[Title] Declaration on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament for 2013 (G8 Lough Erne Summit)
1. We recall our commitment to seeking a safer world for all. Preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery is a top priority. Such proliferation represents a major threat to international peace and security. The international community underlined its concerns in UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 1540, 1673, 1810, 1887, and 1977. We are determined to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime, including by promoting the implementation and universalisation of all relevant multilateral treaties and agreements that help to prevent and combat proliferation. We reaffirm our unconditional support for all three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It remains the cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
2. We note that all NPT State Parties have a responsibility to preserve and strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and are committed to take appropriate steps to implement the NPT's provisions. We look forward to the imminent 2013 Preparatory Committee. We remain committed to the Action Plan, agreed to by consensus, of the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference and call upon all States Parties to implement it. In this regard, we call attention to the meetings of P5 States that took place in London, Paris and Washington DC and one which will take place in Geneva in 2013.
3. The G8 partners concerned also reaffirm their commitment to consult and cooperate to bring about the entry into force of the relevant legally binding protocols of nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. These are important measures which help to build confidence between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states, and enhance regional and international security. In this context we hope that the signature of the protocol to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon- Free Zone will take place as soon as possible. We also welcome the commitment of the P5 States to consult with the States Parties to the Treaty on a Nuclear Weapon-Free-Zone in Central Asia.
4. Recalling the decision at the 2010 NPT Review Conference to hold a Conference on the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons, as well as other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, we regret that it was not convened in 2012. We strongly support Ambassador Jaakko Laajava's work as facilitator of the Conference, and welcome the continued commitment of the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution (the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States). We call upon all States concerned to make all efforts necessary for the preparation and convening of the Conference in the nearest future.
5. While acknowledging the right of withdrawal from the NPT contained in Article X, we consider that modalities and measures to address a withdrawal from that Treaty are needed. We consider that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) should immediately address any State's notification of withdrawal from the NPT. A State Party remains responsible under international law for violations of the NPT committed prior to its withdrawal. This important issue should remain on the agenda of the NPT review cycle for further discussion, including of arrangements for continued safeguarding or disposal of equipment and materials acquired or developed under safeguards during NPT membership.
Proliferation challenges
6. We reiterate our strong concern at current severe proliferation challenges and our commitment to working to resolve them through diplomatic means. Addressing compliance with the NPT is an essential part of efforts to achieve full implementation of the Treaty, including its universality. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and in particular its safeguards system, remains an essential institution for the effective implementation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The IAEA must continue to have the necessary resources and legal authorities to be able to carry out its mission in full, and, in accordance with its statutory mandate, to report cases of non-compliance to the UNSC.
7. We note with serious concern the report of the Director General of the IAEA (GOV/2013/6) of 21 February 2013 that Iran continues to undertake activities in violation of multiple UNSCRs, including having installed 180 advanced centrifuges at the Natanz enrichment site by mid-February, continued installation of additional centrifuges at the Fordow site, and increased production of Uranium enriched to both 3.5% and 20%.
8. We also note with deep concern the Director General's repeated conclusion that, as Iran is not providing the necessary cooperation, the Agency is still unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore cannot conclude that all nuclear activity in Iran is exclusively peaceful.
9. We welcome the useful recent meetings between Iran and the E3+3 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union High Representative). We call on Iran to take concrete steps to address international concerns without delay. We reaffirm that our overall objective is a comprehensive, negotiated solution to the nuclear issue leading to Iran's full compliance with UNSCRs, based on the principles of a stepby- step approach and reciprocity.
10. We once again urge Iran to comply fully and without delay with all of its obligations under the relevant UNSCRs and to meet the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors, including by immediately taking substantive steps toward resolving outstanding issues related to possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear program. We call on Iran, as a first step, without further delay to provide the IAEA with access to all relevant information, documentation, sites, material and personnel in Iran that the Agency has requested. We further call on Iran to suspend work on all heavy water related projects immediately, including the construction of the heavy water research reactor at Arak.
11. We call on Iran to engage urgently, actively and constructively in the diplomatic process with the E3+3, and to cooperate with the IAEA to resolve the serious concerns of the international community and to demonstrate that its nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful. We reaffirm our view that, once international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme is reestablished, in line with the NPT and relevant UNSCRs, all nuclear proliferationrelated sanctions should be lifted.
