"The World and Japan" Database (Project Leader: TANAKA Akihiko)
Database of Japanese Politics and International Relations
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS); Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia (IASA), The University of Tokyo

[Title] The Taft - Katsura Agreement

[Date] July 29, 1905
[Source] Nihon gaiko nenpyo Narabi Shuyou bunsyo Jyo, Gaimusyo, pp.239-240.
[Notes] According to Nihon gaiko nenpyo Narabi Shuyou bunsyo Jyo, the related documents on this agreement in Japan were lost by fire.
[Full text]

... COUNT KATSURA and Secretary Taft had a long and confidential conversation on the morning of July 27....

First, in speaking of some pro-Russians in America who would have the public believe that the victory of Japan would be a certain prelude to her aggression in the direction of the Philippine Islands, Secretary Taft observed that Japan’s only interest in the Philippines would be, in his opinion, to have these islands governed by a strong and friendly nation like the United States,…Count Katsura confirmed in the strongest terms the correctness of his views on the point and positively stated that Japan does not harbor any aggressive designs whatever on the Philippines....

Second, Count Katsura observed that the maintenance of general peace in the extreme East forms the fundamental principle of Japan’s international policy. Such being the case,… the best, and in fact the only, means for accomplishing the above object would be to form good understanding between the three governments of Japan, the United States and Great Britain....

Third, in regard to the Korean question Count Katsura observed that Korea being the direct cause of our war with Russia, it is a matter of absolute importance to Japan that a complete solution of the peninsula question should be made as the logical consequence of the war. If left to herself after the war, Korea will certainly draw back to her habit of improvidently entering into any agreements or treaties with other powers, thus resuscitating the same international complications as existed before the war. In view of the foregoing circumstances, Japan feels absolutely constrained to take some definite step with a view to precluding the possibility of Korea falling back into her former condition and of placing us again under the necessity of entering upon another foreign war. Secretary Taft fully admitted the justness of the Count’s observations and remarked to the effect that, in his personal opinion, the establishment by Japanese troops of a suzerainty over Korea to the extent of requiring that Korea enter into no foreign treaties without the consent of Japan was the logical result of the present war and would directly contribute to permanent peace in the East. His judgment was that President Roosevelt would concur in his views in this regard, although he had no authority to give assurance of this....

Miscellaneous Letters of the Department of State, July, Part III, 1905.