
Prime Minister
ISHIBA Shigeru