12. We condemn in the strongest possible terms the DPRK's continued development of its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programmes and uranium enrichment activities in serious violation of UNSCRs 1718, 1874, 2087 and 2094. These programmes and activities constitute a clear threat to international peace and security.
13. We believe that the DPRK's nuclear test on 12 February 2013 – its third since 2006 – and its launches using ballistic missile technology on 13 April 2012 and 12 December 2012 have further and seriously undermined regional stability and jeopardised the prospects for lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula. We welcome UNSCR 2094, which was adopted on 7 March, in response to the DPRK's nuclear test. The unanimous adoption of this resolution underscores that the international community is united in its condemnation of the DPRK's provocative actions and its continued defiance of its international obligations. We offer the Security Council our full support for its efforts.
14. We remain committed to the goal of verifiable denuclearisation on the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner. We urge the DPRK to take concrete and constructive steps to comply with its commitments under the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks; to abide by its obligations under all relevant UNSCRs, return to the NPT and its IAEA safeguards agreement; to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner; and to refrain from any further provocative acts.
Nuclear Disarmament
15. We reiterate our commitment to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the goals of the NPT, in a way that promotes international stability, based on the principle of equal and undiminished security for all, and underlining the vital importance of non-proliferation for achieving this goal.
16. In that context, we welcome the progress made by the United States and the Russian Federation in implementing the New START Treaty. We also recall and welcome the disarmament-related efforts already made by France and the UK. Efforts by nuclear weapon states in nuclear arms reductions, confidencebuilding and transparency, including increased transparency measures, represent major steps in line with the Article VI of the NPT and the Action Plan adopted by the NPT Review Conference in May 2010.
17. The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) would lead to a complete and legally binding prohibition on nuclear weapon test explosions or other nuclear explosions. It would strengthen the international nonproliferation regime, contributing significantly to our shared goal of a world without nuclear weapons. We welcome recent ratifications of the Treaty, including that of Brunei Darussalam and Chad in 2013, and urge all states that have not done so, and in particular those whose ratification is required for the Treaty to enter into force, to sign and ratify the Treaty as soon as possible. We welcome the voluntary adherence to unilateral moratoria on nuclear testing, though note that these do not have the same legally binding effect as the entry into force of the Treaty. We reaffirm and reiterate our commitment to the Treaty's obligations and call on all states to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty. We reiterate our full support for the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation in its efforts to build up all elements of the verification regime, particularly its International Monitoring System (IMS) and on-site inspections.
18. We again record our profound regret and note the growing frustration in the international community over the persistent failure of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to adopt its programme of work and to start its substantive work on the key issues on the agenda. We support, and note the international recognition of, the CD as the single multilateral disarmament forum. We stress inter alia the importance of beginning without further delay negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices building on the mandate of document CD/1864. We express our support for the moratorium on the production of such materials announced by the G8 nuclear-weapons States, and we call on the other States concerned to follow suit.
Peaceful use of nuclear energy
19. Reaffirming the inalienable right of all States Parties to the NPT to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in compliance with their international obligations, we reiterate our willingness to cooperate with States that meet their nuclear nonproliferation obligations and wish to develop a civil nuclear programme, in order to help them fulfil the essential requirements needed to ensure fair and responsible access to the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These requirements include safety, security, non-proliferation, and respect for the environment.
20. The development and application of innovative technology in relevant frameworks has a growing role to play in supplying global demand for energy and also in building up robust and transparent nuclear energy infrastructure resistant to nuclear accidents. We underscore the responsibility of governments for timely and sufficient measures on accident prevention and management to minimize the consequences of accidents, should they occur. The efficiency and substance of notifications in case of nuclear accidents should be further improved as well.
21. We acknowledge the useful contribution that multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle provide in the field of nuclear energy. We encourage the International Atomic Energy Agency to continue to address this issue. We support the IAEA's work to establish a bank of Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) for the IAEA member states. In this regard, we welcome the creation in accordance with the Russia-IAEA agreement of the LEU reserve in Angarsk, Russia; support the IAEA's decision to establish a bank of LEU for the IAEA member states and welcome Kazakhstan's readiness to provide a site; further welcome the establishment of the American Assured Fuel Supply, comprised of downblended uranium from weapons programs. We support the adoption of a Model Agreement between supplier and recipient States for the Nuclear Fuel Assurance initiative, while respecting the normal functioning of the existing market rules.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
22. We support the central role of the IAEA in upholding and strengthening the international non-proliferation regime. We express our willingness to promote the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement together with the Additional Protocol as the universally accepted international verification standard, which should be a consideration in decisions on the supply of nuclear fuel, equipment, or technology. We welcome ratification of the Additional Protocol by Iraq, Moldova, Namibia, Togo and Vietnam in 2012, as well as Burma's announced decision to sign the Additional Protocol, and call on all States which have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Additional Protocol and apply its provisions as soon as possible.
23. We also call on all States to implement the IAEA's current recommendations on physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5.). We urge all states–parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to ratify, accept or approve the Amendment to the Convention as soon as possible. In addition to securing nuclear and radiological material at their source, we recognise the need to locate and secure material currently available on the illicit market and arrest those attempting to buy, or sell, these materials. We look forward to the IAEA's International Conference on Nuclear Security: Enhancing Global Efforts on 1-5 July 2013, and to the Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague on 24 – 25 March 2014.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group
24. We welcome the call by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) on all states to exercise vigilance and make best efforts to ensure that none of their exports of goods and technologies contribute to nuclear weapons programmes. We also welcome the good progress that is being made by the technical review to ensure that control lists are current, and the outreach efforts undertaken by the Group with a view to enhancing non-proliferation efforts. We welcome the membership of Mexico in 2012 and also Serbia's expected membership in 2013.
Chemical weapons
25. We reaffirm our unconditional support for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the functions of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). We applaud the success of the Convention so far, and look forward to a successful outcome to the 2013 Review Conference. We support efforts to ensure the universalisation of the Convention. Destruction of chemical weapons remains a key objective of the Convention together with refraining from the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, use and proliferation of chemical weapons. We call upon the OPCW to increase its focus too on preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons. We welcome the progress being made by the possessor states as reported recently to the OPCW Conference of States Parties. We encourage them to continue to take every necessary measure to complete their destruction processes in a transparent fashion, and within the framework of the existing verification regime. We reiterate the need for an effective industry verification regime.
26. We share deep concerns over the threat of chemical weapon use in Syria. We call upon all in Syria to refrain from the use of these weapons, and to ensure that they are kept secure at all times. Any use of chemical weapons in Syria, by any party, would be absolutely unacceptable.
27. We call upon Syria to renounce chemical weapons and adhere to the Chemical Weapons Convention and Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.
Biological weapons
28. We welcome the work undertaken so far to implement the outcome of the Seventh Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). We are committed to achieving real progress to promote national implementation and cooperation and assistance, to reviewing developments in science and technology and confidence-building measures and to strengthening the Convention's Article VII on responding to use or threats or use of biological or toxin weapons. In that context, we support further exploration or consideration of the idea of a peer review mechanism to promote exchange of best practice and build trust between states parties. We reaffirm our commitment to promote universal membership of the BTWC and we are determined to work with all the State Parties to reinforce its regime. We welcome the recent ratifications of Cameroon, The Marshall Islands, Nauru, Guyana and Malawi.
Addressing the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction of all types
29. We fully support the key role played by the United Nations Security Council in addressing proliferation issues. We welcome the adoption by the Security Council of Resolution 1977, which renewed the mandate of the 1540 Committee for ten years and reaffirmed Resolution 1540's obligations which, among other things, aim to prevent non-State actors from acquiring WMDs, their means of delivery and related materials and requires all member States to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related materials. We invite all States to nominate a national point of contact and to work toward full implementation of UNSCR 1540. We stand ready to provide assistance to States in this regard and we reiterate our support to the 1540 Committee in the discharge of its mandate.
30. We commend theGlobal Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction as it takes forward work on the mandate agreed at the Muskoka and Deauville Summits, including in the priority areas of nuclear and radiological security, biological and chemical security, scientist engagement, and the implementation of UNSCR 1540, while also remaining committed to completing priority projects in Russia. Building on the commitments made at the 2010 and 2012 Nuclear Security Summits, the Global Partnership continues to assist nations with nuclear and radiological security, including through centres of excellence, promoting international cooperation and a strong nuclear security culture, and advancing information and transportation security. The Global Partnership continues to pursue the expansion of their membership, as agreed by Leaders in 2011, and congratulates Mexico on their new membership. The Global Partnership welcomes the ongoing participation of relevant international organizations in the global efforts to improve coordination of WMD counterproliferation initiatives.
31. We are concerned by the continued proliferation of means of delivery capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This creates a threat to international peace and security, as recognized by UNSCRs 1540, 1887, and 1977. We are committed to making the international community further aware of this threat. States should pay particular attention to proliferation risks when considering cooperation in the field of missile technology, knowhow, and systems.
32. We are concerned in particular by the ongoing programmes on missiles capable of delivering WMD the Middle East, North-East Asia and South Asia including Iran and the DPRK. In this regard, we fully support the efforts of multilateral arrangements, particularly the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), to mitigate risks and challenges of proliferation of WMD means of delivery. We welcome the good progress that is being made by technical experts to ensure that the MTCR control lists are up to date, and we welcome the Regimes' outreach efforts.
33. We support the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC). We welcome the efforts made with regard to the universalisation of the HCOC, and express our willingness to make the Code more effective and to promote transparency on ballistic missiles.
34. We remain determined to promote robust counter-proliferation tools. We welcome the endorsement of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) by Dominica, Dominican Republic, St. Lucia and Thailand in 2012, bringing PSI endorsers to 102, and we look forward to marking its tenth anniversary this year. We will promote the further broadening of participation in the PSI and continuing its focus on legal and operational issues.
35. Furthermore, we will encourage States to identify as a specific offence in their national law the proliferation of WMD, their means of delivery and related materials. We will continue to strengthen our own export control policies to prevent the export of WMD-related goods and technology, including dual use goods and technology, when not in accordance with export control arrangements. We urge all States to take appropriate national measures in accordance with their national authorities and legislation and consistent with international law to prevent the financing of proliferation of WMD, their means of delivery and related materials, and to develop capabilities to impede and stop illicit shipments of WMD-related cargoes. We also urge all States to strengthen export controls, to secure WMD-related materials, and to control access to intangible transfers of WMD-related technology and information. We welcome the adoption by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in 2012 of new standards on countering the financing of proliferation, and will give our full support to their effective implementation.
Conventional arms
36. Conventional arms play a legitimate role in enabling governments to defend their citizens, as enshrined in the UN Charter. However, in the wrong hands they pose a threat to global, regional and national security. Improperly controlled, they can fuel terrorism and threaten peace and stability. For this reason, we reaffirm our support for the global efforts to tackle the illicit trade in conventional arms, including through the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons.
37. We welcome the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty by the United Nations General Assembly on 2 April. Efficient implementation of the Treaty will contribute to saving lives, reducing human suffering, protecting human rights, preventing the diversion of weapons to the illegal market and combating terrorism, while upholding the legitimate trade in arms, vital for national defence and security.
38. We are also committed to taking practical measures where they are most needed. Ten years after the Evian declaration, we reaffirm our commitment to helping states secure and destroy stocks of Man Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADs) and welcome the work that has been done to counter the proliferation of MANPADS. We also welcome the work of the Wassenaar Arrangement in ensuring that its 41 Participating States apply the highest standards to control these and other conventional arms that pose a particular threat in the wrong hands. We pledge our full support for regional efforts to reduce destabilizing accumulations of those conventional arms, particularly in North West Africa and other areas where the harmful effects of poorly regulated and illicit trade have recently been in evidence.
Outer space
39. Outer space activities play a significant role in the social, economic, scientific, and technological development of states, as well as in maintaining international peace and security. We reiterate our commitment to conduct activities in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes in accordance with international law. We recognise the need to prevent an arms race in outer space, and the need instead to take collaborative, practical and pragmatic steps designed to enhance the long-term safety, security, sustainability and stability of the space environment.
40. We support the efforts undertaken within the UN Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space to mitigate orbital debris. We reiterate our support for the work of the Group of Governmental Experts in developing concrete proposals on transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space. We also support the ongoing efforts to develop a strong, non-legally-binding International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities.